Such
efforts would further complicate a Chinese invasion. While a surprise
blitzkrieg attack could blunt Taiwanās ability to mount a Ukraine-style
resistance, Chinese forces would face the additional obstacle of
launching a difficult, full-scale amphibious invasion of the island nation of Taiwan.
All
of this compounds the difficulty of achieving forceful reunification
for China, which, unlike Russia, has not fought a war in over four decades.
Chinaās
leaders also have reason to be unnerved by the breadth and speed of the
financial and economic sanctions levied against Moscow.
Of note,
the joint effort to sanction Russia included several Asian countries
including Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, which have sought to signal their opposition to the invasion of a weaker country by a more powerful neighbour.
International sanctions
While
Chinaās economy is much larger than Russiaās, it will not necessarily
be more resilient to international sanctions. China is far more integrated into the world economy and international community than Russia.
The Chinese Communist Party has staked its legitimacy on continued economic growth and prosperity, and is likely to be far more sensitive than Russia to economic disruptions.
The Ukraine crisis has understandably led China to double down on its quest for self-reliance. But Beijingās ability to insulate the economy from a hostile foreign environment is riding on strong domestic demand, which its āzero-Covidā policy, looming real estate crisis, high debt, and ageing population could undermine.
At the same time, Ukraine has been the recipient of a torrent of military assistance
from the US, most European countries, Australia, Canada, Japan, and
South Korea. While this international assistance has not included direct
military intervention, it has undeniably added to Moscowās troubles on
the battlefield.
Ukraine now has access to a steady supply of
military equipment that will help it withstand a war of attrition
against its much larger and conventionally more powerful neighbour.
Intelligence
shared by the United States has also proven critical ā it handicapped
Russiaās invasion by eliminating the element of surprise and has
reportedly enabled Ukrainian forces to take out numerous Russian targets.
China
should expect assistance to Taiwan by the US and its allies to be just
as (if not much more) robust. And while the US has been careful to avoid
coming into direct conflict with nuclear-armed Russia, China has little
reason to doubt the commitment of the US to defending Taiwan.
US-Taiwan
ties may be unofficial, but as the Ukraine crisis has amplified
Taiwanās profile, the relationship has only continued to strengthen.
A recent Congressional visit
to Taiwan, led by the chairperson of the US Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Bob Menendez, reflects the political will that exists in
Washington to support the islandās democracy.
But Russiaās
invasion of Ukraine, and the refusal of partners like the US to put
boots on the ground, have prompted concerns about the future of Taiwan, a
fellow democracy that is also the target of irredentist claims by a
nuclear-armed autocratic neighbour.
These concerns have prompted calls, including by former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, for the US to make clear that it will defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion.
Yet
even absent a clear commitment, Russiaās failure to achieve a quick and
decisive victory in Ukraine, combined with the devastation to Russiaās
economy from wide-ranging international sanctions, may serve to deter
China from mounting an invasion anytime soon.
