Malaysiakini : Business as usual

Recent events have done little to reassure us. We all read the news about three former PMs (below) being at the same court complex on the same day, each over a corruption-linked case, a world first.

The jailed former prime minister himself has no shame and has shown no genuine remorse: his one apology, in 2024, came with a denial that he took any of the money. He is emboldened by his misguided political flock and former allies, be they other ministers, political or business leaders.

Even race and religion are used shamelessly to make the case for innocence, with people praying for him to be freed. The politicians mislead their rural base as they continue to shamelessly plead to the faithful that their former leader is innocent despite the evidence and the courts convicting him. Pictures of the seized cash and handbags are not enough proof of how venal these people are. They display no shred of shame.

The public, after a while, becomes inured and is no longer outraged, as it comes to see this as normal, and the looters view it as their entitlement and wonder why all the fuss. After all, it is why they seek office, and it is business as usual.

To this we need to add the special role the Attorney-General’s Chambers plays - depending on who is the prime minister and the deputy - in shaping pardons, DNAAs and other goodies, according to who at any time is pulling the levers in the mysterious political games being played behind closed doors of which the public has no knowledge.

The prosecutor who sought the DNAA on the DPM’s 47 charges in 2023 is now the attorney-general sitting on the Pardons Board. Rather than being independent, the AG’s office is used as a tool for pushing political interests, no different from the criminality of the current US regime.

Many experts have now commented on the constitutionally inaccurate explanation used by the Prime Minister’s Office and Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department (Federal Territories) Hannah Yeoh: that it was the king’s decision.

Article 42 provides that the king acts on the advice of the Pardons Board, which must first consider the AG’s written opinion, and whose members include the AG and the federal territories minister herself. Interpretation of the Constitution on this issue has now become political theatre.

The less said about the little-known other members of the Pardons Board, the better. It is even more mysterious in its workings than the ultra-conservative Supreme Court in the US. The government’s approach to appeals for transparency, explanation and the release of the AG’s written opinion is a silent “I beg your pardon?” – that is, “How dare you ask?”

To understand how deep the rot is, just consider that the current government got elected on a strong anti-corruption agenda. Yeoh (below) was, not so long ago, a senior figure in the party that campaigned hardest on 1MDB.

Calling us a banana republic is maybe too generous a term. We are more like "cacing sawah" (earthworm) - with abundant kangkung for the rakyat grown in nutrient-rich sewage swamps owned by the state.

Najib's house arrest

But let’s focus on the big condition cited in the pardon: Pay RM50 million and get out of jail and go home. Sounds like a game of Monopoly, and as we all know, the outcome depends on who holds the chips.

Immediately after the news of the pardon, the deputy prime minister, as Umno president, said he would lead the charge to raise the money for his former boss. There was no reprimand from the PMO or any other institution with oversight responsibilities despite the sensitivities.

The government just fell in line, attempting to give legitimacy to the process and further reinforcing the public view that there are no checks and balances. They acted like guardians of a feudal state.

Here are a few questions which require answers and could perhaps serve as ammunition for those who care and dare to push for full disclosure so that our slide into the swamp is checked.

• So does the pardon come into effect after the RM50 million is paid? What is the grace period? Is it two or three weeks, or open-ended? These are important details given that the house is already being prepared by the law agencies.

• Is it true, according to some reports, that the house arrest has been approved and non-payment of the fine only increases the sentence by one year?

• Can funds be raised from the public for this purpose, or is it meant to be paid only by the felon and his family?

• As the felon's assets and accounts have been frozen - given that it must be assumed much was acquired through fraud - will these be defrosted so he can raise the money? Surely not, but who knows now that the law is proving to be an ass. Which institution is responsible for this matter of law and for providing a clarification?

• What happens to the judgment by Alice Loke, which G25 reads as finding that there is no legal framework for home arrest? Do remember many Malaysians welcomed this decision.

• Moreover, is it even legal to raise funds for a felon's freedom from jail? After all, the conviction has not been overturned. Lawyers out there, please figure this out. Can an injunction be sought to stop the fundraising?

• Which entity is raising the money? Is it legally allowed to do so and to collect money from gullible people who are being politically manipulated? Is that in itself a form of fraud? Would Islamic principles allow this? Can the religious authorities provide an opinion?

• Does the entity raising money (assuming it is legal) have an obligation to disclose the names of all donors? Do its articles of association even allow it to do so? Who is checking?

• What if bad actors or even foreign agents try to contribute to this fund and thereby seek to influence politics in Malaysia? Don’t rule this out.

• Which institution of the state will be responsible for overseeing and monitoring this fundraising, given that it provides real opportunities for defrauding innocent people? After all, this is not a simple matter of a village raising funds for the "penghulu" (village head) to hire a lawyer to fight his court case about who stole the durians.
  
  And we all know that Malaysian leaders entrusted with the money of the people are world-class when it comes to siphoning other people's money - Tabung Haji, anyone? Will anyone go to jail?

• What if cronies who have benefited from the 1MDB scandal are chipping in funds with some loose change from the loot to free their “Bossku”? It would be a case of illicit money being used to free from jail the felon responsible for the “original sin” – 1MDB itself.

• And will the banks play ball in handling this money? Will they risk laundering this money or come clean and ensure full disclosure? Who will audit the sources of the money raised? Hopefully not one of the Big Four implicated in 1MDB.

These questions are but the tip of the iceberg in terms of making sense of issues now at stake, rather than simply executing the ill-thought-through arrangement. One would have thought that these serious challenges would have been thought through before those advising on the pardon settled so easily on the payment of a "political bribe masquerading as a penalty" – a fine the Pardons Board had already cut from RM210 million in 2024. One felon, two pardons.

But then again, if the political system has now taken over the legal system, then as we all know, the former does what it has always done: run roughshod over the legal system and spit at the public in the process.

It is time the rakyat spit back.

Malaysiakini : Negeri Sembilan issue

Rational Malaysians must really pay attention to what Loke told the premier when it comes to the current state of racial politics in Madani.

Loke said: "(For example) in the Negeri Sembilan state government, the majority of Malay voters interviewed said that the Harapan government is actually doing very well, but the main point is that they simply do not want DAP to be in the government.

“Malay voters are no longer looking at achievements, performance, or track records; they simply do not want DAP in the government.”

Think about this for a moment. Umno, with the enabling of Madani, has done such a good job of vilifying DAP that the Malays (in this example, Negeri Sembilan) would rather vote against their self-interests than have the DAP in government. This has been the modus operandi for Umno for decades.

Umno wants to destroy democratic opportunities where the Malays, especially if they are a minority in certain areas, understand that their welfare is safeguarded by a non-Malay majority.

This is a damning indictment and points to how effective the propaganda of Umno has been. When DAP voices out concern, which would help the Malay community, it is demonised, and more often than not, the head of Madani would side with the far-right ethnocentric agitators who really do nothing for the Malay community.

I do not mean this as a backhanded compliment, considering my public criticism of the DAP, but the party has always been a loyal supporter of the coalition they are in and, as far as mainstream politics is concerned, has been far more effective in their various public servant roles than the rest of the rabble they serve with.

Umno for Umno

And it is not as if there was never any simpatico between Umno and DAP personalities, who understood the realpolitik of the times. In 2018, Umno strongman Nazri Abdul Aziz said, “I said the voice of the Chinese after the 2013 general election is DAP. Is that wrong? I am friends with DAP because I respect democracy.

“I want to carry out tourism work in Seremban and in Penang. These are DAP areas. I cannot leave them aside.”

Umno was never really for the Malays, but rather, they were for Umno. I remember when former Kota Raja Umno chief Amzah Umar revealed: “We give a seven percent discount for bumiputera buyers and 12 percent for Umno members, if I am not mistaken.”

And Umno knows that DAP is not and will never be a threat to “Malay rights” and Islam in this country. Here is Umno secretary-general Asyraf Wajdi Dusuki (below), just last year, who wanted to debunk the slander that Islam is under threat from DAP.

"This is a fundamental matter that we must understand, so that all slander and accusations - as though Umno is selling out the country, Islam, and the Malay struggle to others - can be put to rest."

Loke also said, "These are things that BN cannot oppose, and we cannot use their disagreement as an excuse, because BN has already agreed, so the prime minister also needs to make a decision.

“To a certain extent, we told the prime minister that he must be more decisive."

Malay rights

And therein lies the rub. Malay rights have been weaponised to the point that the Madani regime would rather not carry out any utilitarian policies that would benefit everyone, especially the Malays, because they are the majority, for fear of the opposition claiming that Malay/Muslim rights are being sidelined because of DAP.

Who benefits from all of this? While Perikatan Nasional may have taken exception to Anwar’s broadsides against the “maha kaya” (ultra rich) class, PKR rabble-rouser Hassan Abdul Karim has said that not only has there been a return of the crony class, but now we have the resurgence of the “maha kaya” class.

Read Hassan’s (below) warning, but pay attention to the third type: “These people seem to enjoy immunity and cannot be touched due to the 3R ban.”

The Pasir Gudang MP also noted their business dealings, even though this was expressly forbidden by the Federal Constitution.

DAP MP Syahredzan Johan, who I have always thought of as one of the better political operatives this country has to offer, said this: “The Madani government can do all these reforms because DAP is part of the administration. We are the beating heart of this government. We are the conscience of this government.”

Loke’s resignation demonstrates that DAP is the guilty conscience of Madani.

Malaysiakini : Who are the Pathans?

Pathan is the name commonly used in Malaysia for the people also known as Pashtuns or Pakhtuns.

Their ancestral homeland straddles present-day Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly southern and eastern Afghanistan and north-western Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, formerly the North-West Frontier Province, is closely associated with them.

Pashto, the ancestral language of the Pathans, belongs to the Iranian branch of the Indo-European language family. However, not everyone of Pathan ancestry speaks it.

In the Hazara region of Pakistan, including Mansehra, some Pathan communities speak Hindko, while Pashto and Urdu are also spoken in the region.

Predominantly Sunni Muslims, Pathans comprise numerous tribes and tribal groupings. These include the Durranis, formerly called Abdalis, and the Ghilzais of Afghanistan, as well as the Yusufzais associated with the Peshawar valley, Swat and neighbouring districts.

Describing Pathans through supposedly uniform physical features or inherited personality traits tells us little about their historical experience.

Their Malaysian story concerns people who sought employment, built businesses, raised families and adapted to unfamiliar surroundings. It deserves to be told through evidence about their lives.

Migration and the early security forces

Pathan migration to Malaya gathered momentum during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Some men arrived through police and military recruitment; others pursued trade and independent livelihoods.

One significant episode concerns Captain Tristram Speedy’s recruitment of men in Lahore, then in British India, for service in Larut, Perak, in 1873.

A telegram dated Sept 18, 1873, from the lieutenant-governor of Bengal to the foreign secretary at Simla stated that most of Speedy’s recruits were Pathans.

A second telegram, dated Sept 25, 1873, reported that 95 men had departed for Penang with him that morning.

These records deserve attention because accounts that describe the entire contingent simply as Sikh erase its actual composition.

Recognition of the Sikh contribution remains essential, but historical accuracy requires us to acknowledge the Pathan and Punjabi Muslim recruits who served alongside them.

Pathans subsequently served in the police and military establishments of the Malay states, including the Malay States Guides (MSG), Malaya’s first military regiment.

The number of Pathans in the MSG increased from 35 in 1900 to 210 by the end of 1914. Such figures establish a substantial Pathan presence within an institution often remembered principally for its Sikh personnel.

Among the Pathan police officers who lost their lives in service to the country was Maruf Khan (above with his children), who was killed by the communists at Kota Bharu, Perak, around 1948.

Pathans also served as prison warders. Family and service records preserve the names of Pathan warders, including Sultan Afshur Khan at Pudu Jail in Kuala Lumpur and Ghulam Hassan Fateh Jan Khan and Semandar Khan at Alor Setar prison.

These less celebrated occupations sustained institutions that depended upon ordinary salaried workers as much as on senior officers.

Beyond the peninsula

During the late 19th century, the Pathan presence also reached North Borneo, now Sabah, which was then governed by the British North Borneo Company.

According to Ian Black’s book “A Gambling Style of Government: The Establishment of the Chartered Company’s Rule in Sabah, 1878–1915”, the company’s police force included 72 Pathans in 1898.

Pathans also served in the police force in Sarawak.

Traders and families in Kelantan

Kelantan offers a particularly revealing glimpse into Pathan commercial life. According to Robert L Winzeler’s study of ethnic relations in Kelantan, Pasir Mas had a sizeable community of Pathan cloth and gemstone traders in the early 20th century.

Their numbers fell sharply in the 1930s after their trading licences were withdrawn following brawls with Malay villagers unable to repay debts during the economic depression.

The Kelantan story extended across the border to Sungai Golok in Thailand, which had about 40 Pathan families. Trade, schooling and family relationships connected communities on both sides.

Reading their history exclusively within today’s national boundaries would miss much of their everyday experience.

One family’s experience gives this history a human dimension. In an interview, the late Zaman Khan, a former senior police officer, recalled that his Pashtun father was a cloth seller and that the family had lived in Sungai Golok.

Although his father was illiterate, he valued education and arranged for his sons to attend school in Kelantan.

Beyond trade and family life, Pathans in Kelantan also contributed to charitable and wartime causes. In 1917, they donated $100 to the Red Cross Society.

In July 1918, 20 Pathans in Kota Bharu, led by Ma Wali Shah, donated $43 to the British government towards the war effort.

Livelihoods beyond the stereotype

Elsewhere in the peninsula, Pathan livelihoods included cattle trading, transport and small businesses. Dell Akbar Khan’s father, Hyder Khan, traded cattle and operated a beef stall at Kuala Lumpur’s Central Market.

In Tapah, Perak, the Pathans and Sikhs dominated transport by bullock cart, carrying tin ore from the mining centres to the railway station at Tapah Road.

The bullock carters also transported provisions and mining equipment to the mines.

Oral testimony also sheds light on Pathan involvement in the taxi business. Sabia Begum Sulaiman (second from left), granddaughter of Maruf Khan, recalls that her father, Sulaiman Abdul Maarof Khan, Fazal Ehsan and Painda Khan established the Tivoli Taxi Company (below) in the 1950s.

Such recollections deserve to be recorded and preserved, complementing business registration records and contemporary newspaper accounts.

Like the Sikhs, Pathans were highly sought after as watchmen, or “jagas”, to guard government buildings and private premises because of their imposing appearance and reputation for bravery and reliability.

Intermarriage with local Malays helped many Pathan migrants and their descendants put down lasting roots in their adopted homeland.

Malay wives and mothers played a central role in this process, raising children, sustaining households and passing on language and customs across generations. Their contribution deserves greater recognition in histories too often centred on male migrants and their distinguished sons.

Prominent local Pathans

Zaman was among the best-known Malaysians of Pathan heritage. He was the youngest son of Rahim Khan Ghulam Haider, a Pathan cloth seller who walked from village to village in Pasir Mas, Kelantan, selling his wares.

Zaman (above) began his career in the police in 1962 as a cadet assistant superintendent of police. During his police career, he headed five police districts and served as police chief of Penang and later Kuala Lumpur.

He became Prisons Department director-general in 1994 and retired in 1997.

His police appointments also included service as Bukit Aman Criminal Investigation Department director from 1989 to 1993.

Over the course of his career, he handled high-profile cases involving the notorious robber Botak Chin (Wong Swee Chin) and gangster P Kalimuthu, better known as Bentong Kali.

He was also involved in the response to the Japanese Red Army hostage crisis in Kuala Lumpur and the Highland Towers tragedy.

Another prominent Malaysian of Pathan heritage is Dell Akbar Khan (above), who distinguished himself in both policing and football.

He joined the police force in 1970 and served as Kuala Lumpur police chief from 2002 to 2004. A national footballer, he helped Malaysia qualify for the 1972 Munich Olympics. His brother, Sardar Khan, also represented Malaysia in football.

Dell also brought his experience to football administration, serving as Football Association of Malaysia secretary-general and carried out security duties at the Fifa World Cup events in South Africa (2010) and Brazil (2014).

He currently serves as executive vice-president of Malaysian Resources Corporation Berhad (MRCB).

In politics, Abdul Hamid Khan Sakhawat Ali Khan, reportedly of Pathan heritage, served as MP for Batang Padang.

He subsequently served as education minister from 1962 to 1964 and became president of the Dewan Negara, holding office from February 1971 to February 1973.

Musa Aman (above), described in Malaysiakini as being of mixed Pathan and Dusun ancestry, served as Sabah’s chief minister from 2003 to 2018, becoming the state’s longest-serving chief minister.

He took office as Sabah’s 11th governor on Jan 1, 2025. His political career also included service as state finance minister and assemblyperson for the Sungai Sibuga constituency in Sabah.

Kalimullah Hassan is a distinguished Malaysian journalist of Pathan ancestry whose grandfather, Tufail Ahmad Khan (above), came to Malaya in 1908.

A successful rubber trader in Pengkalan Hulu (formerly Kroh), Tufail later jointly owned rubber estates in Kulim and Sungai Petani with Arumugam Chettiar.

He also ventured into the textile trade, opening a shop in partnership with Amar Singh, the father of ex-Subang MP and former MIC vice-president, the late KS Nijhar.

Beginning his journalism career in 1979, Kalimullah worked with The Star, Reuters and The Straits Times. He later served as chairperson of Bernama and group editor-in-chief of the New Straits Times. He also made his mark in business, co-founding the financial services group ECM Libra.

Kalimullah’s (above) reflections on Malaysian society and politics found expression in “The Malaysia That Could Be”, launched in 2016.

The book brings together his New Sunday Times columns written between 2004 and 2008, alongside reflections on Abdullah Ahmad Badawi’s premiership.

Drawing on personal experience, he laments the erosion of ethnic and religious tolerance and makes a case for a more inclusive Malaysia. Underlying his writing is the conviction that our diversity should strengthen the nation rather than divide its people.

In entertainment, Yusof Haslam rose from modest beginnings to become a prominent actor, director and producer.

Through his company, Skop Productions, and works such as the film “Sembilu” and the television series “Gerak Khas”, he helped shape popular Malaysian screen culture. Sarawakian actor Aniq Durar also has Pathan ancestry through his mother.

Mohamed Azman Yahya is a prominent Malaysian corporate leader who, according to sources consulted for this article, is of Pathan ancestry.

He played a pivotal role in Malaysia’s response to the Asian financial crisis. In 1998, he was appointed to establish and head Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad, the national asset management company.

Azman also chaired the Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee, helping viable companies restructure their debts.

He founded Symphony House Berhad in 2002 and subsequently served as chairperson of Symphony Life Berhad and Sepang International Circuit.

In construction and development, Nazir Hussin Akhtar Hussin has more than two decades of experience.

He has served as executive director of Seri Jaya Perkasa Sdn Bhd since 2003 and also holds an executive directorship at Kinergy Advancement Berhad. Beyond his corporate roles, he chaired Yayasan Bank Rakyat from 2021 to 2022.

Another Malaysian of Pathan ancestry active in this sector is Mohamed Nazir Meraslam, managing director of Pembinaan Mohamed Nazir Meraslam Sdn Bhd, a Selangor-based construction and civil engineering firm.

A well-known philanthropist and the longest-serving chairperson of the Malaysia-Pakistan Business Council, he now serves as its patron-in-chief.

A history that belongs to all

How many Malaysians today have Pathan ancestry? No defensible total can be established from the scattered records considered here.

Intermarriage, changing self-identification and the absorption of descendants into broader communities make historical ancestry difficult to translate into a precise population figure.

The Pathan story also cautions against imagining our communities as sealed compartments. People married across boundaries, adopted new languages and built shared lives long before the narrow definitions of belonging advanced in today’s political debates.

We do no service to national unity by allowing smaller communities to disappear from our historical memory.

Malaysian Pathans have earned their place in our history through generations of work and participation. Recording that place honestly gives all Malaysians a fuller understanding of the country we share.

Malaysiakini : Questions over pardon process

As of Sept 21, the attorney-general said the RM50 million had not yet been paid. Here’s one very simple question: Where is the deadline for payment?

If Najib cannot raise the money by that date, shouldn’t the house arrest arrangement be revoked? If a condition has no clear deadline, how do we know when it has been breached?

Even ordinary taxpayers dealing with unpaid tax bills or traffic penalties would normally have rules governing payment and consequences for non-payment. Najib’s case concerns a criminal sentence, a conditional pardon, and RM50 million. Where is the clearly defined procedure?

On Sept 19, the home minister said the Prison Department had not yet received the official written notification of the Pardons Board's decision.

Yet prison personnel visited Najib’s Langgak Duta residence in Kuala Lumpur (below) around the same time, apparently assessing the property for house arrest. What exactly were they inspecting? Were they already aware of conditions that had not been made public? Why the lack of transparency?

Civil society organisation G25 called for the attorney-general’s written opinion and Federal Territories Minister Hannah Yeoh’s representation to the Pardons Board to be made public, together with an explanation of the legal basis for house arrest.

Yeoh, who sat on the Pardons Board, said she considered the AG’s written opinion and gave her views honestly and candidly, in the country’s interest.

Loke said Yeoh’s views were consistent with DAP’s principles. So what did she actually tell the Board? Did she support house arrest? Oppose it? Have reservations?

Why is Loke taking the hit?

That raises another question. If someone from DAP had to resign over this, why Loke? Why not the DAP minister who actually sat on the Pardons Board and participated in its deliberations?

No one is saying Yeoh did anything wrong, so why is Loke taking the political hit?

Perhaps, as DAP secretary-general, Loke’s resignation carries greater political weight. Perhaps this way, DAP could make its objection unmistakable while keeping its other ministers inside government. Perhaps it helps keep the party’s detractors at bay.

Again, we don't know.

Yeoh (below) herself said DAP's central executive committee (CEC) considered various proposals before deciding that only Loke would resign. What were those other proposals?

Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim also cannot escape scrutiny. Both he and the attorney-general provided advice on the legal implications, national stability, and the rule of law, and he had raised his concerns about the pardon. So, what exactly was the government’s position when the decision was made?

Did both men advise against it, or raise serious reservations? How did the final decision arrive at house arrest?

We know the Yang di-Pertuan Agong has the constitutional power to grant pardons, but Malaysians are still entitled to understand the process that led to this particular outcome.

Price of pulling out

After DAP’s emergency CEC meeting, Loke offered to resign as transport minister, while the other DAP ministers remain in government to maintain political stability.

Will one minister’s resignation achieve much? Is it a principled protest, a political message, or a warning?

Here is another uncomfortable question: Was Loke the sacrificial lamb?

Only last month, DAP delegates voted 1,857 to 242 to remain in the federal government. Loke said the party would respect that mandate and continue working from within. With one minister resigning, will anything really change?

Loke (below) said that if all DAP ministers resigned, their opponents could bring down the government, potentially leading to Parliament being dissolved. We understand that.

However, will he and his peers acknowledge that Malaysians are also fed up with unfulfilled election promises and slow-moving reforms?

Perhaps there is another consideration. DAP’s departure would not only threaten the stability of the government. It would also put Anwar’s own position under much greater pressure.

Perhaps that is why one resignation is the compromise: enough to send a message and focus minds. More importantly, to focus Anwar’s mind too.

Are those who previously demanded a stronger stand from DAP harbouring second thoughts? Are they reconsidering because an election could follow? Are they worried about the re-emergence of a stronger Umno Baru presence? Are they concerned about losing the influence they currently have inside government?

Or do they see it as the electorate’s opportunity to decide what comes next?

Perhaps they appreciate that pulling apart a coalition has consequences that are easier to demand from the sidelines than to live with.

Politicians have to consider the consequences of triggering an election, and that is why the choice facing DAP is not simply: “Stand on principle, or don’t.” It is also: “How far are you prepared to go when going further could change the government itself?”

Perhaps that is the question the rakyat should be asking too.

Malaysiakini : From victims to threats

The reason why the Rohingya are here is that successive regimes and political operatives from the opposition advocated for their place and welfare in Malaysian society.

When these “foreigners” become successful and start gaining economic relevance at the expense of the majority, they suddenly become a threat.

Working-class Malays, already handicapped by interventionist state policies, which supposedly protect their rights and privileges, have to contend with various migrant communities for a slice of the pie.

The fact that the plight of the Rohingyas is championed by the bourgeois class and looked on with scepticism or outright hostility by the working class for years was overlooked by the mainstream Malay political establishment.

Social media opprobrium for the Rohingya always includes elements of how well they are organised, and commentary revolves around the politicians and how they are somehow connected to the “problem”.

Keep in mind that refugees, migrant workers, and “illegals” do the jobs that locals do not want to do, and they only become an issue during times of economic and political uncertainty.

Most workers people think of as “illegal” merely want to make a living and send money back home, but because of the politics of the situation, there are issues involved which affect the social dynamic of locals.

Grain of truth

I know folks do not want to hear this, but if you think that we have extreme religious ideas here, you have no clue of the extreme ideas that could be (and have been) injected into the religious discourse by elements moving in migrant communities.

This idea that the Rohingya are fleeing from oppression is much more complex than the narratives of most activists and state-sponsored hacks.

As reported by Al Jazeera, there is a flourishing trade in brides - some even child brides - by Malaysian-based Rohingya men who cannot find local women to marry.

There has been no discussion or accountability of the millions of dollars of aid from Muslim countries and Western organisations for the benefit of the Rohingya community.

Neither has there been accountability for the numerous Rohingya organisations that claim to advocate for the community but have been assimilated into various Muslim advocacy groups in the country and used when needed to make a religious show of force.

Jumping on the bandwagon

Politicians of every ethnicity have attempted to gain brownie points from this issue.

MCA young women's wing chief Ivone Low got some folks’ knickers in a twist when she commented on the thug-like behaviour of “refugee children” in a series of online video clips.

In response, Pengerang MP Azalina Othman Said said children should not be blamed when “the country” failed to protect them.

The “country” did not fail to protect them. The political apparatus of this country failed to protect them, as it has failed with a great many issues.

It really does not matter if it is BN, Perikatan Nasional, or Pakatan Harapan. Each, at one time, most likely when out of government, has used refugees, especially Muslim refugees, as pawns in an effort to discredit the ruling party or attempt to show how the support of refugees translates to supporting the Malay polity.

All this is not only hypocritical but also mendacious, as both attempt to portray the situation as a religious one - when it comes to Muslim refugees - as opposed to economic or political ones.

And this has always been an economic issue. Remember the hostility then human resources minister M Kulasegaran received when he reminded the Harapan government of its campaign pledge to allow refugees to work?

I still have not forgotten when former prime minister Najib Abdul Razak and PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang had that big rally in support of the Rohingya.

Sekretariat Umat chairperson Aminuddin Yahaya, too, had urged Buddhist monks in Malaysia to state their stand on a demonstration held by their counterparts in Myanmar against Najib’s alleged interference in the Rohingya issue, and whether “killings of innocent people” also go against the teachings of Buddha.

This is one of the major economic issues dominating mainstream Malay politics. This is why there has been a sudden spurt of raids against migrants and the underground economy, which has thrived for years.

This major issue, more than Najib’s pardon, will determine which coalition forms the government; who plays the blame game better will be the deciding factor.

We acknowledge that Pardons Board deliberations are confidential, but what does “the best interests of the nation” mean in this case? What principle was applied?

Malaysians may not be entitled to know what was said behind closed doors, but surely they are entitled to understand the principles governing decisions that affect public confidence.

It's about all Malaysians

At what point does something extraordinary become ordinary simply because we keep seeing it?

Think of a recalcitrant child asking mum for a sweet. Mum says no. The child asks again. And again. The crying then starts. The pestering continues. The tantrum heightens.

Eventually, mum is exhausted. “Fine. Take the sweet.”

This may not have happened in Najib's case, but what happens to a democracy when the public is repeatedly asked to revisit the same question until people become too tired to care?

The rakyat may not agree and may simply shrug: “Enough. Just get on with it.”

And that is the danger.

Muda vice-president Zarul Afiq warned that moving Najib from prison to a bungalow could deepen political apathy, particularly among young people.

His concern is that if people believe justice differs according to who holds power, they may start asking: what is the point of democracy?

Should we risk endangering our fragile democracy because of one man?

I think we should ask an even wider question: What happens when people become too tired even to ask?

Because this isn't just about young Malaysians. It is about all Malaysians.

How many times can the same controversy be brought back before people simply switch off? There is a difference between agreement and exhaustion.

Uncomfortable position

Meanwhile, Umno-Baru continues to support Najib by pursuing constitutional and legal avenues to ensure his case receives fair consideration.

Why is it that years after his conviction, Najib's fate continues to occupy so much of the party's political attention?

Is Umno-Baru afraid of moving beyond the Najib era? Why keep this chapter alive?

Both Anwar Ibrahim and Pakatan Harapan are put in an uncomfortable position. Harapan said that those convicted in high-profile corruption and abuse-of-power cases should serve their full sentences.

Anwar said his position is based on the law, the Constitution and the attorney-general's advice.

Yet Umno-Baru, the party supporting Najib, is part of his governing coalition.

Malaysians are entitled to ask: What principle applies here?

Malaysia does not operate in a vacuum. The 1MDB scandal crossed borders and damaged Malaysia's international reputation.

Other countries imprisoned former leaders convicted of serious corruption offences. South Korea imprisoned former presidents; France's Nicolas Sarkozy received a prison sentence in a corruption-related case.

Different countries have different laws and constitutional arrangements.

If Najib were allowed to serve his sentence at home, what would the rest of the world make of it? What message would that send about accountability?

What would investors think? Would ordinary Malaysians expect to obey the same laws?

Malaysia's reputation

After Najib's sentence reduction in 2024, Malaysian think tank Ideas warned about the possible impact on public trust, institutional credibility and Malaysia's international perception.

So we should ask: If house arrest becomes the next chapter, does Malaysia strengthen its reputation for accountability, or weaken it?

Few believe Najib should receive a pardon, but our bigger concern is how this repeated cycle harms the public.

There's the initial shock. Then we argue. Followed by a debate. Then it comes back. And comes back again. Eventually, we get tired.

The rakyat may not have changed their minds. They may simply have run out of energy.

That is how the extraordinary becomes ordinary. Not because we agreed, but because we became too exhausted to object.

So, we return to my original question: Why give priority and prominence to one convicted felon, Najib?

Perhaps the bigger question should be: What happens to Malaysia if the rakyat becomes too tired to keep asking why?

Malaysiakini : Reading the unanimous decision, Tengku Maimun said: “It is our unanimous view that the evidence led during the trial points overwhelmingly to guilt on all seven charges, so much so that it would have been a travesty of justice of the highest order if any reasonable tribunal, faced with such evidence staring it in the face, were to find that the appellant (Najib) is not guilty of the seven charges preferred against him.”

In January 2023, the Umno juggernaut rolled in with Zahid calling on the judiciary to give Najib “fair justice” (whatever this means) in his criminal trials. Claiming that Najib was a victim of political persecution, Zahid made the call in his policy speech at the Umno general assembly, where it received a resounding round of applause from party delegates.

“We demand (sic) that he be given justice in court. We demand that fair justice is given to Datuk Seri Najib,” Zahid thundered.

The phrases “fair trial” and “justice” have been misused interchangeably ever since Najib was first charged in 2018, and continue to be used by his supporters, cronies, politicians, and lawyers.

All this, despite Najib being described as a “national embarrassment” by the Court of Appeal, and despite then High Court judge Collin Lawrence Sequerah’s damning judgment in the 1MDB case.

The judge described Najib’s plundering of state-owned 1MDB as graver than the acts of Attila the Hun, because his role in one of the world’s greatest financial scandals resulted in enormous debts of tens of billions of ringgit that generations of Malaysians will have to bear.

In an 810-page written judgment, Sequerah said Najib had leveraged the vast powers bestowed on him by his “exalted positions” as prime minister, finance minister, and chairman of 1MDB’s board of advisers to enable the audacious theft at the strategic investment company.

The scale of the 1MDB scandal involving Najib was so vast that it made “Attila the Hun look like a choirboy by comparison”.

Umno’s ‘humble plea’

Yet, the Umno charade continues, as if Najib’s pardon - like other privileges for selected politicians - were an entitlement that lesser mortals should not question.

It continued at the Umno assembly over the weekend. Zahid expressed sadness over the postponement of Najib’s pardon application hearing but maintained his support for the royal institution.

“We continue to uphold the rulers and hope for the best for Najib,” he said.

At the closing session, Zahid repeated the same mantra, making a “humble plea” on behalf of the party to Yang di-Pertuan Agong Sultan Ibrahim Sultan Iskandar to consider a pardon for Najib.

“Umno concedes that this matter (of Najib’s pardon) cannot be resolved at this point, and we respect the process. With utmost humility, we - the Umno general assembly - respectfully appeal for Your Majesty’s gracious consent and royal prerogative to grant a full pardon to Najib,” Zahid said.

Najib has not expressed regret or remorse; he has never apologised for his role in the losses suffered by us, the Malaysian taxpayers, who continue to pay for his excesses and his dealings with Low Taek Jho, better known as Jho Low.

Now let us look at the damage caused. As of March 2023, the government had paid RM43.8 billion of 1MDB’s obligations, while a further RM9.7 billion remained outstanding, comprising RM5 billion in principal and RM4.7 billion in interest, according to then-deputy finance minister Ahmad Maslan.

The scale of these figures is difficult to ignore. Public discussion of accountability cannot be separated from the financial burden ultimately borne by the state and, by extension, taxpayers. Even after tens of billions of ringgit had been paid, substantial liabilities remained.

Viewed financially, the cost is not limited to the principal sums involved. It includes the opportunity cost of capital. Using a simplified illustration, a notional RM50 billion placed at five per cent annual interest over six years would generate more than RM17 billion through compound growth. While this is merely a hypothetical comparison, it highlights that the economic impact of large-scale losses extends beyond the original amount involved.

Financial consequences

What could the government have done with the extra money? More could have been allocated to healthcare, affordable housing, and a host of other services that would have benefited the nation and its people.

Instead, burdened with debt, we have been asked to tighten our belts, and even our doctors are being paid a pittance for their yeoman service.

The central question in any debate about clemency, pardon, or accountability is therefore not only whether a punishment has been served, but also how society weighs the magnitude of the financial consequences against principles of justice, responsibility, and public trust.

Redemption is atoning for guilt, a fault, or a mistake. Najib has yet to admit wrongdoing or express remorse, despite the Federal Court affirming the guilty verdicts passed by the courts below in the SRC International case.

The word pardon denotes an exercise in forgiving someone—in this case, a convicted wrongdoer. In most cases, the offender expresses remorse and seeks forgiveness, but here, Najib is seeking a pardon defiantly.

Despite billions lost to theft and leakage, justice lags as culprits continue to benefit from their crimes.

And Umno, to a greater extent, has refused to accept that Najib misused public funds, refusing to accept the adage - if you do the crime, you must do the time.

But a clear message has to be sent: the larger the loss, the higher the threshold many citizens believe should apply when considering exceptional relief. And the higher the status, the more severe the punishment should be.

The Rembau Undang has also stated plainly that no person, institution or Exco meeting can supersede the state constitution or the DKU’s authority on matters of adat. Official government positions are customarily issued through the Menteri Besar or State Secretary, not a collective Exco statement of this nature.

This episode fits a pattern. After the August 2026 state election that returned a BN-PN majority, UMNO installed its Menteri Besar and has since used the machinery of the state government to press a contested royal claim. It is an illustration of how UMNO approaches power, using the assumption that “we are the law.” When constitutional limits stand in the way, procedural formalities and institutional boundaries are treated as inconveniences to be brushed aside.

The timing is not accidental. UMNO is preparing for the Melaka state election, seeking to strengthen its position and create conditions more favourable for an early general election. Control of state institutions and the ability to shape narratives around Malay institutions form part of that larger calculation. If UMNO once again leads the federal government, more of the same can be expected where only selective respect for constitutional processes when convenient will be given, and blunt political pressure when not.

Malaysia’s constitutional monarchy rests on clear demarcations of power. The Undangs of Negeri Sembilan hold a unique traditional role in the election and removal of the Yang di-Pertuan Besar, subject to the state constitution and adat. The elected executive does not. Attempts by politicians to insert themselves into that process for partisan advantage damage both the monarchy and public confidence in the rule of law. The courts, the DKU and the constitution itself must be allowed to resolve the dispute without further political interference.

This should be a day of celebration.

But genuine patriotism does not require us to pretend that every question surrounding the formation and subsequent operation of Malaysia has been satisfactorily answered.

Over the past three days, BoPiMaFo has examined the difference between the Malaysia that was promised and the Malaysia that was implemented.

We asked what actually happened to North Borneo in 1963.

We examined a Federal Court finding that at least one safeguard contained in the Inter-Governmental Committee arrangements was never implemented.

We examined security, development, constitutional finance, demographic change, indigenous political participation and the need for a new constitutional strategy.

Today we ask the larger question:

HAS THE TIME COME TO INTERNATIONALISE THE UNFINISHED CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THE FORMATION AND PERFORMANCE OF MALAYSIA?

BoPiMaFo believes the answer is yes.

But internationalisation must be based on documents, law and evidence — not slogans.

MA63 IS ALREADY AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT

The Malaysia Agreement 1963 is not merely a Malaysian political document.

It is an international agreement concluded in London on 9 July 1963 involving the United Kingdom, the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore. It was registered with the UN on the 21st September 1970, bearing the number 10760.

It entered into force on 16 September 1963 and was subsequently registered with the United Nations.

Article VIII itself required the Governments concerned to take legislative, executive or other action necessary to implement specified assurances, undertakings and recommendations in the IGC Report where they were not already expressly incorporated into the Constitution.

That alone makes the continuing performance of the founding arrangements a legitimate subject of serious historical and international legal study.

Internationalising MA63 does not mean marching into the United Nations tomorrow and demanding that Malaysia be dissolved.

Nor does registration of MA63 with the United Nations automatically give Sabah standing before the International Court of Justice.

Those propositions would be legally simplistic.

Internationalisation means something more serious:

placing the complete history, legal framework and subsequent performance of the Malaysia settlement before international scholars, jurists, parliamentarians, indigenous-rights institutions and appropriate United Nations mechanisms.

DECOLONISATION MUST ALSO BE EXAMINED

North Borneo did not enter 1963 as an internationally sovereign State comparable with independent Malaya.

It was a British Crown Colony undergoing decolonisation.

That makes the United Nations decolonisation framework relevant.

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), adopted on 14 December 1960, declared the principle of self-determination in the process of ending colonial rule.

Resolution 1541 (XV) elaborated the possible forms by which a non-self-governing territory could attain a full measure of self-government. The United Nations today summarises those principal outcomes as independence, free association with an independent State, or integration with an independent State.

These resolutions do not, by themselves, prove that the formation of Malaysia was unlawful.

Nor should Sabahans pretend that Resolution 1541 is an automatic sixty-three-year-late exit clause.

But they do raise legitimate historical questions.

How freely was North Borneo’s future political status determined?

What choices were genuinely available?

How was public opinion ascertained?

Was integration founded upon equality?

What role did the safeguards subsequently embodied in MA63, the IGC arrangements and the Constitution play in obtaining acceptance of Malaysia?

And what is the significance if important safeguards were subsequently not implemented, diluted or transformed?

Those questions deserve international academic and legal examination.

THE COLONIAL CAPACITY QUESTION HAS NEVER DISAPPEARED

There is another issue which deserves much deeper consideration.

When MA63 was signed on 9 July 1963, North Borneo and Sarawak were still British colonial territories.

Yet their representatives signed the Agreement, and the United Nations Treaty Series records North Borneo and Sarawak among the participants.

Britain subsequently informed the United Nations that, following the creation of Malaysia, it was no longer responsible for the international relations of North Borneo and Sarawak.

This does not automatically invalidate MA63.

But it raises a serious international-law question:

IN WHAT PRECISE LEGAL CAPACITY DID NORTH BORNEO AND SARAWAK PARTICIPATE IN AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT WHILE BRITAIN STILL HELD RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?

Who authorised the representatives?

What precisely was the legal nature of their participation?

How did that process interact with the peoples’ right of self-determination?

These questions should not be feared.

If the constitutional foundations of Malaysia are sound, historical scrutiny should strengthen rather than weaken them.

SABAH’S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES CANNOT BE LEFT OUT

Internationalisation must also address the rights of Sabah’s indigenous peoples.

The Federal Constitution itself recognises the natives of Sabah, including through Article 161A and the wider constitutional protections associated with their special position.

But international indigenous-rights law adds another dimension.

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognises important principles concerning self-determination, participation in decision-making, indigenous institutions, traditional lands, territories and resources. Articles 25 and 26, for example, address indigenous relationships with traditionally owned or occupied lands, waters and resources.

The United Nations also emphasises full and effective indigenous participation in decisions affecting their lives, traditional lands, territories and cultural integrity.

These principles have profound relevance to Sabah.

Native customary land.

Forests.

Minerals.

Plantations.

Resource concessions.

Culture.

Political representation.

And demographic change.

This brings us directly to one of Sabah’s most disturbing unresolved questions.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE CAN BECOME A QUESTION OF INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

Sabah has experienced decades of extraordinary irregular immigration and controversy surrounding identity documentation and what became known as Project IC.

If foreigners were unlawfully documented as citizens and subsequently entered the electoral roll, the consequences would extend beyond ordinary immigration enforcement.

Every unlawfully registered voter would alter the relative weight of lawful votes.

And if this occurred on a sufficiently large scale, it could dilute the political influence of Sabah’s indigenous peoples in their ancestral homeland.

Let us be precise.

Article 161A does not guarantee permanent political dominance to Sabah natives.

Nor does international law entitle indigenous peoples to suppress the democratic rights of other lawful citizens.

Every lawful Malaysian citizen has an equal right to vote.

But lawful demographic change is fundamentally different from electoral change produced through unlawful citizenship or fraudulent documentation.

The principle is simple:

EVERY LAWFUL CITIZEN’S VOTE MUST COUNT.

But equally:

NO UNLAWFUL VOTE SHOULD CANCEL THE LAWFUL VOTE OF A SABAHAN.

If demographic or electoral manipulation occurred, its impact upon indigenous political participation deserves both constitutional and international scrutiny.

INTERNATIONALISE THE DEVELOPMENT QUESTION TOO

Sabah’s international story is not merely about political status.

It is also about development.

A territory blessed with petroleum, gas, timber, land, fisheries and enormous natural wealth today records Malaysia’s highest incidence of absolute poverty.

That contradiction deserves examination against the economic expectations accompanying Malaysia’s formation.

Sabah also possesses special constitutional financial arrangements, including the machinery surrounding the 40 per cent entitlement.

The question therefore is not simply how much development expenditure Putrajaya has announced.

The deeper questions are:

How much federal revenue has been derived from Sabah?

What was Sabah constitutionally entitled to?

What was actually returned?

And what development might have occurred had every financial entitlement been faithfully implemented?

This is not an argument that every Sabahan economic problem was created by Kuala Lumpur.

Sabah governments must answer for their own corruption, waste and failures.

But local failure does not erase federal constitutional responsibility.

FROM FEDERATION TOWARDS A NEW COMPACT

Internationalising Sabah’s constitutional questions does not mean that Malaysia must be destroyed.

There is another possibility.

Malaysia can be restructured.

MA63 did not establish a legal confederation.

The Federal Constitution establishes a federation.

We should state that honestly.

But nothing prevents Sabah, Sarawak and Malaysia from negotiating a fundamentally more decentralised arrangement for the future.

Call it asymmetric federalism.

Call it confederal federalism.

Call it a new constitutional compact.

The terminology matters less than the substance.

Sabah and Sarawak should exercise considerably greater authority over matters inherently local to them.

Federal authority should concentrate upon matters genuinely common to the whole federation.

There should be meaningful fiscal autonomy.

Meaningful Borneonisation.

Protection of indigenous lands and institutions.

Demographic and electoral security.

Meaningful Borneo parliamentary representation.

Effective consent mechanisms.

And enforceable constitutional safeguards which cannot simply disappear through political neglect.

SABAH AND SARAWAK SHOULD SPEAK TO THE WORLD

The next phase should therefore involve building an international-quality documentary case.

Collect the British archives.

Open Malaysian records.

Audit every MA63 and IGC safeguard.

Examine the UN Malaysia Mission.

Study Resolutions 1514 and 1541.

Examine UNDRIP.

Document Project IC and the demographic question.

Calculate Sabah’s financial entitlements.

Examine territorial waters, petroleum, Labuan and parliamentary representation.

Then present the evidence professionally.

To international jurists.

Universities.

Parliamentarians.

Indigenous organisations.

Human-rights institutions.

Civil society.

And appropriate United Nations mechanisms.

Not to manufacture hostility against Malaysia.

But to ensure that Sabah and Sarawak’s historical and constitutional questions can no longer be treated merely as inconvenient domestic political complaints.

MALAYSIA SHOULD NOT FEAR THIS

Some will immediately accuse anyone who speaks of internationalising MA63 of disloyalty.

That response misses the point.

Malaysia itself arose from an international agreement and a decolonisation process involving Britain, Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak, Singapore and the United Nations.

Why then should examination of that international history be forbidden?

A confident Malaysia should say:

Open the documents.

Examine the history.

Test the legal arguments.

Audit the promises.

Correct what was not performed.

And negotiate a better settlement where the old one no longer works.

That is confidence.

Suppressing questions is not.

MALAYSIA DAY MUST BECOME MORE THAN A CEREMONY

Today there will be speeches about unity.

There will be flags.

There will be reminders that Sabah and Sarawak helped create Malaysia.

All of that has its place.

But after sixty-three years, Sabahans deserve something more substantial than annual recognition every 16 September.

We deserve answers.

Was the founding bargain faithfully performed?

Were our safeguards implemented?

Were our security assurances honoured?

Were our constitutional financial rights respected?

Were the indigenous peoples of Sabah adequately protected?

Was Sabah permitted to develop in proportion to the immense wealth extracted from its territory?

And does the present federal structure still reflect the partnership envisioned in 1963?

Those questions will not disappear because they make people uncomfortable.

They will grow.

The choice before Malaysia is therefore not between discussing MA63 and forgetting MA63.

The real choice is between:

A MALAYSIA PERMANENTLY HAUNTED BY AN UNFINISHED FOUNDING BARGAIN

and

A MALAYSIA CONFIDENT ENOUGH TO REOPEN THAT BARGAIN, CORRECT ITS FAILURES AND BUILD A FAIRER CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE.

BoPiMaFo chooses the second.

We want a Malaysia worth preserving.

But preservation cannot mean freezing every constitutional imbalance forever.

Malaysia should survive because Sabahans, Sarawakians and Malayans continue freely to believe that the federation is fair, dignified and beneficial to all its peoples.

That is the Malaysia Day conversation we should now begin.

Not next year.

Now.

SELAMAT HARI MALAYSIA.

DANIEL JOHN JAMBUN

Borneo’s Plight in Malaysia Foundation (BoPiMaFo)

16 September 2026

Primary references:

Malaysia Agreement 1963; Inter-Governmental Committee Report; Federal Constitution; United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV); United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; United Nations Malaysia Mission materials; Cobbold Commission Report; relevant British archival records and United Nations Treaty Series materials.

Malaysiakini : In position, but not in power

Academics and historians would no doubt point to a kind of golden age of non-Muslims/Malay political participation, and they would be correct.

This idea of the government and bureaucracy as totemic “Malay” institutions was not as politically ingrained as it is today.

S Samy Vellu (below), the former big cheese of MIC, in an interview with Malaysiakini back in the day, let loose on what he believed was the “curse” that afflicted BN.

He also admitted the component parties were not treated as equals, warned that some in the civil service were sabotaging policy and did not even consider the non-Malays as Malaysians, and seemed shocked that the majority community was flirting with equality.

Samy Vellu stressed that while the government is not discriminatory, those in the civil service are.

“Anything for other races, they don’t like to see it... Some of them don’t consider us (non-Malays) as Malaysians. They are the ones who brought BN down in this election,” he said, referring to the 2008 general election, when BN lost its two-thirds majority for the first time.

And the demonisation and neutering of the biggest non-Malay/Muslim political party reached its nadir when former prime minister Dr Mahathri Mohammad admitted that DAP veteran Lim Guan Eng had no power in the cabinet.

Mahathir even said that the Malays were getting far more than the Chinese community in terms of government allocations, but nothing could be said because it would upset the DAP base.

“So, how come he is said to be the one with the power? He had no power,” the former prime minister said.

While DAP was involved in discussions about the country’s economy and finances, Mahathir (above) added that the party had to consider the Malays too.

Convenient scapegoats

The Malay political establishment needs to project a fig leaf of inclusivity, but make no mistake, the non-Malay/Muslim community and their political leaders would always be the convenient whipping boys for the failures of the Malay establishment, as former Kedah menteri besar Muhkriz Mahathir said in an interview with Malaysiakini.

“Looking at Umno, when there were big issues which we could not address, we would talk about DAP, Chinese chauvinism, and how (DAP leader) Lim Kit Siang becoming prime minister would destroy Malaysia, that the Malays would disappear, and the mosques could no longer air the azan.

“I admit that I too have said such things in front of a 100 percent Malay audience. Thinking back, I feel guilty and a sense of regret,” said Mukhriz.

So now you know that whenever Umno Youth chief Dr Akmal Saleh (above) goes on a rampage, it is because Umno has done something and it needs a distraction.

Creeping Islamisation and DEI hires

Malaysia’s urban demographics and policy decisions have enabled relative economic success despite all the leakages, and this is why this country has been able to maintain the facade of being a “moderate” Islamic country.

In other words, there was political will that this country would not turn into just another failed Islamic state. This was always the centrist malarkey of Umno/BN.

But the plan is changing - not by the political class, but by the Islamisation process that was used by the political class to ensure continuity of power and inherited by an organisation like PAS, which has played the long game extremely well.

The Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism and Taoism (MCCBCHST), responding to Hadi, said - “As the Constitution stands today, a theocratic Islamic state is not possible, as it would be an attack on the basic structure of the Constitution, which includes protection of fundamental rights of minorities.”

A couple of points need to be made here. First, the Constitution has always been interpreted in a way that justifies Malay supremacy, first by the Umno/BN regime and then by whatever coalition followed.

Second, PAS has made it clear by their diktats, slaying of sacred secular cows, and the coddling of the state that they believe that Islam is above the Malaysian Federal Constitution.

In criticising the DAP’s secular stance, this is what PAS deputy president Tuan Ibrahim Tuan Man said: “Malaysia is not a secular country. If it was, why should DAP include ‘to fight for a secular country’ in its own manifesto?

“Islam is the official religion of the federation. Then there is the idea of Malaysian Malaysia. No Malay can accept the concept of equality.

“We accept the basic pillars in the formation of the country such as Islam being the official religion, Malay rulers’ position, Malay language as the official language, Malay culture as the national culture including the special privileges of the Malays.”

If you chronicle the gradual erosion of non-Muslim power, what you will discover is how non-Muslim political operatives have slowly, over the decades, lost access to power when it comes to policymaking.

They are instead relegated to positions where their every move is predicated on not spooking the Malays. All these press announcements by non-Muslim ministers are merely a pantomime of policymaking.

You get all these non-Muslims in what everyone assumes are important nation-building portfolios, but they really are subservient to Malay uber alles principles and, of course, the machinations of the civil service.

Think of them as DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion) hires.

Even when they are bringing in revenue to this country, they become targets for the champions of bangsa and agama.

A good example would be Tourism, Arts, and Culture Minister Tiong King Sing (below), who had to remind folks that he was not a Muslim.

Was it always like this? Ask any non-Muslim who was in government service, and they will tell you, especially the very old-timers, how things changed. How it evolved from we are all in this together to us against them.

I can’t bring myself to be outraged because Hadi, as usual, is just saying the quiet part aloud.