No
government in recent history has been as popular at Harapan during its
first two months of administration, as euphoria painted the sky in our
first-ever government change since independence.
But this
popularity took a dramatic crash in the next 20 months, ending only with
a 30 percent approval rate in its final month before the Sheraton Move
swept them out of power. If an election was called then, nobody would
bet on a Harapan victory.
Whether it was an
expectation-reality mismatch, underperformance, and/or inexperience, the
people were much happier when Muhyiddin Yassin took over, as PN’s
government enjoyed an above 55 percent approval rating during its first
year.
But things plunged rapidly from April 2021 onwards, reaching
an all-time low of 34 percent in July 2021. This was when the violent
Omicron variant hit, putting Covid-19 cases past one million, making
Malaysia’s per-million deaths Southeast Asia’s highest; hospitals became
a disaster movie.
The
lockdowns economically distressed many, with suicide rates soaring to
record highs, and starving Malaysians put out white flags to plead for
help.
Ismail Sabri Yaakob’s government took over as the economy
looked for ways to recover from the once-in-a-lifetime pandemic-induced
downturn.
Ismail Sabri’s government was never able to breach 50
percent in approval ratings, and the dissatisfaction rate rose to the
highest level of 64 percent at the height of inflation (July 2022).
Without
the Sheraton Move, the unpopular Harapan government would have had to
govern through the life-threatening Covid-19 crisis and unprecedented
inflation, both of which were due more to external events that were
highly uncontrollable, but which governments typically take full blame
for.
Now, three major coalitions that governed in the past four years are
compared by how well they have done during their tenure, and most
importantly, how the people felt during those periods.
While
Harapan’s governance was associated with a lacklustre pace in reforms,
its administration now looks better compared to Muhyiddin’s Covid-19
dark and bitter statistics, as well as Ismail Sabri’s angry inflation
period.
Other than yanking Harapan out of these unavoidable global
crises, the Sheraton Move also allowed people to reflect on their
performance with more distance and objectivity, and to soften how they
felt about Harapan, in direct contrast to the PN and BN governments that
were closer in time.
Splitting the opponents
Besides
making Harapan look better with the power of nostalgia, the Sheraton
Move also produced two other benefits to Harapan: Splitting its
opponents and lowering the threshold for victory.
When the deal
was struck to orchestrate the Sheraton Move, rule-breaking behaviours
were normalised. Chief among them was the notion that every politician
deserves to be in the cabinet, and they would withdraw support and
threaten the party if their demands were not met.
By validating
politicians’ egoistic pursuit of wealth and influence in cabinet
positions, large-scale internal and external party feuds happened
between PN and BN.
A new faction within Umno was formed purely to
defend their positions against other party vultures, and they were known
as the “minister cluster”. Those not aligned with Umno president, Ahmad
Zahid Hamidi were dropped as candidates, and they either made Zahid the
target enemy, cried betrayal, or ran on the opponent’s ticket
altogether.
Despite the logical electoral benefit of a PN-BN
partnership, talks also fell through as Umno and PAS started blaming
each other for the government’s faults and corruption, and name-calling occurred to a grave degree between them that a ceasefire was called.
Such
schisms could not have existed without the Sheraton Move that
legitimised the lust for power and made the coalitions realise that they
could not work together or compete for the same voter base.
Before
the Sheraton Move, Umno and PAS seemed to be working intimately under
Muafakat Nasional. After the Sheraton Move, greed was unleashed and
celebrated, splitting the oldest Malay-Muslim parties and normalising
nationwide three-cornered fights.
A more competitive election
meant that the Malay votes are split, thus improving Harapan’s chances
to win with only a quarter of Malay votes. The endless feuds also made
the uneventful Harapan appear stable in comparison. The Sheraton Move
opened the floodgates of greed, and Harapan now benefits.
The
final benefit of Sheraton Move is the birth of the anti-party hopping
law that improved the rules of the game. The intensity and frequency of
party defections made parties realise they were all losers in a zero-sum
game if they could not keep the MPs they’ve helped win.
Though imperfect, the anti-hopping law, in effect from Oct 5, 2022, makes it a constitutional requirement for an MP to vacate his/her seat if they join another political party.
This
helped lower the threshold for victory. A Harapan that wins only 90
seats under anti-hopping law environments is more secure than a Harapan
that has 121 seats in 2018 when MPs were still allowed to defect to
another party.
The anti-hopping law helps Harapan cement its seats
and influence, thus making it more attractive for East Malaysian
parties to strike a partnership to form the government. That also meant
Harapan needs fewer seats as its seats are now stabler seats.
What
good was Sheraton Move? The grave affront to our democracy that broke
all rules and conventions turned out to be beneficial to the primary
victims, Harapan.
It helped provide a contrast to other
governments that governed during the worst crises and made Harapan look
better in comparison, besides splitting the opponents through the
floodgates of greed, and lowered the threshold of victory by improving
the rules of the game.
If Harapan goes on to win GE15, it could be because of the Sheraton Move.
