| Confrontation Part 2 |
| Friday, November 15, 2013 |
The rise of the General Yani on Nasutionās behalf was only one of many minor indications of upcoming trouble for the US courtship of the Indonesian army. Nasutionās stance in Konfrontasi had demonstrated that General Nasution and the army was, although anticommunist, also nationalists. Nasution himself was not necessarily pro-stabilization nor was he against Konfrontasi. In the US offensive and systemic approach, the army could hence turn out to become impediments as well as assets.
The administrationās remaining hope for reviving the stabilization program were then focused on a small group of persons. Only one of them was Indonesian. In Djakarta, the most ardent supporter of stabilization had been First Minister Djuanda Kartawidaja. Besides Djuanda, few people seemed able to move Sukarno in pro-stabilization direction. On November 7, Djuanda died on a nightclub in Djakarta.
In the administration, November became the month where disillusion replaced hope. After Konfrontasi, the stabilization effort had been impaired both by Congress and Sukarno. The Indonesian army were in no position, nor seemed to have the will to support the US offensive effort. When Djuanda died, the single factor on which the whole offensive effort now seemed to rest, was Kennedy himself, through the personal rapport he was believed to have with Sukarno. The president, in the administration jargon, had become the only leverage left.
On November 22, Kennedy was shot in Dallas. At the time, both Nasution and Jones were in Washington, both still waiting for meetings with Kennedy. The psychological effect in the administration was devastating. When Kennedy died, the US not only temporarily lost political leadership, which to some degree could be substituted, they lost permanently what they only days before had concluded was their main asset towards Djakarta. "The light had gone out of the day," Jones writes, "The assassinās bullet put an end to our plans and disposed of the immediate prospects for settlement of the Malaysia dispute."96
As seen from Washington, the spring of 1963 had, despite Konfrontasi, seen a steady improvement in US-Indonesian relations. The stabilization effort, despite Congress reluctance to support it, seemed to be progressing and Sukarnoās anti-Malaysian actions seemed to be returning to the rhetorical level. However, the British, Malaysia, Congress and the American press viewed Sukarnoās actions as expressions of a basic expansionism which needed to be contained with firmness. Hence the British and the US, despite having basically the same objectives, counteracted each other. A circle of escalation emerged, where a firm statement from London or Kuala Lumpur, in the administrationās view, resulted in increased aggression from Djakarta or halted negotiations. The US then persuaded Sukarno into reassuming talks using future aid as leverage, and each time going closer to the point of providing Sukarno an ultimatum on aid. The peak was reached when the US used a privately conveyed ultimatum after the formation of Malaysia. Sukarno seemed first to accept, but another firm action by Kuala Lumpur again made Sukarno increase aggression.
The administration thus had exhausted all their available negative sanctions while attempting to counter the negative effects of British and Malay firmness towards Sukarno. While the British firmness stemmed from the British basic interpretation of Sukarno as basically an expansionist who had to be contained by force, the US had based their policy on the interpretation that Konfrontasi was a byproduct of complex Indonesian internal affairs, not a basic feature of Sukarnoās policy. Hence, the US believed Konfrontasi could be contained through negotiations, and that stabilization was more important than containing Sukarno by firmness.
The Congress and press put limits on how far the Administration could utilize positive sanctions. While the negative sanctions of aid had been exhausted, the positive could still be utilized through the promises of future aid if Sukarno limited Konfrontasi. However, the press and Congress, interpreted aid to Indonesia as direct support to Konfrontasi and Sukarno. By September, Konfrontasi had escalated to a stage where the Congress and Press no longer would accept continued aid to Indonesia. Hence, the US were derived of both the positive and negative sanctions built into their offensive strategy.
In an attempt to revive the offensive strategy, the US planned to utilize the personal rapport forged between Sukarno and Kennedy. The administration concluded that Kennedy through his personal connections was the only leverage the US had left. Stabilization could be gradually revived in a process where a visit by Kennedy would be the vital first step inducing Sukarno to halt Konfrontasi, which in turn would reopen the possibility of aid. When Kennedy died, the offensive strategy towards Indonesia seemed to be a hopeless effort.
All New Nothing New: Hesitation and the Final Initiatives
Johnson started his presidency at a time when the US were regrouping from the last months losses in Indonesia. During the following months, the US fell back on their backup position of keeping a foothold in Indonesia, while upgrading the halt of Konfrontasi to be a major policy objective. A final initiative to halt Konfrontasi was made through Robert Kennedy, before largely letting the British take over the policy lead in the conflict. Concerns over Vietnam and a range of other factors led to that few major policy decision during the following months, leaving US policy largely as the administration of a slow US withdrawal of aid, while maintaining contact with friends in Indonesia. An open ultimatum to Indonesia in aid in May marked the ending of the US offensive strategy towards Indonesia. Howard Jones and others has interpreted the open ultimatum as a result of Johnsonās personal policy inclinations, "Johnson was a great believer in the carrot and the stick," Jones comments on the change, underlining that the Johnson did not alter policy, but only shifted emphasis towards a harder line from December 1963. However, evidence suggests that the shift in emphasis was a slower process, and did not stem from Johnsonās personal desires for a harder line. Rather, when American ultimatums moved from its previous private forums to public statements, it was a result of pressure from the press and Congress, election concerns and the reduced influence of the Asianists within the administration, as well as a reflection of the administrationās surrender of the offensive strategy.
Johnsonās was not a stranger to the Indonesian problems facing the administration in December 1963, although neither especially involved in them. Some of his basic views on Southeast Asia can be traced from his reports from an Asian trip in 1961: "The battle against Communism must be joined in Southeast Asia with strength and determination," Johnson wrote to Kennedy, and "The struggle is far from lost." Johnson saw "no alternative to United States leadership in Southeast Asia," but "Any help [...] must be part of a mutual effort.." Yet, the greatest threat to nations like the United States was "not the momentary threat of Communism itself, rather that danger stems from hunger, ignorance, poverty and disease. We must -- whatever strategies we evolve -- keep these enemies the point of our attack [...]".97
Although Johnson probably thought more of mainland Southeast Asia than the Southwest Pacific when writing the above lines, they proved that Johnson had a basic sympathy for using aid for national security reasons as well as for humanitarian reasons. Also, he attached importance to United States involvement in Southeast Asia. Indonesia seemed an ideal application of Johnsonās 1961 formula: Hunger was now rising and economic disturbances drove the policies leftward. In many ways, it seemed natural that "the point of our attack" remained an aid effort, as it had been under Kennedy.
However, aid was not an easy strategy to defend domestically. On December 18, the Congress finally and specifically restricted aid to Indonesia. The administrationās response and future Indonesia policy were reviewed in Johnsonās first ordinary National Security Council (NSC) meeting on January 7, 1964āit was Johnsonā "full initiation to the perils of the Presidency in a time of trouble," the Washington Post wrote, dealing with "the thorniest menace to peace in Southeast AsiaāIndonesia, the mercurial Sukarno and his undeclared war [...]".98
The NSC portrayed two likely scenarios in Indonesia. In the first scenario, Sukarno retreated from Konfrontasi. This scenario could only be achieved through an "Asian solution" excluding Western participation, the NSC concluded, since this was necessary to save face for the Indonesians. However, Sukarno would in this scenario remain hostile to Malaysia, only not as overtly as before. In the other scenario, the Indonesian open aggression continued. The aggression could also escalate, although no one in Djakarta seemed to really seek escalation. If the conflict escalated, the US would be involved through the Anzus and Seato treaties. Rusk underlined the importance of solving the crisis, the "stakes are very high," Rusk stated, "More is involved in Indonesia with it [sic] 100 million people, than is at stake in Viet Nam."99 The US could not afford to avoid to do its best to hinder escalation of the conflict into actual war, Rusk and the NSC concluded, a conflict where the US would have to bail out its allies. 100
Despite the American overall priority to avoid another war in Southeast Asia, the crisis was still mainly a British responsibility. "[A]llied solidarity in this situation" was very important, Rusk commented when Speaker John W. McCormackās expressed a wish for continued British supremacy in policy decisions regarding Malaysia. US actions and available policies in the Indonesia-Malaysia question remained hence limited by British and Australian concerns, the NSC concluded.101
Leverages towards Sukarno was now very few: Both Congress and the British restricted the options, as did the need for an "Asian solution". Aid was one leverage that still could be used, although not as efficiently as before. Johnson and the NSC agreed to comply as far as they had to with the Congress legislation, and phase out restricted aid slowly and silently. Some aid to maintain contact with the army was still maintained, as the army remained the most likely successor to Sukarno and still was anticommunist. However the aid was from now on non-military only, and would specifically not strengthen any military capacityāits specific purpose was now to keep some visible US presence inside the army, as unspecified leverage and as tokens of an endangered friendship. Also, to continue some aid would hinder an open break with Djakarta, and hence secure US investments in Indonesia. It was particularly important to avoid letting the oil companies go into Chinese hands. There was full consensus on the near future objectives of the policy: To still keep a "foot in the door" in Indonesia.102
Presidential determination had to secure the aid, and various strategies was planned to avoid public criticism as well as to avoid making such determinations into PR-opportunities for Sukarno. The most important strategy pondered, was that the aid determinations could be limited to thirty days periods, so it should not be interpreted as a commitment or major policy decision by any parties. Robert Kennedy was given responsibility for mapping out legal positions which could defend aid using this an other strategies.103
Few other leverages seemed available. To take the issue into the UN was one possibility. McGeorge Bundy suggested sending "to Djakarta a tough man who would tell Sukarno that the president did not intend to continue assistance unless Sukarno halted the confrontation effort.," pointing to Robert Kennedy as ideal with his reservoir of goodwill with Sukarno. Despite RFKās displayed reluctance, the president decided to heed Bundyās advice and promptly ordered the Attorney General on another mission to Indonesia.104Hence, aid was turned further into an open instrument of political extortion, differing from the previous method of "coaching" Sukarno indirectly and in private. 105
On January 16, 1964 Robert Kennedy went to meet Sukarno in Tokyo. The press covered his trip extensively, speculating in various motives behind Johnsonās decision to send Kennedy, besides for talking to Sukarno. Most analysts also saw the trip as a rescue action for aid to Indonesia, particularly after Senator Richard Russell phoned Johnson and warned him that "certifying" aid to Indonesia with reasons of "national interests" could lead to actual impeachment against Johnson, if Sukarno continued Konfrontasi.106 This analysis had some basis. Behind the decision to send Robert Kennedy was implicitly the long-term objective of reviving the offensive US plan, which included economic aid. However, the direct mission of Kennedy was to calm Konfrontasi. Furthermore, The NSCā explicit reason for calming Konfrontasi, was that an escalation would lead to unwanted US involvement. By January 1964, reviving economic aid had hence not been removed as a part of US policy plans, but it was a distant objective subordinate to the immediate concern of avoiding US direct military involvement in Indonesia.
The remaining common analyses were more personal and domestic policy-oriented. "The Attorney General needed a mission that would take him away far from the scene of a personal tragedy" speculated the Sunday Times, adding Johnsonās political need to assure Robert Kennedy of an important role in the administration, as well as the mutual need to assure the public of friendliness between Kennedy and Johnson.107There was also "by coincidence, "the Times concluded, "the urgent need to talk turkey to power-hungry President Soekarno in order to stave off growing troubles in South-East Asia, which had in them the seeds of discord between the U.S. and Britain." 108 Other interpretations included that Johnson wanted to push Kennedy forward as a vice-presidential candidate. Parts of the Republican press branded the trip as irresponsible, or even as a method to get Kennedy out of the way, where he could do less harm than in Washington.
Kennedyās assignment was specifically to persuade Sukarno to order a cease-fire and enter negotiations, similar to Kennedyās role in the West Irian crisis. "Did you come here to threaten me?" asked Sukarno "No, Iāve come to help get you out of trouble," replied Kennedy, defusing Sukarnoās initial skepticism and expectations of ultimatum.109 As with the West Irian crisis, Robert Kennedy used Sukarnoās feelings of cognition with the now late John F Kennedy. Also, he was authorized to use strong words with Sukarno, since he was believed to be one of the few who probably could do so without seriously damaging relations.
After the first Tokyo meeting, Kennedy went to Seoul, Manila, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok to ride the momentum of the first promising talks. He persuaded Sukarno and Abdul Rahman into declaring truce, with immediate effect. Furthermore, the Maphilindo countries now agreed that the Thais led by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman were to lead a new round of negotiations and provide observers for the cease-fire under a UN mandate. A summit was planned already the following month. Robert Kennedy avoided discussion of details of the conflict and kept the US outside any commitments. It was an "Asian solution for Asians." However, only days after the oral agreement was announced on January 23, doubts were raised on the interpretation and solidity of the agreement. Yet, the cease-fire was a reality, even if it was vague and frail. Again Kennedy was acclaimed for a diplomatic victory, this time also in large type across the front pages of American press.110
Robert Kennedy ended his round trip in London, where he tried to persuade the British to approve the deal. The British were still skeptical on the US role in Indonesia, and particularly what seemed to be continued US military aid to a country which Britain were in semi-war with.111 The reluctant approval from London came on January 26, despite public criticism and scorn of "the Kennedy truce" in London press. Soon after, the talks in London were continued with secret quadripartite talks in Washington. From February 10ā11, politicians and experts from the US, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand discussed "Far East problems"āSoutheast Asian problems in general and the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute in detail. The talks would mark the end of US-British discords over Konfrontasi.
The quadripartite talks and following bilateral talks led to a working agreement between the US and Great Britain. In exchange for British support to US polices in Vietnam, the US would support the British in Malaysia.112 The talks "dispelled the doubts and apprehensions which the British had previously felt," the British Assistant Under Secretary of State stated, and it was clear that "the agreement reached between United States and the United Kingdom enable all to go forward and be able to prepare for political or military action [...]." 113 The new agreement ascertained the US commitment to support British policies in Malaysia, as well as the overall importance of British and US bases in the area. Although the Quadripartite talks concluded that Maphilindo was a worthwhile project, the parties found it unacceptable to remove any bases from the Maphilindo area, which last summersā Manila agreement between Tunku, Sukarno and Macapagal had implied. The Singapore base was hence under a US guarantee. Also, Robert Kennedyās truce agreement remained sanctioned, and the burden of further negotiations were henceforth put on "the Asians." 114
The US press increasingly caused concern for the administration in its Indonesia policy. The pressā longstanding demands for a harder line against Sukarno reinforced Congressā demands, and was moreover beginning to harm the new presidentās public image: In the end of February, the presidentās advisers began to worry about impressions in the public of Johnsonās non-policy on Indonesia. "[...] until the President starts telling the town what he wants in positive terms, weāre going to continue to get a lot of innuendo that heās not at the foreign policy helm," Komer wrote.115 In the administration, suggestions were aired that Johnson should assume a tougher line on Sukarno to gain "short-term domestic plusses." This only added further to Komerās worry for Johnson. A hard line now would increase the chances of the crisis becoming "even more unmanageable," which was the last thing Johnson needed with the Arab/Israeli and Kashmir crisis already discrediting him domestically. 116 Public awareness of more crises would "further flak that LBJ canāt handle foreign policy, and is reversing the Kennedy line". 117 Komer suggested that the US played out their current aid hand as long as possible instead, by continue to graduate aid and issue private warnings only to Djakarta. A major fight in Congress to save the "mighty lean" aid budget would have the advantage that LBJ could "fob off part of the blame on Congress," should he lose the fight. 118 The domestically necessary hard stance should be focussed on China, rather than Indonesia or other neutral countries. Komer, with Hilsman, Harriman and Michael Forrestalās support, postponed the shift towards a new and harder line, but the could not halt it. 119
A Presidential determination confirming the existing aid schedule was made on February 2, 1961.120 In the following months, the US made few new initiatives. The President postponed and halted decisions, while the slow wind-up of aid continued. Several reasons lay behind this development: One was the lack of available options besides keeping the same course. The new president as well as the administration became more preoccupied with the troubles of mainland Southeast Asia, leaving less time for other concerns. Furthermore, initiative had to some degree been moved to Britain and Asia, through the British-US deal and Robert Kennedy truce agreement. Hence the administration had some justification for not taking important decisions before Britain or the Asian nations had altered policy or other significant events occurred. Moreover, the fear of public reactions, and possibly even impeachment, made Johnson hesitate to make any controversial aid determinations in an election year.
Among the "Asianists" in the administration there were signs of friction. In the Far East office, those working with Malaysia felt that Indonesian concerns overrode Malaysian concerns, and that particularly the ambassador in Kuala Lumpur was being kept outside events.121 The Philippine ambassador had little or no contact directly with the NSC aide Michael Forrestal and the White House, and hence were out of contact with the circles that he perceived were "running things" on a day-to-day basis. 122 In the White House, Southeast Asian affairs except Vietnam, increasingly circled around Sukarno and Djakarta, the "gloomy Dane [of] the Southeast Asian Hamlet." 123 The general attitudes now seemed more tense and pessimistic, contrasting last years optimism. Also Robert Kennedy expressed feelings of desertion and abandonment, even betrayal. Kennedyās involuntary, but intensive efforts to prepare for a settlement was abandoned by Johnson, and Kennedyās "feeling grew that the President did not, and the State Department dared not, give a damn about his effort," Schlesinger writes, and Kennedy was left with "a bitter taste." 124 In March 1964, Roger Hilsman was replaced by William Bundy, a person less close to the "Jonesian" circles. While the core group of Asianists in the White House and State remained in control over the administrationās Indonesia policy, outside forces and other commitments had severely limited their policy options. 125 Johnsonās reluctance to use other aides than McG. Bundy combined with the increased priority he gave to Vietnam, contributed to shift American Indonesia policy more into one of administration and reaction rather than one of plans and action. 126 As a result, US initiatives were increasingly reduced to consist of what Jones did in Djakarta, with Johnson and Washington watching events drift. 127
The Maphilindo countries failed to actually hold a summit, halted by the interpretation of "truce". While Sukarno argued that truce implied only that the Indonesian-supported guerillas on Malaysian territory ceased fighting, Abdul Rahman demanded that the guerillas also must return to Indonesia. The Thai negotiators failed to get the parties much closer until Jones in late May devised a compromise, in which thirty-two of the 900 Indonesian "guerillas walked out of the jungles" wearing "fresh, well-starched uniforms," looking all but soldiers from combat.128 A new summit was finally arranged in Tokyo in mid-June. Not long after, the conflict reassumed its slowly escalating course, leaving the situation tenser than ever by early fall 1964. 129
Sukarno responded to the harder line from Washington much like the 1962 action plan had warned: With defiance. On March 25, an editorial in "in one of the leading American weekly magazines," demanded a US ultimatum on aid for peace in Indonesia. Sukarno responded " [...] we will never accept aid with political string attached. When any nation offers us aid with political strings attached, then I tell them," switching to English, "Go to hell with your aid!" The story gained feathers as it swept across American newspapers headlines, eventually leading to an open attack on Sukarno by Senator Birch Bayh, in front of the Senate:
So at a public meeting in Djakarta on March 2, where more than 2,000 people had gathered, President Sukarno pointed at Ambassador Howard P. Jones and said: āThere is one country threatening to stop its foreign aid to Indonesia. That country thinks it can scare Indonesia. I say go to hell with your aid130
In Washington, the Asianists were now isolated in defending aid to Indonesia. The press was antagonistic in their description of the "dictator who rose to power on the wings of American aid"131 and "the rathole" 132 Indonesia. The administrationās old arguments for aid fell on hostile ground or was drowned. In the public or in open Congress, the Administration could not argue that their aid actually sought to build up the very forces opposing Sukarno in the power balance. 133 The Administration eventually caved in. When Sukarno launched his "action command" on May 3, 1964, the new Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, William Bundy, retorted with a an open, televised threat to Sukarno of withdrawing aid if Konfrontasi continued. The reactions in Indonesia was strong, and Sukarno warned that all US aid now might be banned. What caused the stir "was not so much the substance of the remarks" Jones summarized, for the US had said the same in private for several months, "but the fact that they had been made public." 134 The practical result was worsened relations, and that US aid lost the little credibility as a leverage that may have remained. The statement had the negative effect of making those receiving US aid became more vulnerable to PKI propaganda, since the US openly had remarked that aid to Indonesia implied favors in return. Hence, receiving US aid could become more of a burden than an asset. 135
By summer 1964, aid was reduced mostly to suit the contact purposes of the defensive strategy, and it faced imminent threats of being cancelled both from Djakarta and Washington. The House of Representatives strengthened the Broomfield amendmentās aid inhibitions further through the Tower amendment. The new amendment threatened to close the opening for special aid through presidential determination. However, the White House were confident that the opening for special determination could be re-established later in the legislative process, if the situation did not deteriorate dramatically.136
In July 6, 1964 Johnson continued the aid program with a new National Security Action Memorandum. However, the memorandum concluded that "no public determination with respect to aid to Indonesia should be made at this time, in view of the unsettled conditions in the South Pacific area," hence halting all new official aid programs.137 The limited MAP and AID programs already under Presidential determination from February continued, but were now under constant review. Rusk still expressed hopes of some leverage from the aid, but mostly through the contact the aid legitimized with Indonesian officials and leaders. 138
US policy remained a variation over the same as defined in the 1962 action plan: The immediate offensive objective was now reduced to "halt Indonesiaās confrontation and restore equilibrium.," while the long-term defensive program was maintained.139 US aid programs had been "an essential tool in this dual task," Rusk argued, they had "helped us keep open the communications between our two Governments and build up a limited but real leverage with the Sukarno regime, which we are using to prevent a dangerous drift from the West." 140 The aid had also helped prevent "greater deterioration" of Konfrontasi. Notably, the Mobrig program had "given us valuable influence in this key organization (the countryās first line of defense against internal subversion) and has greatly enhanced its effectiveness." 141 Hence, Rusk implied that the most effective US program had been the one involving Mobrig.
The remaining US programs were now wholly removed of aggressive potential. "[N]o training [was] provided in such fields as ranger, pathfinder, airborne, counter-insurgency, parachute packing, in-flight refueling, and landing force staff planning," Rusk summarized to the president.142 By June 1964, 490 civilians and 170 military personnel were under technical and administrative training, including 50 officers under civic action, but excluding the university programs. 143 Mostly for humanitarian reasons, the malaria eradication program continued, but also since a withdrawal could create negative publicity. The continuation of aid continued as there still remained some hope of calming Konfrontasi. 144However, it was to be low-key and confidential and presented to the Congress committees as a routine matter, to avoid negative publicity and in order not to encourage to Sukarno. 145 The emphasis of the administrationās policy was now to keep what aid it could as long as possible, in order to secure continued contact with the anticommunist elements in Indonesia.
Johnson did not in the beginning differ extensively from Kennedy in outlook on Southeast Asia and aid policy. However, when he took over the presidency, the situation was dramatically different from only 6 months earlier. The NSC and the president now turned avoiding escalation of Konfrontasi into their main priority, besides keeping a foothold in Indonesia through army contact. A final effort to stabilized the situation and revive talks over Konfrontasi was made by sending Robert Kennedy on a Southeast Asian mission. Kennedy formed a basis for future negotiations under Thai auspices but the negotiations did not take place before June, and soon after Konfrontasi continued to escalate. In February and March, US talks with Australia, New Zealand led to agreements on future Southeast Asia policy. NotablJohnson did not in the beginning differ extensively from Kennedy in outlook on Southeast Asia and aid policy. However, when he took over the presidency, the situation was dramatically different from only 6 months earlier. The NSC and the president now turned avoiding escalation of Konfrontasi into their main priority, besides keeping a foothold in Indonesia through army contact. A final effort to stabilized the situation and revive talks over Konfrontasi was made by sending Robert Kennedy on a Southeast Asian mission. Kennedy formed a basis for future negotiations under Thai auspices but the negotiations did not take place before June, and soon after Konfrontasi continued to escalate. In February and March, US talks with Australia, New Zealand led to agreements on future Southeast Asia policy. Notably, the US agreed to support the British in Malaysia in return for British support in Vietnam, making the Vietnamese concern override whatever differences the US had with Britain over Indonesia policy. Vietnam, British considerations, pressure from the Congress and public as well as lack of offensive policy option and internal frictions contributed to making Johnson take few decisions on Indonesia, but rather let the gradual phasing out of aid continue. The notable exception was the first public ultimatum on aid made to Sukarno by William Bundyās in May, which finally removed aid as a significant political tool. US policy was hence by summer 1964 limited to the passive, defensive strategy only, of waiting while keeping a foothold in Indonesia.
Conclusion
The last half of 1963 forced interpretation into the major policy scene. The question for many US policy makers was how to understand Indonesiaās foreign policy. The different interpretations implied very different strategies. Sukarno had introduced a range of new concepts and ideologies into Indonesian policy since 1959. Among the most important were the ones connected to Guided Democracy, and in foreign policy: Nefo/Oldefo (New Emerging Forces versus Old Established Forces). The Administration did not take the ideologies seriously as formal ideological frameworks, but rather saw them as vicarious defenses for Sukarnoās policies. However, they had political implications. The US saw the promotion of these ideologies as movement in direction of Beijing. The ideologies also developed a clear anti-American edge. To counter the anti-American moods raised by Sukarnoās ideologies and PKI propaganda, the US ran an "information program." Most of the sub-programs was under USIA general guidance for East Asia, but there were also local variants. Indonesia became the largest USIA effort in East Asia next to Japan. The main targets for the US information effort were students, officers and whomever was probable to be part of the post-Sukarno elite. One specific costly area for the information effort, outside USIA budgets, were sports. Here, also the Peace Corps and aid budgets were used, and a sports race with the East Bloc over coaches and funding for the Asian Games emerge. Specifically did the Asian Gamesā political implications and the following exclusion of Indonesia from the Tokyo Olympics cause concern to the US.
When Sukarno launched a confrontation against the formation of Malaysia in January 1963, the matter of interpretation became more urgent. The confrontation could threaten the stabilization effort, and even lead to a war in which the United States by treaty had to fight with the British and Australians against Indonesia. Since Konfrontasi was launched in a period of improved relations with the US, it was hard to understand why Sukarno launched his attacks, and henceāhow to stop them from disrupting the US effort to turn Indonesia westwards. Possible interpretations included Sukarnoās personal hurt feelings, his anti-colonialist nature and the mystical role of the Leader in Javanese culture. The administration however found it more likely that Sukarno saw Konfrontasi as advantageous to himself in the internal power balance, and that an external enemy curbed internal strife. Likewise did the PKI utilize it to increase the nationalistic, anti-imperialistic popular frenzy on which they thrived. The army could support it since a confrontation secured high funding and reintroduced martial law rights in Indonesia. The possibility that the army actually was the instigators behind Konfrontasi was raised by Ambassador Jones. He come to the viewpoint that both Sukarno and parts of the army actually believed Malaysia to be a colonialist plot, and to the army the new state was possibly even a potential Chinese threat that the West failed to see. Neither the army or Sukarno, nor Beijing and Moscow, seemed to have an interest in an actual military conflict, but rather they seemed to desire a low-scale irritation which embarrassed the British and curbed Indonesian internal conflicts. The US conclusion was that it was possible to contain the conflict on a level small enough to maintain stabilization efforts while allowing for rhetoric.
The British and Malay did not share the American interpretations, but saw the conflicts as variants over a "Grand Design" by Sukarno for a pan-Malayan Greater Indonesia under Sukarnoās leadership and including the Philippines and all the former British colonies like Malaysia. The US strategy was frowned upon as "appeasement". The Grand Design theories also had their followers in Washington, however none in the inner policy making circles in the administration. In Congress, Sukarnoās rhetoric impeded funding for the administrationās aid programs to Indonesia. The difference between US and British/Malayan interpretations disunited the Western attempts to contain Konfrontasi. When the US arranged for summits and talks, the results of the summits were in US eyes counteracted by British and Malay statements of firmness which provoked, or provided excuses for, escalation of the conflict by Sukarno, leading to US use of bargaining power in order to form new talks, with aid as the prime US leverage. This circle reached a peak when Malaysia was formed on September 15. The formation led Malaysia and Indonesia into severing diplomatic and economic ties with each other, as well as to increased military pressure from Indonesia. A US ultimatum, stating that all US aid relied on Sukarno resuming normal relations with Malaysia was first accepted, but rejected after the Malaysian diplomatic break with Indonesia. The result was the disruption of the stabilization plan, and hence the offensive half of the administrationās action plan for Indonesia. Some personal diplomacy by Kennedy and Jones hindered the situations from escalating further.
With the action plan disrupted, the administration still sought to keep an offensive strategy towards Indonesia, in order to try to coach Sukarno and the country westwards and reinstate the stabilization plan. The only leverage they had left over Sukarno, Kennedy, Hilsman, and Jones concluded, was the prospect of Kennedy visiting Djakarta. Hence, they planned a package deal with Sukarno: If Sukarno cooled down Konfrontasi and reinstated the action plan, the US would resume aid and Kennedy would go on lengthy state visit to Indonesia to show friendship. Meanwhile, the defensive part of the action plan was to be maintained as far as possible. To secure military aid under the defensive plan, the White House used loopholes in the new Congressional aid impediments. All weapon supplies were however cancelled.
When Kennedy died, the administration was left in shock. Kennedyās death had been preceded by the death of the stabilization planās foremost protagonist in Indonesia, First Minister Djuanda. With the two gone, much of the hopes which the administration had held for invigorating the stabilization plan and revive the forward momentum from spring 1963 vanished. President Johnson held immediate policy talks with Jones, who was in Washington for holiday and to discuss the new offensive strategy, and friendship talks with Nasution, who was on a friendship visit in Washington while JFK was shot. Still, the momentum for reviving the offensive strategy had been lost
The final offensive effort made by the US was the Robert Kennedy mission of in January 1964. To revitalize negotiations between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, Johnson decided to send Robert Kennedy on a personal, special mission to Djakarta in order to talk Sukarno into entering talks. A rudimentary basis for future negotiations under Thai auspices were set up during the mission, but failed to provide any long-term improvements. Shortly after Kennedyās trip, the US and Britain negotiated an agreement in which US support to British Malaysia-policy was promised in return for British support to the US in Vietnam. Hence, Vietnamese concern override whatever differences the US had with Britain over Indonesia policy. Besides the time spent on Vietnam, British considerations, pressure from the Congress and public and internal frictions, a mere lack of offensive policy option contributed to making president Johnson make few new decisions on Indonesia, but rather to allow the gradual phasing out of aid continue. A public ultimatum on aid made to Sukarno by William Bundyās in May finally removed aid as a significant political tool, although still leaving some aid for foothold purposes.
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1 Speech by Sukarno, December 28 1964, (quoted in Airgram 491, Djakarta to State, unknown date, Enclosure 1, POL 15ā1, "Head of State 11/1/64", box 2314, NARA). Note that "rooster" also implicates strength, bravery, and could mean "champion".
2 When I use the terms "worldview", "theory", "concept" and "idea" I refer to variably sized, loose and dynamic meme-constructs, ranging from the single-meme (idea, concept) through the intermediate networks/complexes (theory, ideology) and to the individually all-encompassing meme-network (worldview, cultural background, religion). The terms are used loosely, presupposing arbitrary divisions between the different intermediate networks. I have chosen to use the more loose terms for legibility, and in order to maintain this workās focus on narrative rather than formal models.
3 The concept, like much political language in Indonesia, was originally conceived in Dutch. From Dutch, the word that became "guided" might better have been translated into the English word "planned". Sukarno chose "guided" instead, since that word had more active and dynamic associations, disregarding the vast difference in political association in the West between "planning" and "guiding" in politics.
4 Phrases, words or concepts which spread rapidly among a population.
5 Manipol is an acronym for "Political Manifesto". USDEK is a shorthand for the five mentioned elements in the national unity. The 1945 Constitution was a temporary wartime arrangement giving the President power over all the other branches of Government.
6 Nasakom was an acronym for three major elements in the Indonesian society, the nationalist, religious and communist ones.
7 FRUS 1961ā63 XXIII: 169, Memo, R. Johnson to Rostow, April 21, 1961, Attachment
8 Ambassador Green, in Embtel 460 (Djakarta), August 29 1965, "DEF/Defense Affairs", "INDON", 1/1/64, Box 1642, NARA
9 Ambassador Green, in Embtel 460 (Djakarta), August 29 1965, "DEF/Defense Affairs", "INDON", 1/1/64, Box 1642, NARA
10 FRUS 1961ā63 XXIII: 317, Deptel 317 (Djakarta), October 24, 1963; Jones actually told Sukarno that "Pantjasila was in harmony with American Philosophy" (FRUS 319)
11The degree in which these areas may be called ethnic "Malay" is variable, however, from the core areas of Malaya to the disputed Melanesian areas of the Philippines and Australian New Guinea.
12 See next subchapter, "Konfrontasi"
13 FRUS 1961ā63 XXIII: 293, Memo of conversation, Kennedy, Jones, Forrestal, October 11, 1962; FRUS 1961ā63 XXIII: 184, Telcon, Ball-McConaughy, August 25, 1961
14 Report, "Indonesiaās Grand Design in Southeast Asia", Guy Pauker, May 1964, RM 4080-ISA/ARPA Order 189ā61, RAND Corporation, (printed in LBJ, CF, NSF, Indonesia/SEA/SWP, Reel 7, UPA Microfilms), p. 19
15 For broader treatment, see Chapter 4, "Feil! Fant ikke referansekilden."
16 USIA (the agency) is the general term for the Information Agency in Washington, while USIS (the service) was the term used when talking about field operations or specific missions. Also, the term IA (information agency) is used when referring to USIA.
17 See chapter ....
18 Administrative History, United States Information Agency, (1961ā68), undated, Vol. 1 (Narrative), Chapter 1, Box 1, LBJ Library; Administrative History, United States Information Agency, (1961ā68), undated, Vol. 1 (Narrative), Box 1, LBJ Library, tables 5ā1, 5ā2, 5ā4B, 5ā7, chart 5ā1,
19 The actual total USIS salary and expenses appropriation figure for 1963 was $123 million, while the total actual appropriation of USIA for 1963 was $157 million and the overseas mission actual appropriation for salaries and expenses was $55 million (figures rounded).
20 The figures exclude area wide efforts, which constituted nearly half the total budget. For natural reasons, the figures changed dramatically in 1964 and 1965.
21 April 22, 1963, "House Hearings on USIA Appropriations for 1964", p8 (Quoted in Administrative History, United States Information Agency, (1961ā68), undated, Vol. 1 (Narrative), Box 1, LBJ Library, p5/30)
22 Ibid.
23 See for instance the discussion before Sukarnoās visit to Washington, chapter 1.
24 Administrative History, United States Information Agency, (1961ā68), undated, Vol. 1 (Narrative), Box 1, LBJ Library, pp5/24ā5/27
25 Vietnam and Dominican republic issues concentrated on the concept "freedom", while the space issues concentrated on pictures of the moon and Mars, besides Edward H. Whites 20-minute space walk. The reasoning behind was summarized as, "Whether or not we and/or the Soviets consider ourselves to be in a race to the moon and beyond, the developing (and some developed) nations find space achievements a handy yardstick for measuring technological capabilities and potential." (Administrative History, United States Information Agency, (1961ā68), undated, Vol. 1 (Narrative), Box 1, LBJ Library, pp. 5/26ā5/27)
26 Embtel 853 (Djakarta), November 9 1964, LBJ, CF, NSF, Indonesia/SEA/SWP, Reel 7, UPA Microfilms, frame -241
27 Howard P, Jones (interviewee), recorded interview by Dennis OāBrien (interviewer), June 23, 1969(March 20, 1970, April 9, 1970, Oral History program, JFK Library, pp.45ā47
28 Summary record of NSC meeting, January 7 1964, #2, NSC Meetings, NSF, LBJ Library
29 Ibid.
30 See next chapter "Feil! Fant ikke referansekilden.", p * for more on the US-British agreements.
31 Jones 1971: pp. 266ā7
32 For instance did the nationalist Mohammad Yamin want to unite Malaya into Indonesia and draft borders after the old Madjahapit Empire rather than the colonial borders. Mohammed Hatta claimed to be the one who hindered Sukarno from pursuing such integration until the 1960s. (Jones 1971: p273)
33 Until 1878, Sabah had been under the Sultan of Sulu in the Southern Philippines. In 1878, the British had taken overāthe dispute was whether the take-over had been based on a lease agreement or a sale. (Ibid.)
34 Jones 1971: p268
35 Jones 1971: p269
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Embtel 680 (Djakarta), October 12, 1962, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14, JFK Library
39 This argument is also forwarded by Jones in as the most important in hindsight, and is formulated in his memoirs. (Jones 1971: p272
40 Letter, British Foreign Office to Washington (read by Bundy), Ref "Guidance of October 11", October 11, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library
41 Along with Jones were Edward Ingraham in 1960, who later became the Indonesian Desk officer, and Frank Galbraith, Jonesā deputy. (Gardner 1997: pp. 185ā186)
42 Jones 1971: p270ā271
43 Typically the federation forces would get intelligence on all the guerilla moves, and then wait in a hideout for the guerillas to arrive. Then, the forces would snipe the guerillas, normally with few or none losses on part of the federation forces.
44 CIA Current Intelligence Memo, OCI#1560/63, June 3, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library
45 The names of the Army officers who presented this view are not reproduced, indicating that they either were lesser known figures, connected to intelligence, or persons who received high positions in the New Order regime. (Jones 1971: p270ā271)
46 Jones 1971: p. 270
47Deptel 99 (Circular), July 17, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14, JFK Library, p5
48 Embtel 1356 (Djakarta), 3 July 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, JFK Library
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Embtel 1806, (Djakarta), March 1 1964, "POL INDON", 3ā1-64, NARA
52 Nasution was assumed to be the brain behind Indonesiaās successful guerilla strategy during the liberation war, and is now referred to as one of the founders of modern guerilla strategy.
53 There were indications that the Army actually fed the British with intelligence on their landings.
54 NSC Paper for NSC meeting, May 12, May 9 1964, #64c, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 246, LBJ
55 Letter, British Foreign Office to Washington (read by Bundy), Ref "Guidance of October 11", October 11, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library
56 Ibid.
57 deptel13137jul63, pp. 1ā2
58 deptel13137jul63, pp. 1ā2
59 deptel13137jul63, pp. 1ā2
60 deptel13137jul63, pp. 3ā4
61 Ibid.
62 Jones 1971: p271
63 Ibid.
64 Deptel 99 (Circular), July 17, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14, JFK Library, p. 25
65 Deptel 99 (Circular), July 17, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14, JFK Library, p. 3
66 Deptel 99 (Circular), July 17, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14, JFK Library, p. 5
67 (Memo, Forrestal to Kennedy, August 30, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library)? ā check other than CF-NSF to be sure, attached memo memo29aug63
68 Memo, Forrestal to Komer, July 19,1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library;
69 Memo, Komer to Kennedy, July 23, 1965, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library
70 Memo, Komer to M. Bundy, July 16, 1965, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library;
71 Memo, Komer to M. Bundy, July 16, 1965, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library
72 See chapter and
73 (Memo, Forrestal to Kennedy, August 30, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library)? ā check other than CF-NSF to be sure
74 Memo, Forrestal to Kennedy, August 30, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library
75 Memo, Komer to M. Bundy , September 17, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library;Deptel 301 (Djakarta), September 13, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library
76 Memo, Komer to M. Bundy , September 17, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library;
77 Deptel 301 (Djakarta), September 13, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library
78 Deptel 453 (Djakarta), October 10, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library
79
80 Deptel 384 (Djakarta), September 26, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library
81 Oral Message, Kennedy to Macapagal, September 27, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library
82 Memo, M. Bundy to Kennedy, September 27, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library;jfkmacmillan27sep63
83 Lord Home took over as British Prime Minister three weeks later, on October 19.
84 See chapter 4, subchapter ..... for arguments on the role of CIA and military and the overthrow of Sukarno
85 Memo, R.W. Komer to M. Bundy, January 15 1964, R.W. Komer Name File, box 6, NSF, LBJ Library
86 Deptel 50928 (Djakarta), October 28, 9163, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library; FRUS 1961ā63 XXIII: 318, Deptel 509 (Djakarta), October 28, 1963 [and more]
87 Deptel 503 (Djakarta), October 24, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library
88 Memo, M. Bundy to Read, October 25, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library
89 Deptel 503 (Djakarta), October 24, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library; FRUS 1961ā63 XXIII: 317, Deptel 317 (Djakarta), October 24, 1963
90 Memo of conversation, President Kennedy, Jones, Hilsman, Forrestal, November 19, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library
91 Memo of conversation, President Kennedy, Jones, Hilsman, Forrestal, November 19, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library
92 Jones 1971: pp. 385ā386
93 Jones 1971: p298
94 Memo, L. B. Johnson to the President, May 23 1961, McGeorge Bundy Name file, Box 19,NSF, LBJ Library
95 Marquis Childs, "NSC Looks at Southeast Asia", Washington Post, January 8[?], 1964
96 Summary record of NSC meeting, January 7 1964, #2, NSC Meetings, NSF, LBJ Library
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Jones 1971: p299; Henry Brandon, "Brother Robert looks beyond election", The Sunday Times, January 26, 1964
103Henry Brandon, "Brother Robert looks beyond election", The Sunday Times, January 26, 1964
104 Jones 1971: p. 301; Memo, Forrestal to W. Bundy, May 8 1964, LBJ, CF, NSF, Indonesia/SEA/SWP, Reel 7, UPA Microfilms, frame -0056)
105 Deptel 290 (Tunis), Rusk to Ambassador, February 2 1964, "2/1/64", POL 32ā1, "INDON-MAL", NARA
106 See for instance Deptel 4307 (London), January 16 1964, "DEF6/ Armed Forces", "INDON", 1/1/64, Box 1641, NARA
107 Memo, W. R. Tyler to Rusk, April 1 1964, [DEF12ā1641]
108 Memo of Conversation, February 12, 1964, state/rfk, Indonesia, CF, NSF, LBJ Library
109 Deptel 1484 (Circular), Rusk to various, February 12 1964, "2/1/64", POL 32ā1, "INDON-MAL", NARA;
110 Memo, R.W. Komer to M. Bundy, December 3 1963, Indonesian Country File, box246, NSF, LBJ Library
111 Memo, R.W. Komer to M. Bundy, February 25 1964, Indonesian Country File, box246, NSF, LBJ Library
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 NSAM 278, February 3, 1964, NSAMs, NSF, LBJ Library; Memo, Rusk to L.B Johnson, June 29 1964, #4, NSAMs, NSF, Box 5, LBJ Library
116 Charles Baldwin (interviewee), recorded interview by Dennis J. O Brien (interviewer), March, 1969, Oral History Program, JFK Library, pp. 65ā69
117 William E. Stevenson (interviewee), recorded interview by Dennis J. O Brien (interviewer), May 5, 1969, Oral History Program, JFK Library , p94
118 Charles Baldwin (interviewee), recorded interview by Dennis J. O Brien (interviewer), March, 1969, Oral History Program, JFK Library, pp. 65
119 Schlesinger 1978: p. 685
120 Jones 1971: p. 320
121 Transcript, James C. Thomson, Jr. interviewed by Paige E. Mulhollan, July 22, 1971, pp. 24ā29 Tape 1 of 2, LBJ Library
122 For a more extensive discussion, see Chapter 4, subchapters 2 and 3.
123 CIA estimated that number of Indonesian guerillas committed to Konfrontasi in March 1964 to be 1600, whereof 800ā870 were in Borneo. (Memo, A. McCafferty to Bundy, March 11 1964, LBJ, CF, NSF, Indonesia/SEA/SWP, Reel 7, UPA Microfilms, frame -891
124 Jones 1971: pp. 304ā305
125 Quoted in Jones 1971: p. 321
126 Unknown, "While Sukarno dreams of Empire", Philadelphy Inquirer, March 30 1967, quoted in Jones 1971: p322
127 Senator Morse quoted in Jones 1971: p. 324
128 For argument, see chapter 4, ["preparing for war"], p. ...
129 Jones 1971: p. 303
130 For argument, see chapter 4, ["preparing for war"], p. ...
131 Draft memo, W. Bundy to President, August 27 1964 #74, "Indonesia Memos", Vol. 2, 5/64ā8/64, 2/2, Indonesia, CF, NSF, LBJ
132 NSAM 309 (McG. Bundyās version), July 6 1964, #1a, NSF, NSAMs, Box 5, LBJ
133 Memo, Enclosure 1, Rusk to President, June 29 1964, #4, NSF, NSAMs, Box 5, LBJ
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Memo, Enclosure 2, Rusk to President, June 29 1964, #4, NSF, NSAMs, Box 5, LBJ Library
138 Ibid.
139 Memo, Rusk to President, June 29 1964, #4, NSF, NSAMs, Box 5, LBJ Library The source....
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