First, a plan is approved based on forecasts. Then construction starts. Then real costs start to appear. Then problems and overruns become clear. Then decisions are made to fix the situation.

By the time correction happens, the project is already partly locked in, and that is the stage where difficult decisions must be made. Continue and let costs grow further. Or step in and control it.

Most people look at this as a political issue, whereas the real issue is how the contracts are designed.

More expensive, higher fees

In the original model, the project delivery partner was paid based on the total value of the project, and that creates a simple problem.

If the project becomes more expensive, fees can increase. This may not necessarily be corruption, but it is a system that can encourage higher costs over time.

So when the system was changed to fixed-price contracting, that mattered. It was not just paperwork, but a way to control future spending. That is what fiscal discipline actually looks like.

This problem is not unique to Malaysia. In the United Kingdom, the HS2 high-speed rail project has also faced ballooning costs, redesigns, delays, and scope changes.

Parts have been reduced or reconsidered as costs became too high. Not because anyone “failed”, but because large infrastructure projects often cost more than originally expected.

So, when that happens, governments must adjust.

With the LRT3, the disagreement is not really about whether it should exist. It does exist and the disagreement is about what certain decisions mean.

One view says that reducing scope means the project was weakened. Another view says that reducing scope means costs were brought under control.

Both views sound reasonable, but they lead to very different conclusions about responsibility.

Not a simple story

Big infrastructure projects are not one decision, but many decisions over many years, so we should not treat them as one simple story.

There are different stages: approval, construction, adjustment and completion. Each stage involves different people. Each has different pressures. Thus, each stage should be judged differently.

The most important question is not who approved the project, or who completed it, or who inherited it.

The most important question is this: When costs started rising, were decisions made early enough to prevent bigger financial damage later? Because in public finance, the biggest risk is not change, but waiting too long to change.

No one likes changes in big projects. They are hugely controversial and often criticised; but if no changes are made when costs rise, the problem can worsen.

Regrettably, the public pays for it later; through higher debt, higher taxes, or when other services are reduced.

That is the real trade-off.

The LRT3 line is now complete and that is good. However, completion should not stop questions.

We still need to ask how decisions were made along the way. Not to blame individuals for political reasons, but to understand whether public money is being managed properly.

In the end, fiscal discipline is not about political narratives or competing claims of credit.

It is about whether difficult decisions are made early enough to prevent problems from becoming crises, or whether political narratives later turn responsibility into blame.