Jihad Watch : Jonathan Ariel argues that the American debacle in Afghanistan can be
traced back to Washingtonās failure, decades ago, to confront Pakistan
over its support of the Taliban, which has sometimes been hidden but
never wavered. His analysis is here.
The seeds of the humiliating American withdrawal
from Afghanistan were laid shortly after the post 9/11 US invasion of
the country, when the United States refrained from confronting Pakistan
over its continued support of its Taliban proxy.
The Taliban was founded in 1980 as a joint US-Pakistani-Saudi
effort to combat Soviet troops in Afghanistan shortly after the USSRās
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.
Pakistan provided the geographical base and an almost endless
supply of manpower, primarily Pashtuns, who comprise about 40% to 45%
of Afghanistan and approximately 20% of Pakistan. About 85% of them live
in āPashtunistan,ā which straddles the Durand Line. The United States
provided the weapons while Saudi Arabia provided the funding to buy
those weapons and cover the costs of maintaining Afghan refugee camps in
Pakistan.
The Pashtun-dominated Taliban rapidly emerged as the biggest
and best-armed component of the mujahideen, the umbrella organization of
Afghan rebels fighting Soviet troops in Afghanistanā¦.
The Taliban consists almost entirely of ethnic Pashtuns, who are
spread between Afghanistan and Pakistan; the border ā demarcated by the
Durand Line ā does not exist for them; they cross the porous border at
will. Pashtuns from Pakistan helped Afghani Pashtuns in the āTalibanā
movement that the U.S., Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia together created to
fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. That effort proved successful; the
Taliban turned out to be the most numerous and best fighters against the
Russians in Afghanistan.
Once the Russians left Afghanistan, a civil war broke out between the
Taliban and the other, less islamically fanatical, mujahideen groups.
Pakistan at that point, through its sinister Inter-Service Intelligence
(ISI), continued to support the Taliban with weapons, training, and when
needed, safe refuges; ISI kept to this policy even after the Taliban
started cooperating with Al Qaeda. The Pakistanis didnāt care. Many of
them, too, supported Al Qaeda.
After 9/11, Pakistan could not be seen by the Americans as aiding the
Taliban, a terror group that had given refuge to Al-Qaeda, which had
just murdered 3,000 Americans. So it engaged in subterfuge, pretending
to end its support of the Taliban, but all the while continuing to help
it. The ISI persuaded the Taliban to leave Afghanistan and, without
engaging American forces in battle ā which would have ended in a
crushing defeat for the group ā to move to Pakistan where its members
could live safe from American attacks, establish their training camps,
and wait for the moment when American forces had been sufficiently drawn
down, or perhaps pulled out altogether, in order to reenter, and
reconquer, Afghanistan. That is exactly what happened this past August.
Pakistan, with Saudi financial backing, continued
to maintain the Taliban as a viable force to be deployed when, in the
fullness of time, the United States would tire of the never-ending war
in the country and begin extricating itself. In addition, Pakistan
continued to play a double game with the United States by allowing the
ISI-backed Haqqani network to continue to operate in Pakistan. Khalil
Haqqani, who despite having a $5 million bounty on his head as a wanted
terrorist had long been a regular visitor to ISI HQ, is now one of the
new rulers of Afghanistan.
Pakistanās duplicity went beyond its continued support of the Taliban
while pretending to the Americans that it had abandoned the group. The
so-called Haqqani network of Islamic terrorists takes its name from a
family; Jalaluddin Haqqani was the founder of the group of hardline
Muslims; the Haqqanis were allies of the Taliban, and even more damning,
of Al-Qaeda. Yet Khalil Haqqani, the groupās chief fund-raiser, was āa
regular visitorāto the ISI HQ, where he received both money and weapons
from the Pakistanis. Haqqani has just emerged as one of the Taliban
rulers in Afghanistan.
It is clear that even as late as June 2021, had
the United States made clear to Pakistan that if it didnāt ensure that
the Taliban would permit a peaceful and orderly withdrawal of all US
personnel and their Afghan allies who wished to leave the country there
would be hell to pay, this debacle would never have happened. The United
States has almost unlimited leverage over Pakistan, from applying
crippling sanctions to broadly hinting it will give India a green light
to retake the parts of Kashmir (Gilgit-Baltistan) that have been under
unrecognized Pakistani occupation since 1948.
Pakistan has for decades been the spoiled child of American foreign
policy. Its terry-thomas-moustachioed, swagger-sticked generals were
regarded by their American counterparts as splendid fellows, so much
more trustworthy than the Soviet-leaning Indians, such as Jawaharlal
Nehru and Krishna Menon. Besides, Washington reasoned, those Pakistani
Muslims hated Communists. So they did; but they also hated Infidels. The
country has been a major recipient of American aid, year after year. It
was American aid dollars that paid for Pakistanās nuclear program.
The Americans had invested so much money, and trust, in Pakistan that
they didnāt want to believe in the duplicity of Islamabad. The U.S.
could have read Pakistan the riot act and told it to demand of the
Taliban that it ensure an unhurried and organized withdrawal of the
Americans and their local allies from Afghanistan, but it failed to do
so. It could have threatened to cut off all aid, to impose economic
sanctions, to give India the signal that it should go ahead, with
American blessing, and take back parts of Kashmir that Pakistan has
illegally occupied since 1948. None of this was attempted.
Given the huge disparity between Pakistani and
American capabilities, Pakistanās limited nuclear capabilities would
have been irrelevant, because 165 warheads mounted on relatively
short-range (2,650 kilometers) Shaheen-3 missiles do not constitute an
actual threat to the United States. Pakistanās generals might have
chutzpah but are competent professionals, not suicidal maniacs. In the
face of a credible US threat, they would seek a diplomatic solutionā¦.
Pakistan has 165 nuclear warheads, the U.S. has 5,550, more than 34
times as many. But more important, there is no threat of these landing
in the U.S.; Pakistanās Shaheen-3 missiles have a range of 2,650 km.,
but the distance from Pakistan to the U.S. is 12,350 km.; there is no
chance of Pakistanās nuclear bombs landing on American soil.
Israeli military planners are particularly worried about the huge
armory of 150,000 rockets, some of them precision-guided, that Hezbollah
now possesses, hidden throughout southern Lebanon. It doesnāt want them
to be let loose in a series of massive barrages at Israeli civilian
population centers; thousands launched every day for a month would be
far too much for the Iron Dome missile defense system to handle.
This is not, however, the only reason, as militarily, Israel has the capacity to defeat both Iranian proxies. In
order to destroy Hamas, Israel would have to resume the status of
Gazaās occupying power, or ensure in advance that a multinational force
of some kind would be available and capable of assuming responsibility
for Gaza. No such force is likely to come into existence anytime soon. A
unilateral Israeli occupation of Gaza is possible, but would exact a
prohibitive price economically, diplomatically and in terms of public
opinion.
The Israelis do not want the massive headache of reoccupying Gaza
militarily, even though it is the only way to assure the complete
destruction of Hamas, and not merely offer another episode of āmowing
the grassā in Gaza. There is no U.N. force likely to step in to do the
job; it was had enough to find a handful of UN peacekeepers to
ineffectually patrol in southern Lebanon. Once Israel had defeated Hamas
in Gaza, and the IDF established its presence in the Strip, it would
then be up to Israel, as the occupier, to prevent chaos, first of all by
providing economic support to the impoverished Gazans. Israel is sure
to be attacked, too, on the diplomatic level, in the UNās various
bodies, from the General Assembly to the UN Human Rights Council, to the
Security Council, but also will be raked over the coals in the worldās
media, that will paint the Jewish state as an aggressor and āoccupierā
that needs to be pushed out of Gaza.
Destroying Hezbollah would require Israel to
destroy half of Lebanon, since Hezbollah is a state within a state that
is more powerful than the legitimate state itself. Militarily it can be
done, but would create a humanitarian and public relations disaster.
Israel has therefore based its policy on containment and management,
having concluded that the economic, diplomatic and military sacrifices
and ramifications the alternative would entail are too expensiveā¦.
Hezbollah has entrenched itself so thoroughly within the civilian
population of Lebanon, hidden its 150,000 rockets, and rocket launchers,
inside schools, hospitals, office and apartment buildings, that in
destroying as much of that weaponry as it can, Israel would also be
destroying a great deal of the countryās civilian infrastructure. This
would become for Israel, as Jonathan Ariel says, āa humanitarian and
public relations disaster.ā Nor do the Israelis want to endure the
casualties ā the dead and wounded IDF soldiers ā that a full-scale
ground invasion would entail.
In treating Pakistan as an ally, rather than as the duplicitous
supporter of the Taliban, the US could never wipe out the group, which
could find refuge and regroup, and continue to train safely, inside
Pakistan.
Jonathan Ariel argues that Israel can no longer rely on the
ācontainmentā of the threat from Iranās nuclear project; it needs to
āneutralizeā ā that is, destroy entirely ā the threat of a nuclear Iran.
Israelās Mossad has over more than a decade managed to repeatedly slow
down ā to ācontainā ā Iranās race to the bomb. Mossad introduced the
Stuxnet computer worm that caused 1,000 centrifuges to spin out of
control and destroy themselves; Mossad agents assassinated five of
Iranās top nuclear scientists; Mossadās agents stole Iranās entire
nuclear archive and brought it back to Israel, where study of the
documents showed just how extensive, and well-hidden, Iranās nuclear
program had been; Mossad caused the destruction, through sabotage, of
two centrifuge plants at Natanz, one in 2020 and another, its
replacement that had been built 50 meters underground, in 2021. And
Israel has kept the Iranian regime rattled, too, by a series of
unexplained explosions and fires at petrochemical plants, electric
plants, and other major infrastructure throughout Iran. But while Israel
has slowed down Iranās nuclear program, the Iranians have not been
dissuaded: they continue to hide nuclear facilities from the IAEA, and
are rapidly enriching uranium, which under the JCPOA was supposed to
attain a maximum level of 3.7%; now the Iranians have managed to enrich
uranium to a level of 60%, and the breakout period to a bomb is a
matter, some ā including Israelās Secretary of Defense Gantz ā say, of
months, not years.
The debacle in Afghanistan should have startled the Israelis into
this realization: they cannot count on the Bidenites to prevent Iran
from producing a bomb. Biden may solemnly promise that on his watch Iran
will not get a bomb, but how likely is it that, given his recent
behavior, he would go to war, when he is so determined to leave the
Middle East, in order to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power?
The lesson of Afghanistan, now under Taliban rule after the hasty,
ill-planned, confused, and ignominious American withdrawal, that has
persuaded many Muslims of American decline and a Muslim ascendancy, is
for the Jewish state very simple and very stark: Israel, you are on your
own.