Under PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang, this takes a more exclusivist tone of marginalising non-believers.

Another proof of PAS’ long-term vision is its launch of the “Wawasan Induk Negara Sejahtera 2051” that lays its grand vision of how Malaysia should be transformed at the party’s 100th year.

That is why it does not see coalition partnership the same way other parties do. It does not matter who they work with, as long as it serves them to get closer to the party’s long-term vision.

PAS used to hold on to the principle of “tahaluf siyasi” (or political pact) to justify working with BN (1974), Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (1990), Barisan Alternatif (1999), Pakatan Rakyat (2008).

It then changed to a new strategy called “ta’awun siyasi” (or political cooperation), which is a looser concept that allows it to work with as many parties as possible - even at the same time.

It was what helped justify a flexible partnership with arch-rival Umno, but still formed a political coalition with Bersatu. It was why this was perceived as a betrayal to Umno but was logical to PAS and its long-term vision.

‘Big brother’ tendency

Second, PAS has a “big brother” tendency that is growing by the election. When times are good, it would not take long before PAS shows how uncomfortable they are playing second fiddle.

In 1999, when it won 27 seats (from the previous seven seats) as part of Barisan Alternatif with DAP, Keadilan, and Parti Rakyat Malaysia (PRM), it became overzealous and started pursuing kharaj land tax on non-Muslims, mandating Muslim dress codes, banning gambling and restricting alcohol, and pushed for syariah enactments in Kelantan and Terengganu.

DAP left the pact. The current rift with Bersatu is similar, as PAS is not only the largest party in Parliament now, but has also made breakthroughs in Sabah and Negeri Sembilan to feel confident.

Even when times are bad, PAS has a track record of making unilateral decisions and violating coalition principles. Despite rejections by DAP and PKR, PAS insisted on implementing hudud when it was part of Pakatan Rakyat.

Similarly, Umno’s main grievance against PAS was that the Islamic party did not consult Umno before forming Perikatan Nasional, resulting in the severance of trust and the MN structure.

And this can be attributed to how PAS works. Its ulama leadership is the central authority. The veto authority of its ulama outweighs any coalition discussion.

It is hard for PAS to view its ulama as being subservient or even equal to other coalition partners. After all, any partnership is meant to serve PAS’ highest truth of governing the country with Islam. There could not be anything higher.

Third, PAS’ ideological stance will not shift. In its party constitution, 2003 Islamic State document, official speeches, and multiple peer-reviewed journals, it is unambiguous that PAS is intent on an Islamic state that runs on Islamic precepts and syariah laws.

The short diversion to use “negara berkebajikan” (welfare state) in 2011 was simply a matter of relabelling and sequencing (welfare first, to lead to an Islamic state).

Other parties are aware of this, but were still open to working with PAS because of what they bring. PAS has one of the most disciplined party machinery that could be mobilised in an instant.

Its 70-year grassroots infrastructure is mature, covering pre-schools to secondary schools, youth volunteering corps, and civil society. In a world where voters are split, a party that could deliver between 30 to 40 MP seats with certainty is a kingmaker.

By this time, every party knows what it is like to work with PAS. Yet, most parties are still tempted to consider, given PAS’ seemingly unstoppable electoral ascendency.

These parties will convince themselves that they could manage PAS’ behaviour and eventually come out on top. However, they should ask Bersatu how this turned out.