Malaysiakini : These places gave them a taste of home. They could purchase “English tea”, biscuits, beer, canned food, cigarettes and toiletries. They indulged in many familiar routines or enjoyed simple hot meals, like sausages, mash, stews and pies.

These spaces were highly regulated, with clear rank boundaries and firm expectations of conduct.

In Ipoh, the Naafi store was located on Jalan Ashby, overlooking the nearby Gurdwara Sahib Ashby.

When the British army left in the 1960s to 1970s, they took their soldiers, but left behind mess halls, officer canteens and structured templates for professional conduct across the ranks.

Under Naafi, socialising was regulated, breaches carried serious consequences, and alcohol misuse, coercion of juniors, or unauthorised outsiders were not tolerated.

Gaps in enforcement

The misconduct now described as yeye culture is not a continuation of that system; it emerged decades later due to gaps in enforcement and elite tolerance.

Early Malaysian officers inherited these facilities and largely maintained professional standards. Mess halls were used to build camaraderie, morale, and unit cohesion, not excess.

After the British left, tweaks were introduced to give the system a local flavour: alcohol was removed, and family participation in social gatherings was encouraged.

Officers cannot fairly be blamed for later misconduct, because what changed was enforcement, not the social template.

Over time, rules remained on paper, but leadership tolerance widened the gap between policy and practice.

Yeye culture emerged gradually, where certain conditions aligned: junior officers were dependent on seniors for career advancement, questionable behaviours were quietly tolerated, and power was concentrated at the top, enabling selective enforcement.

Formally banned, but…

By the time the practice was formally banned in 1998, it had already taken root in some units. It was not formally sanctioned, but allowed to persist.

Some explanations point to lapses in faith, moral decline, or lingering colonial influence, but these are misleading. Misconduct occurs when those with power feel immune to consequences.

The Armed Forces Islamic Services Corps (Kagat), established in 1985, can advise, counsel, and recommend action, but cannot punish.

Discipline starts at the top, and only commanding officers and generals have the authority to discipline personnel.

When senior officers are themselves involved or choose to protect colleagues, advisory or moral oversight by Kagat cannot compel action.

Enforcement depends on the willingness of those at the top, not on rules, reports, or ethical guidance alone.

Under fire

According to Malaysiakini reports, the “parti yeye” culture has continued to plague the armed forces, despite the ban and Kagat’s formation, highlighting the difficulty in cracking down when high-ranking officers are implicated.

Retired brigadier-general Arshad Raji emphasised that such events could only occur with the knowledge and consent of a camp’s commanding officer, describing it as “impossible” for them to claim ignorance.

He said, "What happened here (as alleged in viral claims) is not right. Do not turn officers’ mess halls into a whore house."

Even personal lives suffer: Zhane, the ex-wife of a captain, said her marriage ended within two years of her husband’s participation in wild parties.

She addressed the failure of leadership and said, "It is all up to the leadership of the battalion. If you get a boss who is good and cares about the welfare of his officers and their families, it is a blessing."

The camp’s top brass knew, but chose not to act, despite her attempts to report the matter through proper channels.

Such tolerance at the top filters down the ranks by normalising behaviours that would otherwise be unacceptable.

Are these incidents isolated? What do insiders reveal? What will trigger enforcement? Did gatherings go unnoticed and were quietly tolerated until social media exposure and incriminating photos forced action?

Military social spaces can exist

This culture of tolerance mirrors other challenges in the armed forces, including procurement scandals and misuse of welfare funds.

The pattern is consistent: concentrated power weakens oversight, enables selective enforcement, and erodes institutional credibility.

Order, by contrast, depends on effective oversight, accountability, and leadership.

Naafi is mentioned to provide context, not blame. It shows that similar social spaces can operate under strict discipline.

Today’s failures are post-colonial, structural, and leadership-driven; they are not historical, cultural, or religious.

Misconduct thrives when power shields it. Discipline, integrity, and reform do not rise from the bottom. They begin at the top, where authority holds sway. This is not an attack on the armed forces; it is a defence of professionalism.

The MACC has been investigating military procurements since 2023, but that does not address decades of tolerated misconduct and weak enforcement. Will the MACC investigate earlier purchases?

So, until those in power are held responsible for what occurs under their command, the cycle of tolerance and misconduct will continue.