We acknowledge that Pardons Board deliberations are confidential, but what does “the best interests of the nation” mean in this case? What principle was applied?

Malaysians may not be entitled to know what was said behind closed doors, but surely they are entitled to understand the principles governing decisions that affect public confidence.

It's about all Malaysians

At what point does something extraordinary become ordinary simply because we keep seeing it?

Think of a recalcitrant child asking mum for a sweet. Mum says no. The child asks again. And again. The crying then starts. The pestering continues. The tantrum heightens.

Eventually, mum is exhausted. “Fine. Take the sweet.”

This may not have happened in Najib's case, but what happens to a democracy when the public is repeatedly asked to revisit the same question until people become too tired to care?

The rakyat may not agree and may simply shrug: “Enough. Just get on with it.”

And that is the danger.

Muda vice-president Zarul Afiq warned that moving Najib from prison to a bungalow could deepen political apathy, particularly among young people.

His concern is that if people believe justice differs according to who holds power, they may start asking: what is the point of democracy?

Should we risk endangering our fragile democracy because of one man?

I think we should ask an even wider question: What happens when people become too tired even to ask?

Because this isn't just about young Malaysians. It is about all Malaysians.

How many times can the same controversy be brought back before people simply switch off? There is a difference between agreement and exhaustion.

Uncomfortable position

Meanwhile, Umno-Baru continues to support Najib by pursuing constitutional and legal avenues to ensure his case receives fair consideration.

Why is it that years after his conviction, Najib's fate continues to occupy so much of the party's political attention?

Is Umno-Baru afraid of moving beyond the Najib era? Why keep this chapter alive?

Both Anwar Ibrahim and Pakatan Harapan are put in an uncomfortable position. Harapan said that those convicted in high-profile corruption and abuse-of-power cases should serve their full sentences.

Anwar said his position is based on the law, the Constitution and the attorney-general's advice.

Yet Umno-Baru, the party supporting Najib, is part of his governing coalition.

Malaysians are entitled to ask: What principle applies here?

Malaysia does not operate in a vacuum. The 1MDB scandal crossed borders and damaged Malaysia's international reputation.

Other countries imprisoned former leaders convicted of serious corruption offences. South Korea imprisoned former presidents; France's Nicolas Sarkozy received a prison sentence in a corruption-related case.

Different countries have different laws and constitutional arrangements.

If Najib were allowed to serve his sentence at home, what would the rest of the world make of it? What message would that send about accountability?

What would investors think? Would ordinary Malaysians expect to obey the same laws?

Malaysia's reputation

After Najib's sentence reduction in 2024, Malaysian think tank Ideas warned about the possible impact on public trust, institutional credibility and Malaysia's international perception.

So we should ask: If house arrest becomes the next chapter, does Malaysia strengthen its reputation for accountability, or weaken it?

Few believe Najib should receive a pardon, but our bigger concern is how this repeated cycle harms the public.

There's the initial shock. Then we argue. Followed by a debate. Then it comes back. And comes back again. Eventually, we get tired.

The rakyat may not have changed their minds. They may simply have run out of energy.

That is how the extraordinary becomes ordinary. Not because we agreed, but because we became too exhausted to object.

So, we return to my original question: Why give priority and prominence to one convicted felon, Najib?

Perhaps the bigger question should be: What happens to Malaysia if the rakyat becomes too tired to keep asking why?

Malaysiakini : Reading the unanimous decision, Tengku Maimun said: “It is our unanimous view that the evidence led during the trial points overwhelmingly to guilt on all seven charges, so much so that it would have been a travesty of justice of the highest order if any reasonable tribunal, faced with such evidence staring it in the face, were to find that the appellant (Najib) is not guilty of the seven charges preferred against him.”

In January 2023, the Umno juggernaut rolled in with Zahid calling on the judiciary to give Najib “fair justice” (whatever this means) in his criminal trials. Claiming that Najib was a victim of political persecution, Zahid made the call in his policy speech at the Umno general assembly, where it received a resounding round of applause from party delegates.

“We demand (sic) that he be given justice in court. We demand that fair justice is given to Datuk Seri Najib,” Zahid thundered.

The phrases “fair trial” and “justice” have been misused interchangeably ever since Najib was first charged in 2018, and continue to be used by his supporters, cronies, politicians, and lawyers.

All this, despite Najib being described as a “national embarrassment” by the Court of Appeal, and despite then High Court judge Collin Lawrence Sequerah’s damning judgment in the 1MDB case.

The judge described Najib’s plundering of state-owned 1MDB as graver than the acts of Attila the Hun, because his role in one of the world’s greatest financial scandals resulted in enormous debts of tens of billions of ringgit that generations of Malaysians will have to bear.

In an 810-page written judgment, Sequerah said Najib had leveraged the vast powers bestowed on him by his “exalted positions” as prime minister, finance minister, and chairman of 1MDB’s board of advisers to enable the audacious theft at the strategic investment company.

The scale of the 1MDB scandal involving Najib was so vast that it made “Attila the Hun look like a choirboy by comparison”.

Umno’s ‘humble plea’

Yet, the Umno charade continues, as if Najib’s pardon - like other privileges for selected politicians - were an entitlement that lesser mortals should not question.

It continued at the Umno assembly over the weekend. Zahid expressed sadness over the postponement of Najib’s pardon application hearing but maintained his support for the royal institution.

“We continue to uphold the rulers and hope for the best for Najib,” he said.

At the closing session, Zahid repeated the same mantra, making a “humble plea” on behalf of the party to Yang di-Pertuan Agong Sultan Ibrahim Sultan Iskandar to consider a pardon for Najib.

“Umno concedes that this matter (of Najib’s pardon) cannot be resolved at this point, and we respect the process. With utmost humility, we - the Umno general assembly - respectfully appeal for Your Majesty’s gracious consent and royal prerogative to grant a full pardon to Najib,” Zahid said.

Najib has not expressed regret or remorse; he has never apologised for his role in the losses suffered by us, the Malaysian taxpayers, who continue to pay for his excesses and his dealings with Low Taek Jho, better known as Jho Low.

Now let us look at the damage caused. As of March 2023, the government had paid RM43.8 billion of 1MDB’s obligations, while a further RM9.7 billion remained outstanding, comprising RM5 billion in principal and RM4.7 billion in interest, according to then-deputy finance minister Ahmad Maslan.

The scale of these figures is difficult to ignore. Public discussion of accountability cannot be separated from the financial burden ultimately borne by the state and, by extension, taxpayers. Even after tens of billions of ringgit had been paid, substantial liabilities remained.

Viewed financially, the cost is not limited to the principal sums involved. It includes the opportunity cost of capital. Using a simplified illustration, a notional RM50 billion placed at five per cent annual interest over six years would generate more than RM17 billion through compound growth. While this is merely a hypothetical comparison, it highlights that the economic impact of large-scale losses extends beyond the original amount involved.

Financial consequences

What could the government have done with the extra money? More could have been allocated to healthcare, affordable housing, and a host of other services that would have benefited the nation and its people.

Instead, burdened with debt, we have been asked to tighten our belts, and even our doctors are being paid a pittance for their yeoman service.

The central question in any debate about clemency, pardon, or accountability is therefore not only whether a punishment has been served, but also how society weighs the magnitude of the financial consequences against principles of justice, responsibility, and public trust.

Redemption is atoning for guilt, a fault, or a mistake. Najib has yet to admit wrongdoing or express remorse, despite the Federal Court affirming the guilty verdicts passed by the courts below in the SRC International case.

The word pardon denotes an exercise in forgiving someone—in this case, a convicted wrongdoer. In most cases, the offender expresses remorse and seeks forgiveness, but here, Najib is seeking a pardon defiantly.

Despite billions lost to theft and leakage, justice lags as culprits continue to benefit from their crimes.

And Umno, to a greater extent, has refused to accept that Najib misused public funds, refusing to accept the adage - if you do the crime, you must do the time.

But a clear message has to be sent: the larger the loss, the higher the threshold many citizens believe should apply when considering exceptional relief. And the higher the status, the more severe the punishment should be.

The Rembau Undang has also stated plainly that no person, institution or Exco meeting can supersede the state constitution or the DKU’s authority on matters of adat. Official government positions are customarily issued through the Menteri Besar or State Secretary, not a collective Exco statement of this nature.

This episode fits a pattern. After the August 2026 state election that returned a BN-PN majority, UMNO installed its Menteri Besar and has since used the machinery of the state government to press a contested royal claim. It is an illustration of how UMNO approaches power, using the assumption that “we are the law.” When constitutional limits stand in the way, procedural formalities and institutional boundaries are treated as inconveniences to be brushed aside.

The timing is not accidental. UMNO is preparing for the Melaka state election, seeking to strengthen its position and create conditions more favourable for an early general election. Control of state institutions and the ability to shape narratives around Malay institutions form part of that larger calculation. If UMNO once again leads the federal government, more of the same can be expected where only selective respect for constitutional processes when convenient will be given, and blunt political pressure when not.

Malaysia’s constitutional monarchy rests on clear demarcations of power. The Undangs of Negeri Sembilan hold a unique traditional role in the election and removal of the Yang di-Pertuan Besar, subject to the state constitution and adat. The elected executive does not. Attempts by politicians to insert themselves into that process for partisan advantage damage both the monarchy and public confidence in the rule of law. The courts, the DKU and the constitution itself must be allowed to resolve the dispute without further political interference.

This should be a day of celebration.

But genuine patriotism does not require us to pretend that every question surrounding the formation and subsequent operation of Malaysia has been satisfactorily answered.

Over the past three days, BoPiMaFo has examined the difference between the Malaysia that was promised and the Malaysia that was implemented.

We asked what actually happened to North Borneo in 1963.

We examined a Federal Court finding that at least one safeguard contained in the Inter-Governmental Committee arrangements was never implemented.

We examined security, development, constitutional finance, demographic change, indigenous political participation and the need for a new constitutional strategy.

Today we ask the larger question:

HAS THE TIME COME TO INTERNATIONALISE THE UNFINISHED CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THE FORMATION AND PERFORMANCE OF MALAYSIA?

BoPiMaFo believes the answer is yes.

But internationalisation must be based on documents, law and evidence — not slogans.

MA63 IS ALREADY AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT

The Malaysia Agreement 1963 is not merely a Malaysian political document.

It is an international agreement concluded in London on 9 July 1963 involving the United Kingdom, the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore. It was registered with the UN on the 21st September 1970, bearing the number 10760.

It entered into force on 16 September 1963 and was subsequently registered with the United Nations.

Article VIII itself required the Governments concerned to take legislative, executive or other action necessary to implement specified assurances, undertakings and recommendations in the IGC Report where they were not already expressly incorporated into the Constitution.

That alone makes the continuing performance of the founding arrangements a legitimate subject of serious historical and international legal study.

Internationalising MA63 does not mean marching into the United Nations tomorrow and demanding that Malaysia be dissolved.

Nor does registration of MA63 with the United Nations automatically give Sabah standing before the International Court of Justice.

Those propositions would be legally simplistic.

Internationalisation means something more serious:

placing the complete history, legal framework and subsequent performance of the Malaysia settlement before international scholars, jurists, parliamentarians, indigenous-rights institutions and appropriate United Nations mechanisms.

DECOLONISATION MUST ALSO BE EXAMINED

North Borneo did not enter 1963 as an internationally sovereign State comparable with independent Malaya.

It was a British Crown Colony undergoing decolonisation.

That makes the United Nations decolonisation framework relevant.

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), adopted on 14 December 1960, declared the principle of self-determination in the process of ending colonial rule.

Resolution 1541 (XV) elaborated the possible forms by which a non-self-governing territory could attain a full measure of self-government. The United Nations today summarises those principal outcomes as independence, free association with an independent State, or integration with an independent State.

These resolutions do not, by themselves, prove that the formation of Malaysia was unlawful.

Nor should Sabahans pretend that Resolution 1541 is an automatic sixty-three-year-late exit clause.

But they do raise legitimate historical questions.

How freely was North Borneo’s future political status determined?

What choices were genuinely available?

How was public opinion ascertained?

Was integration founded upon equality?

What role did the safeguards subsequently embodied in MA63, the IGC arrangements and the Constitution play in obtaining acceptance of Malaysia?

And what is the significance if important safeguards were subsequently not implemented, diluted or transformed?

Those questions deserve international academic and legal examination.

THE COLONIAL CAPACITY QUESTION HAS NEVER DISAPPEARED

There is another issue which deserves much deeper consideration.

When MA63 was signed on 9 July 1963, North Borneo and Sarawak were still British colonial territories.

Yet their representatives signed the Agreement, and the United Nations Treaty Series records North Borneo and Sarawak among the participants.

Britain subsequently informed the United Nations that, following the creation of Malaysia, it was no longer responsible for the international relations of North Borneo and Sarawak.

This does not automatically invalidate MA63.

But it raises a serious international-law question:

IN WHAT PRECISE LEGAL CAPACITY DID NORTH BORNEO AND SARAWAK PARTICIPATE IN AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT WHILE BRITAIN STILL HELD RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?

Who authorised the representatives?

What precisely was the legal nature of their participation?

How did that process interact with the peoples’ right of self-determination?

These questions should not be feared.

If the constitutional foundations of Malaysia are sound, historical scrutiny should strengthen rather than weaken them.

SABAH’S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES CANNOT BE LEFT OUT

Internationalisation must also address the rights of Sabah’s indigenous peoples.

The Federal Constitution itself recognises the natives of Sabah, including through Article 161A and the wider constitutional protections associated with their special position.

But international indigenous-rights law adds another dimension.

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognises important principles concerning self-determination, participation in decision-making, indigenous institutions, traditional lands, territories and resources. Articles 25 and 26, for example, address indigenous relationships with traditionally owned or occupied lands, waters and resources.

The United Nations also emphasises full and effective indigenous participation in decisions affecting their lives, traditional lands, territories and cultural integrity.

These principles have profound relevance to Sabah.

Native customary land.

Forests.

Minerals.

Plantations.

Resource concessions.

Culture.

Political representation.

And demographic change.

This brings us directly to one of Sabah’s most disturbing unresolved questions.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE CAN BECOME A QUESTION OF INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

Sabah has experienced decades of extraordinary irregular immigration and controversy surrounding identity documentation and what became known as Project IC.

If foreigners were unlawfully documented as citizens and subsequently entered the electoral roll, the consequences would extend beyond ordinary immigration enforcement.

Every unlawfully registered voter would alter the relative weight of lawful votes.

And if this occurred on a sufficiently large scale, it could dilute the political influence of Sabah’s indigenous peoples in their ancestral homeland.

Let us be precise.

Article 161A does not guarantee permanent political dominance to Sabah natives.

Nor does international law entitle indigenous peoples to suppress the democratic rights of other lawful citizens.

Every lawful Malaysian citizen has an equal right to vote.

But lawful demographic change is fundamentally different from electoral change produced through unlawful citizenship or fraudulent documentation.

The principle is simple:

EVERY LAWFUL CITIZEN’S VOTE MUST COUNT.

But equally:

NO UNLAWFUL VOTE SHOULD CANCEL THE LAWFUL VOTE OF A SABAHAN.

If demographic or electoral manipulation occurred, its impact upon indigenous political participation deserves both constitutional and international scrutiny.

INTERNATIONALISE THE DEVELOPMENT QUESTION TOO

Sabah’s international story is not merely about political status.

It is also about development.

A territory blessed with petroleum, gas, timber, land, fisheries and enormous natural wealth today records Malaysia’s highest incidence of absolute poverty.

That contradiction deserves examination against the economic expectations accompanying Malaysia’s formation.

Sabah also possesses special constitutional financial arrangements, including the machinery surrounding the 40 per cent entitlement.

The question therefore is not simply how much development expenditure Putrajaya has announced.

The deeper questions are:

How much federal revenue has been derived from Sabah?

What was Sabah constitutionally entitled to?

What was actually returned?

And what development might have occurred had every financial entitlement been faithfully implemented?

This is not an argument that every Sabahan economic problem was created by Kuala Lumpur.

Sabah governments must answer for their own corruption, waste and failures.

But local failure does not erase federal constitutional responsibility.

FROM FEDERATION TOWARDS A NEW COMPACT

Internationalising Sabah’s constitutional questions does not mean that Malaysia must be destroyed.

There is another possibility.

Malaysia can be restructured.

MA63 did not establish a legal confederation.

The Federal Constitution establishes a federation.

We should state that honestly.

But nothing prevents Sabah, Sarawak and Malaysia from negotiating a fundamentally more decentralised arrangement for the future.

Call it asymmetric federalism.

Call it confederal federalism.

Call it a new constitutional compact.

The terminology matters less than the substance.

Sabah and Sarawak should exercise considerably greater authority over matters inherently local to them.

Federal authority should concentrate upon matters genuinely common to the whole federation.

There should be meaningful fiscal autonomy.

Meaningful Borneonisation.

Protection of indigenous lands and institutions.

Demographic and electoral security.

Meaningful Borneo parliamentary representation.

Effective consent mechanisms.

And enforceable constitutional safeguards which cannot simply disappear through political neglect.

SABAH AND SARAWAK SHOULD SPEAK TO THE WORLD

The next phase should therefore involve building an international-quality documentary case.

Collect the British archives.

Open Malaysian records.

Audit every MA63 and IGC safeguard.

Examine the UN Malaysia Mission.

Study Resolutions 1514 and 1541.

Examine UNDRIP.

Document Project IC and the demographic question.

Calculate Sabah’s financial entitlements.

Examine territorial waters, petroleum, Labuan and parliamentary representation.

Then present the evidence professionally.

To international jurists.

Universities.

Parliamentarians.

Indigenous organisations.

Human-rights institutions.

Civil society.

And appropriate United Nations mechanisms.

Not to manufacture hostility against Malaysia.

But to ensure that Sabah and Sarawak’s historical and constitutional questions can no longer be treated merely as inconvenient domestic political complaints.

MALAYSIA SHOULD NOT FEAR THIS

Some will immediately accuse anyone who speaks of internationalising MA63 of disloyalty.

That response misses the point.

Malaysia itself arose from an international agreement and a decolonisation process involving Britain, Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak, Singapore and the United Nations.

Why then should examination of that international history be forbidden?

A confident Malaysia should say:

Open the documents.

Examine the history.

Test the legal arguments.

Audit the promises.

Correct what was not performed.

And negotiate a better settlement where the old one no longer works.

That is confidence.

Suppressing questions is not.

MALAYSIA DAY MUST BECOME MORE THAN A CEREMONY

Today there will be speeches about unity.

There will be flags.

There will be reminders that Sabah and Sarawak helped create Malaysia.

All of that has its place.

But after sixty-three years, Sabahans deserve something more substantial than annual recognition every 16 September.

We deserve answers.

Was the founding bargain faithfully performed?

Were our safeguards implemented?

Were our security assurances honoured?

Were our constitutional financial rights respected?

Were the indigenous peoples of Sabah adequately protected?

Was Sabah permitted to develop in proportion to the immense wealth extracted from its territory?

And does the present federal structure still reflect the partnership envisioned in 1963?

Those questions will not disappear because they make people uncomfortable.

They will grow.

The choice before Malaysia is therefore not between discussing MA63 and forgetting MA63.

The real choice is between:

A MALAYSIA PERMANENTLY HAUNTED BY AN UNFINISHED FOUNDING BARGAIN

and

A MALAYSIA CONFIDENT ENOUGH TO REOPEN THAT BARGAIN, CORRECT ITS FAILURES AND BUILD A FAIRER CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE.

BoPiMaFo chooses the second.

We want a Malaysia worth preserving.

But preservation cannot mean freezing every constitutional imbalance forever.

Malaysia should survive because Sabahans, Sarawakians and Malayans continue freely to believe that the federation is fair, dignified and beneficial to all its peoples.

That is the Malaysia Day conversation we should now begin.

Not next year.

Now.

SELAMAT HARI MALAYSIA.

DANIEL JOHN JAMBUN

Borneo’s Plight in Malaysia Foundation (BoPiMaFo)

16 September 2026

Primary references:

Malaysia Agreement 1963; Inter-Governmental Committee Report; Federal Constitution; United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV); United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; United Nations Malaysia Mission materials; Cobbold Commission Report; relevant British archival records and United Nations Treaty Series materials.

Malaysiakini : In position, but not in power

Academics and historians would no doubt point to a kind of golden age of non-Muslims/Malay political participation, and they would be correct.

This idea of the government and bureaucracy as totemic “Malay” institutions was not as politically ingrained as it is today.

S Samy Vellu (below), the former big cheese of MIC, in an interview with Malaysiakini back in the day, let loose on what he believed was the “curse” that afflicted BN.

He also admitted the component parties were not treated as equals, warned that some in the civil service were sabotaging policy and did not even consider the non-Malays as Malaysians, and seemed shocked that the majority community was flirting with equality.

Samy Vellu stressed that while the government is not discriminatory, those in the civil service are.

“Anything for other races, they don’t like to see it... Some of them don’t consider us (non-Malays) as Malaysians. They are the ones who brought BN down in this election,” he said, referring to the 2008 general election, when BN lost its two-thirds majority for the first time.

And the demonisation and neutering of the biggest non-Malay/Muslim political party reached its nadir when former prime minister Dr Mahathri Mohammad admitted that DAP veteran Lim Guan Eng had no power in the cabinet.

Mahathir even said that the Malays were getting far more than the Chinese community in terms of government allocations, but nothing could be said because it would upset the DAP base.

“So, how come he is said to be the one with the power? He had no power,” the former prime minister said.

While DAP was involved in discussions about the country’s economy and finances, Mahathir (above) added that the party had to consider the Malays too.

Convenient scapegoats

The Malay political establishment needs to project a fig leaf of inclusivity, but make no mistake, the non-Malay/Muslim community and their political leaders would always be the convenient whipping boys for the failures of the Malay establishment, as former Kedah menteri besar Muhkriz Mahathir said in an interview with Malaysiakini.

“Looking at Umno, when there were big issues which we could not address, we would talk about DAP, Chinese chauvinism, and how (DAP leader) Lim Kit Siang becoming prime minister would destroy Malaysia, that the Malays would disappear, and the mosques could no longer air the azan.

“I admit that I too have said such things in front of a 100 percent Malay audience. Thinking back, I feel guilty and a sense of regret,” said Mukhriz.

So now you know that whenever Umno Youth chief Dr Akmal Saleh (above) goes on a rampage, it is because Umno has done something and it needs a distraction.

Creeping Islamisation and DEI hires

Malaysia’s urban demographics and policy decisions have enabled relative economic success despite all the leakages, and this is why this country has been able to maintain the facade of being a “moderate” Islamic country.

In other words, there was political will that this country would not turn into just another failed Islamic state. This was always the centrist malarkey of Umno/BN.

But the plan is changing - not by the political class, but by the Islamisation process that was used by the political class to ensure continuity of power and inherited by an organisation like PAS, which has played the long game extremely well.

The Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism and Taoism (MCCBCHST), responding to Hadi, said - “As the Constitution stands today, a theocratic Islamic state is not possible, as it would be an attack on the basic structure of the Constitution, which includes protection of fundamental rights of minorities.”

A couple of points need to be made here. First, the Constitution has always been interpreted in a way that justifies Malay supremacy, first by the Umno/BN regime and then by whatever coalition followed.

Second, PAS has made it clear by their diktats, slaying of sacred secular cows, and the coddling of the state that they believe that Islam is above the Malaysian Federal Constitution.

In criticising the DAP’s secular stance, this is what PAS deputy president Tuan Ibrahim Tuan Man said: “Malaysia is not a secular country. If it was, why should DAP include ‘to fight for a secular country’ in its own manifesto?

“Islam is the official religion of the federation. Then there is the idea of Malaysian Malaysia. No Malay can accept the concept of equality.

“We accept the basic pillars in the formation of the country such as Islam being the official religion, Malay rulers’ position, Malay language as the official language, Malay culture as the national culture including the special privileges of the Malays.”

If you chronicle the gradual erosion of non-Muslim power, what you will discover is how non-Muslim political operatives have slowly, over the decades, lost access to power when it comes to policymaking.

They are instead relegated to positions where their every move is predicated on not spooking the Malays. All these press announcements by non-Muslim ministers are merely a pantomime of policymaking.

You get all these non-Muslims in what everyone assumes are important nation-building portfolios, but they really are subservient to Malay uber alles principles and, of course, the machinations of the civil service.

Think of them as DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion) hires.

Even when they are bringing in revenue to this country, they become targets for the champions of bangsa and agama.

A good example would be Tourism, Arts, and Culture Minister Tiong King Sing (below), who had to remind folks that he was not a Muslim.

Was it always like this? Ask any non-Muslim who was in government service, and they will tell you, especially the very old-timers, how things changed. How it evolved from we are all in this together to us against them.

I can’t bring myself to be outraged because Hadi, as usual, is just saying the quiet part aloud.

Malaysiakini : When ‘scaffolds’ become ‘concrete pillars’

Like in construction, scaffolds are removed with each stage of completing a multi-storey building. In our context, the New Economic Policy (NEP) and racial quotas are the “scaffolds”, which were necessary 50 years ago to address wealth disparity and ease racial tensions.

But over decades of rephrasing the race-based policies, the scaffolds have turned into permanent concrete pillars with cumulative effects.

Low-income Malays, the Orang Asli in particular, are trapped in mediocrity while the well-connected Malay elites get richer and richer.

To grow a national family, no member should be left on the wayside. All have shared aspirations for a better life. The state in this context is the familial provider. But the family remains divided.

We were raised and educated in national and vernacular schools from ages seven to 12. Our racial and cultural identities were formed early. We are differentiated by class, race, and religion.

Yet we have a remarkable capacity to get along without being overtly belligerent. That’s our Malaysian paradox. So, what follows?

Algorithm vs reality

I revisited this question when I caught up recently with former colleagues from Institut Teknologi Mara, Shah Alam. (I left ITM in the late 1980s for Australia to work as a journalist and later as a media academic).

Drawing from our inter-racial experiences, we thought Malaysians may not be as divided as the politics and algorithmically polarised social media suggest.

Our reminiscence brought me back to the early 1960s when I ran around barefoot with my Malay and Indian friends in the village.

The early morning muezzin’s call to prayer from the community mosque was my alarm bell.

Growing up, we respected our elders. Friends and strangers were “makcik” (aunt) and “pakcik” (uncle), “tuk” (grandfather) and “nenek” (grandmother).

We celebrated Kongsi Raya, Christmas, and Deepavali as one chaotic family. The grounds for growing an extended national family that existed in the pre-1969 era cracked after the race riots in 1969.

Innocence lost

We lost our tween innocence. Anxieties and fears were projected onto us from those who had witnessed the wanton killings in Penang and Kuala Lumpur.

The racial weeds started to creep in. Weeds are naturally opportunistic. They spread their seeds, settle, and grow in any cracks and exposed soil. And, in our government machinery, there are many cracks.

An effective weed killer lies in our political will to restore what was good about pre-1969 Malaysian society.

With today’s TikTok generations, imagine if we could mobilise a national family unit starting from the ground up to those who govern us. Social media can be a reckoning force in generating collaborative inter-ethnic content.

Political apathy from the TikTok generations will see the national family unit breaking up, further undermining Pakatan Harapan’s original reformasi agenda - particularly the prime minister’s declaration of zero tolerance for corruption.

In an extended family, trust is the currency of survival. Corruption and ongoing racial differentiation devalue that trust.

If the head of the household is seen to hoard resources and pardon corrupt elders, the younger members will lose their faith. (Malaysia is currently ranked 52nd on the Corruption Perceptions Index on a scale of 0 to 100, with 100 being “very clean”).

As the Center to Combat Corruption and Cronyism (C4) said following Harapan’s state election losses in August in Negeri Sembilan, Johor, and Sabah: “… numerous individuals appointed by Anwar to positions of power have found themselves tainted by scandals”. The irony is, well, scandalous.

C4’s conclusion rings ominously true: “With the 16th general election fast approaching, every further delay, compromise, or abandoned promise only serves to assure the public’s loss of confidence in Harapan and their subsequent loss of the mandate to govern.

“These electoral losses must serve as a warning... that Malaysians will not tolerate broken promises of a government that is complicit in corruption and has eroded our institutions of good governance.”

The prime minister may well have declared his "zero tolerance" for corruption.

But if the bureaucrats of state-owned enterprises and the Malay-dominant civil service resist any reforms, the head of the household is effectively hamstrung.

What undermines the national family unit is not just who is corrupt (or racist). It is the type of leadership that protects the corrupt (and the racist) that will break up the national family, the feel-good sloganeering notwithstanding.

Malaysiakini : A measurable change in our textbooks

The difference between earlier and current secondary school history textbooks is too substantial to be dismissed as a mere change of emphasis.

Until about the mid-1990s, the textbooks were generally more balanced in their authorship, coverage and interpretation.

They were not perfect, but they gave students a broader view of the peoples, economic forces and cultural influences that shaped Malaya and, later, Malaysia.

In the words of Azmi Sharom (above), an outspoken public intellectual: “History as it is taught appears to be an effort to push forward the Malay/Muslim agenda and little else. The current history syllabus is divisive and selective and it does not give … a clear or holistic picture of our history.”

Santhiram R Raman reached a similar conclusion in “From Decolonization to Ethno-Nationalism: A Study of Malaysia’s School History Syllabuses and Textbooks 1905–2020.”

He argued that “biased history teaching in schools” has “turned history into a private, ethnic domain” and that “half-truths and inaccuracies favouring and glorifying the efforts of one ethnic group” had entered history textbooks.

The comparison with earlier textbooks is revealing. “Sejarah Menengah Malaysia Tingkatan Empat”, published by Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka in 1979, devoted about eight pages to tin mining and acknowledged that the Chinese virtually controlled the industry until the 1880s.

It devoted another seven pages to rubber and gave due recognition to Indian labour. The 2018 Form Three textbook reduces the Chinese role in tin mining to two or three sentences and treats the Indian role in rubber in much the same cursory manner.

The 1996 Form Two textbook offered a reasonably detailed account of Chinese and Indian contributions to Malaya’s economic development, including the opening of settlements and towns.

It described Chinese miners as the leading entrepreneurs in the 19th-century tin industry.

The 2003 Form Two textbook similarly stated that the Chinese dominated tin mining until the end of the 19th century.

In the current series, however, no mention is made of the role of Chinese pioneers in the commercial cultivation of pepper, gambier, tapioca and pineapple.

The contribution of Indian labourers to the construction of Malaya’s roads, railways, bridges, ports, airports and government buildings is similarly absent.

These are not peripheral details. Tin and rubber drove Malaya’s export economy, while migrant labour built much of the infrastructure that sustained it, often under appalling conditions.

Remove these contributions and students are left with mines without miners, plantations without labourers and towns without the communities that built them.

From Indianisation to historical amnesia

Earlier textbooks also explained the profound Hindu-Buddhist influence on early Malay civilisation. Gilbert Khoo’s “Sejarah Malaysia Tingkatan Satu” (1977) discussed its influence on government, royal installation, language, literature, the arts, customs and beliefs.

The 1979 Form Four textbook covered early Kedah as an Indianised kingdom and discussed the roles of Indian traders, priests and princes.

Current textbooks do not adequately explain this inheritance. Concepts such as “devaraja”, Sanskrit-derived royal terminology and the extensive Sanskrit influence on Malay vocabulary receive insufficient attention.

Words such as “raja” (king), “syurga” (heaven), “neraka” (hell), “sembahyang” (pray) and “puasa” (fasting) did not appear from nowhere.

Acknowledging their origins does not make Malay culture less Malay. On the contrary, it reveals the depth, adaptability, and richness of a civilisation shaped by centuries of cultural exchange.

The same selectivity appears on page 13 of the 2017 Form Two history textbook. A caption states: “Penemuan beberapa buah candi di kawasan Lembah Bujang yang menunjukkan kewujudan kerajaan Kedah Tua” (The discovery of several candi in the Bujang Valley indicates the existence of the kingdom of Kedah Tua).

The term “candi” refers here to Hindu-Buddhist religious monuments. The caption is not false, but it omits what these monuments most directly reveal: the influence of Hindu-Buddhist religion and culture in Kedah Tua.

By acknowledging the monuments while withholding their defining significance, the textbook presents a partial truth - a clear example of bias through omission.

The treatment of Parameswara (above) is even more troubling. The 2017 Form Two textbook repeats the disputed claim that he converted to Islam in 1414 and became Megat Iskandar Shah.

The “Ming shih-lu” (also known as Ming Veritable Records), however, records Megat Iskandar Shah reporting Parameswara’s death to the Ming court.

Leading scholars, including Wang Gungwu, Christopher Wake and OW Wolters, provide strong grounds for distinguishing father from son and for concluding that Parameswara did not convert. A disputed interpretation should not be presented to schoolchildren as settled fact.

The Orang Asli have suffered a similar disappearance. “Tawarikh Tanah Ayer Kita” (1963) devoted five pages to them, while William Jalleh’s 1972 Standard Four textbook gave them four pages and explicitly described them as “penduduk asal Tanah Melayu” (original inhabitants of Malaya).

In the current secondary series, they are virtually invisible apart from a brief reference to the Senoi Praaq. Yet the 2019 Form Four textbook describes the Malays as “rakyat asal Tanah Melayu”.

Malays have an indisputable and central place in the peninsula’s history, but the Orang Asli are its first peoples. An honest national history must be capable of stating both truths.

How Yap Ah Loy was diminished and discredited

No individual better exposes this change in emphasis than Yap Ah Loy. The 1979 Form Four textbook devoted almost three pages to his contribution and praised the determination with which he rebuilt Kuala Lumpur despite repeated disasters.

The 2018 Form Three textbook places him last among four personalities associated with the city’s development and gives students little sense of the scale of his achievement.

However, the Kuala Lumpur City Hall’s (DBKL) “Kuala Lumpur Structure Plan 2040” reduces him to the ungrammatical statement that the tin mining centre was “continue developed by Yap Ah Loy”. This is not merely poor English. It symbolises the shrinking of a once-prominent historical role into an awkward afterthought.

READ MORE: HISTORY | Kuala Lumpur's origins: DBKL should set the historical record straight

More recently, Yap has been attacked as a secret-society leader, gambling operator, opium profiteer and even a pimp, as though those labels were sufficient to erase his place in history.

The facts should not be concealed. SM Middlebrook and JM Gullick record his association with the Hai San secret society and his early management of a gaming farm.

According to Gullick, there were about 300 prostitutes on Yap’s (above) premises. In 19th-century mining settlements, secret societies, revenue farms, gambling, opium and prostitution formed part of the political economy. The colonial government licensed or taxed several of these activities and profited from them.

These facts deserve critical treatment, particularly the exploitation of women. Context is not exoneration, but condemnation alone is not history. Unsavoury business interests do not erase Yap’s documented public role.

Secret societies were not merely modern criminal gangs; they also organised labour, credit, protection and communal authority where state institutions were weak.

A truthful account must examine the whole man, including his failings, without weaponising selected vices to make his achievements disappear.

After Kuala Lumpur was devastated during the Selangor Civil War, Yap helped to recapture it in 1873 and undertook its reconstruction.

He borrowed heavily, revived mining and trade, persuaded people to return, maintained order, built roads, supported community institutions and kept the town viable.

Historian Ahmad Kamal Ariffin has argued that Yap’s role in rebuilding Kuala Lumpur deserves its proper place in textbooks and that, without him, the city might not have become the national capital.

Kuala Lumpur was not built by one man, but its survival owed much to Yap’s courage, resilience and determination. To acknowledge that is not communal triumphalism; it is historical fairness.

Distortions beyond Kuala Lumpur

The same weakness appears in a 2019 academic article on the Pahang Uprising. Amnah S Ismail and her co-authors claim, without citing a source, that the British proposed raising Dato’ Bahaman’s monthly allowance from $72 to $500, but that Bahaman rejected the offer because the chieftains’ other demands were ignored.

British colonial records and Abdullah Zakaria Ghazali’s study state the reverse: Bahaman requested an increase from $70 to $500, the British refused, and his resentment was one factor behind the revolt.

Reversing who made and rejected the request alters both the motive and meaning of the episode.

Our school textbooks display the same tendency to magnify one role while minimising others. The 2019 Form Four textbook says that the Malay Regiment formed the bulwark of Malaya’s defence during the Japanese invasion, although British, Indian and Australian formations constituted the main defending forces.

The 2018 Form Three textbook credits Long Jaafar with introducing Larut to the world tin market while overlooking the Chinese capital and labour that transformed production.

It also attributes pepper and gambier cultivation to the British, marginalising the Chinese pioneers who developed these commercial crops.

The pattern is subtle but persistent: acknowledge non-Malay contributions briefly, reduce their scale and shift the centre of agency elsewhere.

History must belong to every Malaysian

Not every error or omission proves a conspiracy. Textbooks must inevitably select and condense. Taken together, however, these changes reveal a consistent direction: Malay and Islamic agency is expanded, while non-Malay and pre-Islamic contributions are compressed, qualified or removed.

What emerges is not simply a shorter account of the past, but a national history rewritten through an increasingly narrow ethnic and religious lens.

This contradicts the declared purpose of national education: to build unity and a shared identity. When a Malaysian child opens a history textbook and cannot see his or her community in the making of the nation, the message is painful and unmistakable: you may live here, but you do not fully belong to the story.

The Education Ministry should appoint a genuinely independent, multi-ethnic panel of historians chosen for scholarship rather than ideological conformity.

Textbook claims should be properly sourced, contested questions clearly identified, and major departures from earlier accounts openly explained.

Drafts should undergo transparent review by specialists in Malay, Chinese, Indian, Orang Asli, Sabah and Sarawak history. Government agencies, including DBKL, should meet the same standard before publishing historical narratives that carry the authority of the state.

Malaysia does not need a Malay history with Chinese, Indian and indigenous footnotes. Nor does it need rival communal histories competing for recognition.

It needs an inclusive Malaysian history, grounded in evidence and large enough to acknowledge every community’s rightful place. Our children deserve to inherit the past as it was, not as political fashion would prefer it to have been.

Telling the whole truth does not diminish the Malays, weaken Islam or threaten national unity. It honours every generation whose labour, sacrifice and imagination helped to build this country.

The past belongs to all of us. If we allow it to be selectively rewritten, we do more than wrong the dead: we teach the living that some Malaysians matter more than others.

That is not the foundation of unity. An honest history is.

Malaysiakini : The RCI said the religious affairs ministers relied entirely on recommendations from management and the board on fund management and investments. In other words, there was little or no independent scrutiny by the minister.

It also found that the law gave the minister broad powers over Tabung Haji's operations, funds, and investments.

Nobody expects a religious affairs minister to be a financial expert. But surely he must ask: How much money are we committing? What are the risks? Has proper due diligence been done?

And if something goes wrong, who is accountable?

A minister cannot know everything, but overseeing an institution means asking the right questions. Otherwise, what exactly is ministerial responsibility?

Old controversies raise fresh questions

Unsurprisingly, this is not the first controversy involving Jamil.

In 2011, there was controversy over the use of zakat funds for legal costs involving him and religious officials. Jamil denied that zakat money had been used, while reports said the money had initially come from a zakat account before being replaced with government funds.

In 2015, allegations emerged over Islamic Economic Development Foundation (Yapeim)-linked funds and a US trip involving shopping and golf. Jamil denied wrongdoing and sued the NGO chief who made the allegations.

The controversy was serious enough for Jamil to announce a task force to examine Yapeim's governance.

None of this proves that Jamil committed a crime. But it is part of the public record.

Malaysians have long memories, even if politicians sometimes hope they don't. For years, controversies have surfaced. Denials have followed. Investigations have come and gone. More importantly, accountability has often seemed to disappear somewhere along the way.

Now that the Tabung Haji case has moved to the prosecution stage, we hope the justice system will shed light on what transpired in the management of the pilgrim fund.

We must not confuse suspicion with proof. But neither should we pretend public suspicion comes from nowhere.

When people repeatedly see powerful politicians escape consequences, they lose faith in the system. That may be the greatest damage of all.

Ministerial responsibility cannot be ignored

The RCI also found that political involvement affected certain Tabung Haji decisions between 2014 and 2018, including profit distribution, haj charges, and financial support.

It recommended major governance changes, including separating responsibility for haj management from financial and investment management.

So perhaps the biggest question is not: Did Jamil personally make a bad decision? It is: Did he do enough as the minister responsible?

Those are two very different questions.

A minister may not personally commit wrongdoing. But political responsibility does not disappear simply because a minister says: “I relied on the board.” Or, “I relied on officials.” Or, “I did not know.”

Ministerial office brings power. It brings authority. It must also bring accountability, especially when things go wrong. And this applies to every minister.

Every political party should demand accountability from its own people, not just its opponents, because protecting political friends is not governance. Demanding accountability is.

The rakyat should expect more. Much more.

Ultimately, the question is not only whether a minister broke the law. It is whether he did the job the rakyat entrusted him to do.

If ministers are not accountable for what happens under their watch, what exactly are they responsible for?

Malaysiakini : It is very clear from the above statements that the party’s goal is a theocratic Islamic state for Malaysia with hudud imposed. A theocratic Islamic state is not compatible with the Federal Constitution, which provides equality for all citizens before the law and entitles them to equal protection of the law.

As the Constitution stands today, a theocratic Islamic state is not possible, as it would be an attack on the basic structure of the Constitution, which includes protection of fundamental rights of minorities.

A Turd Called Hadi

Basic structure doctrine

The basic structure of a Constitution is intrinsic to, and arises from, the very nature of the Constitution. It is settled law that features of the basic structure cannot be abrogated or removed by a constitutional amendment. (Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala Air 1973 SC 1461).

In Malaysia, the Federal Constitution “is the supreme law of the Federation and any law passed after Merdeka Day which is inconsistent with the Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void”. Thus, in Malaysia, the Constitution is supreme and not Parliament.

In Sivarasa Rasiah v. Badan Peguam Malaysia & anor (2010) 2 MLJ 333, the Federal Court, speaking through Gopal Sri Ram, said at page 342: “... Further it is clear from the way in which the Federal Constitution is constructed there are certain features that constitute its basic fabric.

“Unless sanctioned by the Constitution itself, any statute (including one amending the Constitution) that offends the basic structure may be struck down as unconstitutional. Suffice to say that the rights guaranteed by Part II which are enforceable in the courts form part of the basic structure of the Federal Constitution.”

In M Indira Gandhi's case, the Federal Court, in affirming the basic structure doctrine, amongst others, stated on page 52:

1. “The Federal Constitution is premised on certain underlying principles...these principles include the separation of powers, the rule of law and the protection of minorities.”

2. “These principles are part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Hence, they cannot be abrogated or removed”

In Alma Nudo Atenza v Public Prosecutor and another (2019) 4 MLJ 26, the Federal Court, in affirming the doctrine of basic structure of the Constitution, stated that “...the power of the ordinary courts to review the legality of state action is sacrosanct and form part of the basic structure of the Constitution.”

This means that even if Parliament passes a law by a 2/3 majority (or by 100 percent of MPs) to abolish Fundamental liberties, eg minorities' rights, this amendment will be struck out as null and void as being unconstitutional by the court.

4. Thus, from above, especially from pronouncements made by Hadi, it is clear that PAS' goal is to create a theocratic Islamic state. The Kelantan Syariah Criminal Code (II) Bill 1993 provides, amongst others, for hudud offences. This PAS quest for a theocratic Islamic state is unconstitutional and against the Constitution’s basic structure and the fundamental rights, including equality (Article 8) guaranteed by the Constitution.

Oath of MPs

The MPs must take an oath before being appointed as members of the House of Representatives that they would “... bear true faith and allegiance to Malaysia, and will preserve, protect and defend its Constitution.” Thus, MPs must defend the Constitution against PAS' push for a theocratic state.

The MCCBCHST calls upon all Malaysians to unite and defend the Federal Constitution, which is a product of give and take, and the social contract embodied in it is one of moderation and compromise. A theocratic state will have the effect of undermining the Federal Constitution and destroying the fundamental rights of citizens.

The MCCBCHST further calls upon PAS to give a pledge to protect the Federal Constitution and abide by it.

Even when there is no theocratic state, PAS was found wanting, and 16 offences contained in the Kelantan Syariah Criminal Code (1) Enactment 2019 were ruled to be null and void as being in conflict with the Federal Constitution by the Federal Court in the case of lawyer Nik Elin Nik Rashid. Thus, PAS must proceed with caution and abide by the Federal Constitution.

Malaysiakini : The comment got over 1,000 likes, suggesting wide backing for such cultural assaults.

So, are Chinese, Indian, Dayak and Kadazan cultures now deemed outside the "Malaysian identity", as Ridhuan suggested? Does only Malay-Muslim culture count as "national spirit"?

Yet these jokers conveniently ignored that Penang, as reported by Malay Mail, also recently declared the tomb of the Indian-Muslim saint Dato Koyah, who died in 1840, as state heritage. He was known for spiritual healing and feeding the poor.

The Kapitan Keling Mosque, Acheen Street Malay Mosque, Sheikh Omar Tomb, plus nasi kandar, pasembor, and Malay mi udang (prawn noodles) had also been honoured earlier as Penang heritage. 

Obsessed with Chinese ghosts? 

For some weird reason, Ridhuan seems to be haunted by the phantoms of his ancestors.

In mid-August, he blasted a Hungry Ghost Festival banner in Kuala Lumpur for being only in Chinese and lacking Bahasa Melayu, The Rakyat Post reported.

But if the banner did have a Malay translation, then he or other provocateurs may have barked: "How dare you invite Malays to a pagan event that may undermine our faith?"

Either way, it's impossible to placate rabid racists – damned if you do, damned if you don't.

As an aside, actually it would be good to have some English text too, so that "banana" Chinese like me can rediscover our culture. Tourists would also like to visit the ghoulish festival.

But Malay banners would be strange. They may sound like this: "Acara Hantu Lapar diadakan di tokong ini. Orang Islam tidak dialu-alukan sebab kami mahu elakkan dari didakwa menyebar agama lain kepada Muslimin. Sekian, terima kasih."

Or in English: "The Hungry Ghost event is being held at this temple. Muslims are not invited as we want to avoid being prosecuted for spreading other religions to them. Thank you."

Does Ridhuan understand that? I'm sure he does, but he and other converts such as Firdaus "Fear-dose" Wong and Zamri Vinoth will keep finding angles to stir up racial tension.

However, most converts practise Islam without making a big hoo-hah. They also respect their forefathers' culture. But sadly, a very vocal minority is creating Islamophobia.

Yoga may empty the brain

The latest one to join this chorus of condemnation is Cikgu Chandra, who became "famous" for attacking Hindu temples. After recently converting to Islam, he wasted no time attacking his Indian heritage.

He wrote: "Yoga may empty the brain. It's better for Muslims to pray five times daily and recite holy phrases."

His Facebook post got over 9,300 likes. Chandra is most welcome to be diligent in Islamic prayers, but why attack his ancestors' culture? Is he popular among Malays because he bashes Indians?

Do his supporters know that yoga improves health? But when a Muslim does stretching on a mat, will they be accused of "idolatry"?

Yet yoga offered in gyms and studios nowadays does not have religious mantras – they are purely for exercise and relaxation. Rather than "emptying the brain", yoga calms the mind.

Meanwhile, restless brains filled with hatred are prone to constant racist incitement. This is actually a crime that Madani often ignores, even though police reports have been lodged.

If anything linked to Indian culture is deemed to be anti-Islamic, then the Malay language itself must be "scrubbed clean" of many, many words.

These include agama, syurga, neraka, bumiputera, bahasa, raja, menteri, mulia, suka, duka, jaga, jati, etc, which come from the Sanskrit and Pali languages linked to the Hindu-Buddhist past of the Malays.

But racial "ketuanan" (supremacy) ideology prefers to ignore this history. English words are also linked to Christianity, so should those be removed too?

Puppet masters?

Instead of mocking yoga or Hindu temples, Chandra should examine how prayers can reduce Muslim social ills.

These include rasuah, dengki, fitnah, buang bayi, sumbang mahram, rokok, rempit, and dadah (bribery, jealousy, slander, dumping babies, incest, smoking, reckless riding, and drugs).

Most of these are deemed as "dosa besar" (major sins). But I was surprised that even rempit was deemed sinful - as the then Penang mufti explained in a 2022 Utusan Malaysia report, Islam forbids Muslims from harming themselves or others.

Perhaps pugnacious Muslim converts should focus on solving the real problems of the Malays? That would be far more productive than spreading fear and hatred against their Chinese and Indian ancestral cultures.

But what's the real motive of these drama kings? Here is one big clue: they are largely silent about corruption, which is probably the biggest threat to the Malays themselves.

This strongly suggests who their real dalang or puppet masters are.

Malaysiakini : They did the right thing after dragging the country’s reputation and status through the swamps to the sewers, and yet they want to be “forgiven” despite having spewed a series of half-truths and fibs.

However, they could not hide a whole pumpkin in a heap of rice.

It was not the proverbial Tamil proverb of "You can tell a thousand lies to make one marriage happen”. It was a series of lies, each concocted to convince Malaysia that the administration of football has been nothing less than squeaky clean.

Series of actions

First, they suspended its secretary-general for the fiasco involving the fielding of seven foreigners in an Asia Cup qualifier last June.

Then they blamed “clerical staff” for “technical errors” in uploading the wrong documents.

There were shouts of bravado, and then Yusoff described the next move as “a major war” to defend Malaysia’s footballing reputation, declaring that all resources would be used.

Yusoff insisted FAM will be “ready with all the documents and relevant details” to overturn Fifa’s ruling.

Yet the irony is glaring: the very documents that triggered this scandal have already been deemed falsified.

I had then asked: “But what kind of war is this, when the generals march empty-handed? The birth certificates of the players’ grandparents presented by FAM are forged. CAS will have access to the originals, and FAM will be left with egg - not honour - on their faces.”

The irony is that FAM filed a report at the Petaling Jaya district police headquarters on a supposed forgery as if they were innocent parties to the issue - akin to a thief reporting to the police that a theft had taken place!

Federal Commercial Crime Investigation Department (CCID) director Rusdi Isa said two statements have been recorded and an investigation paper has been opened under Section 468 of the Penal Code for forgery, as reported by New Straits Times earlier this year.

But when the FAM openly and officially thanks the prime minister for “facilitating the citizenship” of the foreign players, some soft-pedalling can be expected from our officialdom.

However, the indictments by three international bodies - Fifa's disciplinary committee, its Appeals Committee and the Centre for Arbitration in Sports (CAS) exposed their complicity in one of the biggest sports scandals that hit our shores.

Besides, the damning findings of the Enforcement Agencies Integrity Commission (EAIC) laid bare the sordid details - the involvement of government officials in facilitating fraud, deceit and outright lies.

Vying for positions again

But how does FAM intend to “restore public trust and support” when many of those who reigned have offered themselves - yet again to be part of the administration?

Has all been forgotten? According to news reports, most of them will be in the saddle next weekend - on Sept 17, when the biennial general meeting is held, dictating how football will be run.

Based on a list of individuals who have received notification of their nomination eligibility and confirmed their intention to proceed, obtained by NST, an analysis reveals that 17 of 28 candidates are established FAM insiders, past exco veterans or members of the leadership lineup that vacated their seats seven months ago.

Only 11 candidates represent newcomers who have never sat on the national governing body's executive board.

Of the 17 insiders, 12 candidates were members of the short-lived 2025-2029 exco that resigned en masse in January, with several pre-2025 heavyweights attempting comebacks.

Fifa’s damning verdict

Let us be reminded of what the Fifa Disciplinary Committee had to say last October: “Using fraudulent documentation to allow a player to compete constitutes, pure and simple, a form of cheating, which cannot in any way be condoned.

“Such conduct erodes trust in the fairness of competitions and jeopardises the very essence of football as an activity founded on honesty and transparency.”

So, some of those who had a hand in or admitted complicity in this whole affair may be next to decide on the future of Malaysian football.

The old boys’ network is reassembling, but with their reputation in tatters and held in contempt by Fifa, will this be acceptable?

The mass resignation of FAM’s exco was hailed as a watershed moment - a cleansing of rot, clearing the swamp, a chance to restore integrity.

Yet seven months later, the same faces are circling back, eager to reclaim the reins of power. This is not reform; it is recycling.

The AFC governance review and the Fifa disciplinary rulings laid bare the fraud, deceit, and complicity that dragged Malaysian football into global disgrace.

The EAIC findings exposed government officials greasing the machinery of lies. And yet, those who presided over forged documents, half-truths, and hollow bravado now seek forgiveness without accountability, redemption without reform.

Fifa’s words last October must not be forgotten: “Using fraudulent documentation to allow a player to compete constitutes, “pure and simple, a form of cheating”.

Cheating corrodes trust, destroys credibility, and poisons the very essence of sport.

If Malaysian football allows the old guard to march back into office, it signals to the world that deceit carries no consequence, that governance is a charade, and that integrity is expendable.

The question is not whether FAM can survive another scandal - it is whether Malaysian football can survive another betrayal.

Unless competent “outsiders” with a commitment to good governance, integrity, and fairness take the helm, the “war” to defend Malaysia’s footballing reputation will remain a farce.

The generals will march again, but still empty-handed, still firing blanks - and this time, the battlefield will be trust itself.