Articles, Opinions & Views: The Problem in Southern Thailand Part Two


 
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In A Foxhole
“When you're left wounded on

Afganistan's plains and

the women come out to cut up what remains,

Just roll to your rifle

and blow out your brains,

And go to your God like a soldier”

“We are not retreating. We are advancing in another direction.”

“It is fatal to enter any war without the will to win it.”

“Old soldiers never die; they just fade away.

“The soldier, above all other people, prays for peace,

for he must suffer and be the deepest wounds and scars of war.”

“May God have mercy upon my enemies, because I won't .”
“The object of war is not to die for your country but to make the other bastard die for his.

“Nobody ever defended anything successfully, there is only attack and attack and attack some more.

“Fixed fortifications are a monument to the stupidity of man."
“It is foolish and wrong to mourn the men who died.
Rather we should thank God that such men lived.

The Soldier stood and faced God


Which must always come to pass

Photobucket
He hoped his shoes were shining

Just as bright as his brass

"Step forward you Soldier,

How shall I deal with you?


Have you always turned the other cheek?


To My Church have you been true?"


"No, Lord, I guess I ain't


Because those of us who carry guns


Can't always be a saint."

I've had to work on Sundays

And at times my talk was tough,

And sometimes I've been violent,

Because the world is awfully rough.

But, I never took a penny

That wasn't mine to keep.

Though I worked a lot of overtime

When the bills got just too steep,

The Soldier squared his shoulders and said

And I never passed a cry for help

Though at times I shook with fear,

And sometimes, God forgive me,

I've wept unmanly tears.

I know I don't deserve a place

Among the people here.

They never wanted me around


Except to calm their fears.


If you've a place for me here,


Lord, It needn't be so grand,


I never expected or had too much,


But if you don't, I'll understand."

There was silence all around the throne

Where the saints had often trod

As the Soldier waited quietly,

For the judgment of his God.

"Step forward now, you Soldier,

You've borne your burden well.

Walk peacefully on Heaven's streets,

You've done your time in Hell."

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The Problem in Southern Thailand Part Two
Tuesday, May 10, 2005
Continued from Part 1

Part 2
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
1.1 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
Globalism, interdependency, blocs and alliances are the more popular terminology in international relations today. Because of the view that a near to common interest could be struck in economic, social, political, religious and cultural lines; national interest, though still strong and alive, could be kept at hold while nations speak of agendas mutual and intimate to one another. The European Union is a glaring example of this move. Likewise, national government sees the inherent need to chart the way for national integration. Cohesiveness amongst the population will ensure political stability and development while elimination friction among citizens. This near to Utopian view towards politics however has one catch, these integrating forces begets movements that insist in maintain their right to autonomy or even independence. As the principle goes, where there is an action, there would be an equal reaction. This friction for the need to maintain autonomy and independence is inherent in every society, even in Malaysia where races are seen to be able to live relatively together. Control mechanisms like the law, religion; socio-economy and development are normally placed by the government or society to control or reduce and isolate this friction. Should these mechanism be not effective or fail, the friction will escalate to separatism where the demand for autonomy or independence, buttressed by the nineteenth century doctrine of self-determination, which is invoked by countless ethnic, language and religious groups to justify their search for separate state. Even with 185 sovereign sates in the world today, the agenda to establishing new states still flourish. The list of secessionist, independence or separatist movement is long and growing. This range from the law abiding docile movements like the Quebecois Movement of Quebec, Canada to the more violent movements like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam of Sri Lanka. Their agenda range from language to ethnic lines. The Kingdom of Thailand, never been colonized by a western power in its long history. the population’s reverence to the monarchy and the frequents of coup d’etat make it prominent however it is the problem of separatist movement in southern Thailand which drawn much attention. The persistence and resurgence of ethnic nationalism by the Malays over hundred of years in the face of repeated attempts to integrate the ethnic group into the larger political entities of Thailand is the cause of many a headache to the authorities. The Thai government over the years has attempted to seek a solution to the problem however the persistence of the issue deemed these actions as bearing not the required results. Is there a long-term solution beyond the horizon? It must be impressed that there may not be ‘ A Solutions’ but a number of areas to be addressed except if the Thai government decides to conform to the separatist movement’s demand.

Apart from efforts made by the Thai government, could regional assistance help Thailand to provide a lasting solution without interfering with her internal affairs? Indonesia’s vital role in brokering peace between the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front could be used a benchmark simultaneously rejuvenating the solidarity amongst ASEAN nations already ravaged by the economic downturn. The research paper will look into this prospect.

1.2 AIM
The aim of this research paper is to analyze the prospect of regional brokered solution towards the separatist problem in Southern Thailand.

1.3 OBJECTIVE
The research paper will focus on major ethnic issue that has plagued Southern Thailand, its historical background and actions taken by the Thai government to provide a lasting solution. The structure and policy of ASEAN and the forums that exists to assist Thailand bilaterally or multilaterally to find a peace solution with regards in maintaining Thai national integrity while enhancing further ASEAN solidarity will be analyzed.

1.4 METHODOLOGY
In approaching this topic, this paper will be using secondary sources from books, articles and journals that will provide a basic foundation on the concept of politics and ethnical friction, patterns in separatist movements. The evolution of the separatist movement in Southern Thailand and the strategy and actions adopted by the Thai government. Study into secondary data related to the formation, ideals, principle and forums in ASEAN with particular emphasis on the Indonesian brokered peace talks with MNLF will be conducted. Interviews with personalities who are authority of Regional politics and observers will be the source of primary data, which provide valuable insight of the possibilities of an ASEAN brokered peace in Southern Thailand.

1.5 IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH
Separatist movements have been inherent in the history of nations in ASEAN. Each nation would have its own and unique experiences in handling such situation. While some are successful, others are still haunted with the problem. The problem of the separatist movement in Southern Thailand not only affects the well being of the Thai people but it also has border implications. This in whole affects ASEAN while the spirit of non-intervention by member states has been observed religiously, talks of limited intervention has been in the pipeline. The credibility of ASEAN as a regional association of states has been in question after the economic downturn affecting the region since 1997. The Indonesian brokered peace talks between the Philippines government and MNLF has however received international praise and prospects of using the existing relationship, goodwill and forum within ASEAN’s international image. This research will explore the forums existing and the addressing future problems of this nature.

1.6 LIMITATIONS
The separatist movement in Southern Thailand is deeply drawn into history. It has reached the stage of separatism while strategies embarked by Bangkok are not seen to be conclusive. Similarly, except for Thailand’s role in brokering peace between Malaysia and Indonesia during the Confrontation (before the formation of ASEAN) and Indonesia role in the peace talks with MNLF, ASEAN states have been strictly adhering to the principle of non-intervention. Thus apart from having to look into the corridors of history, as early as the first century A.D, no authoritative thesis or study has been conducted in the author’s limited knowledge into looking at ASEAN collectively as peace broker for crisis of such in the region. This is because it was not while the research will be based highly on the opinion of the thus possibly resulting in generalization. This and the ubiquitous problem of time become the inherent limitation in writing this most interesting paper.
1.7 OUTLINE/CONTENT
The outline/content will be structured in the following chapters:
a. Introduction.
b. Concept and effects of separatist movement.
c. Separatist movement in Southern Thailand.
d. The Government strategy and action.
e. Prospect of a solution and the role of ASEAN as a peace broker.
f. Recommendation.
g. Conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPT AND EFFECTS OF SEPARATIST

2.1 DEFINITION
Separatism is the aim of establishing an independent political unit to represent a particular ethnic religious or other grouping sometimes associated with the aim of secession or self-determination. A driving force behind separatism is the perceptions of a distinct geographical, ethnic, religious, or cultural, identity, which becomes associated with the political movement. The desire for a control over the destiny of a group in political, economic, and cultural terms may lead to demands for independence which may express themselves in peaceful protest as well as political violence or forms of nationalism. Separatism may lead to internal conflict, civil war, and intervention. There are number of different other separatist movement, for example Eritrea , the Basques in Spain and France.

In some cases for separatism may be satisfied by revolution that is enhanced local self government or semi autonomy.[1] Secession is the declaration or attempted declaration of independence by parts of a state.[2]

Nationalism is demand by members of a nation for political self government which normally entails the founding of independent state. Descent, language, culture, or religion, proved resilient in modern world as a potent source of political change.[3] Political violence is the use of violence in order to achieve political objectives. Range from random violence that breaks out during legitimate political demonstration to systematic and organized murder and destruction used to achieve political objective. Justification of political violence is problematic issue for both political theorist and those concerned with bringing about political change. For some theorist, political violence may be justified, repressive political system and not in democratic political systems. In contemporary world political violence has been ‘internationalized’ by existence of non-state national group for example Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) who have used violence in an attempt to pressure the international community to help them achieve their political objectives, in this case a national territory.[4]

2.2 CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY, INDEPENDENCE, AND THE DOCTRINE OF SELF DETERMINATION

Autonomy is associated with the idea of sovereignty and independence. Movements whose ethnic autonomy or separatism constitute a potentially infinitely great threat where they arise within the boundaries of existing liberal states. Movements claiming to represent clearly defined ethnic identities, such as the French Canadian Quebecois, have a ready-made mass constituency, which will certainly become a potent political force if and when it succeeds in uniting the whole of the ethnic minority group against other groups and the central government.[5] The list of secessionist or independence movements is lengthy and continues to grow. The Tibetans in China; the Sikhs in the Punjab; the Khasmiris; the Tamils in Sri Lanka; the Shans, among others, in Myanmar (Burma); the Palestinians; the southern Sudannese; the Muslims in the Philippines; and the Kanakas in New Caledonia, just to mention a few. The state can no longer control all the activities of its citizens, or keep out all unwanted external influences. However, this does not mean that the state as the premier form of political organization - a unit that provides a full range of services for its citizens- is becoming obsolete.

Independence has been used in two senses in the analysis of international politics and foreign policy. In the fist sense, independence is a corollary of sovereignty. Secondly, the word is described a policy goal pursued by individuals, interest and factions which seek independence or self-determination for an identifiable group which will often comprise a nation or a putative nation.[6]

Self-determination is the right of a people to choose its political future and by extension the right to choose independence and statehood. Phenomenon of the 20th century enshrined in the United Nation (UN) charter. Factors such as ethnicity, nationality, language or religion define a peoples self identity but such definition are likely to be controversial claims of self-determination often have a territorial basis giving rise to separatism or secession.[7]

2.3 PATTERN OF SEPARATIST MOVEMENT
Movements claiming to represent clearly defined ethnic identities, such as I.R.A, the deaths from political violence showed considerable rise. Many of the deaths have resulted from acts of cold-blooded random terror. Bombings and shootings have murdered hundred of innocent civilians, men, women and children.[8] At the purely tactical level separatism has already met with some considerable successes. It is primarily an offensive rather than a defensive weapon, which in the classic tradition of guerrilla tactics involves avoiding pitched battles with superior military firepower. The case of the LTTE in Sri Lanka have made considerable progress in carrying out its aim depending upon adequate leadership, expertise, logistic support and training. The unconventional war is a priceless asset to the insurgents. The Moros of Southern Philippines has embarked on a similar approached to seek separation and independence from the Philippine government. The recent capture of a military officer and his aide by the separatist has made headlines in the media.

2.4 EFFECTS OF INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ON
SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS.

It is obvious that separatism is characterized by region-specific patterns derived from tradition, history, culture, and economics. The nature of regimes, their security forces, and counterinsurgency strategies also varies from region to region. International relations are also important since the presence of external sponsors can influence an insurgency’s chance of success. The recent development in the international scene is in Yugoslavia. More than half a million ethnic Albanians have been displaced by Yugoslavia’s ethnic cleansing drive in Kosovo, and their numbers are still increasing which was reported by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.[9] Therefore to counter the atrocities conducted by the Serbs, Kosovo Liberation Army’s (KLA) were for form, majority is the ethnic-Albanian separatist. In the past year the KLA has grown from almost nothing to a fighting strength in the tens of thousands. Their weapons are no better than you would expect from a makeshift army of farmers, teachers and other civilians. Russia and the West are pushing a plan to make the breakaway Serb province an autonomous region. The Serbs insist that Kosovo is an integral part of their territory. But roughly 90 percent of its inhabitants are Albanian-and they seem firmly behind the armed rebels. Scarcely a year ago the KLA was an obscure separatist group with any more than a few hundred members. The rebels divided the province into six geographic zones, each fielding several brigades of up to 1,000 troops.[10]

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has been fighting for a separate homeland for Tamils in the north and east since 1983. Their leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, proposed “initial talks” with the government as preliminary to “formal negotiation” to end the war. India, the local superpower, offered a friendly hand, and in 1987 appeared to have brokered a deal with Tamil groups, whereby they would hand over their weapons in return for more autonomy in Tamil areas. The Tigers pulled out of the deal, and an Indian “peacekeeping “ force went after them, with some success. It withdrew after Sri Lanka’s government decided it no longer wanted a foreign army in the country. Rajiv Gandhi, India’s Prime Minister at that time, was murdered, it is assumed by the Tigers. The Tigers are rich. The Tamils diaspora of perhaps half a million people is spread throughout the world, contributing money to Tamil charities, much of which pays for the Tigers’ war effort. London is an important Tamil center. The British government is trying to clamp down on organizations that take advantage of Britain’s traditional policy of providing sanctuary for dissident groups. Like Britain, it is the home for many organizations representing ethnic conflicts abroad. As a fighting force the Tigers are an elite, if that is not an abuse of word. They are well armed, have a small navy that regularly attacks and sinks government ships, and may have aircraft. They are thought to have bases in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, even though India has formally outlawed them since the murder of Rajiv Gandhi.[11]

CHAPTER THREE

SEPARATIST MOVEMENT IN SOUTHERN THAILAND

3.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Greater Patani had been an independent kingdom until 1786, it was formerly known as ancient kingdom of Langkasuka, it was changed to the Kingdom of Patani in the 14th century. It was an important commercial center for Asian and European traders. Hinduism and Buddhism seem to have been practiced until Islam was adopted as the official religion in the 15th century. Arab merchants were the people that spread the religion throughout the region between 12th and 15th centuries through trading. However the King of Patani himself embraced the religion and declared his kingdom to be an Islamic state in 1457.

The Islamisation of Patani have replaced the Hindu-Buddhist culture and its institutions. The Muslim religious elites (ulamas) came to dominate the Kingdom’s sociopolitical system. The King of Siam conquered Patani and had the Muslim dynasty abolished in 1786.[12] The Siamese government then divided Patani into seven provinces: Patani, Nhongchik, Raman, Ra-ngae, Saiburi, Yala, and Yaring. By 1906 the area of the seven Malay provinces was administratively reorganized into a ‘circle’ (monthon) called Monthon Patani. The Monthon Patani incorporated the seven provinces into four larger provinces: Patani, Bangnara, Saiburi and Yala.It were the idea of divide and rule but it had many problems associated with the administration and taxes collections.[13] In order to weaken the Muslim power and for administrative purposes. The provinces were governed by appointed bureaucrats under a centralized administrative structure. Sporadic rebellion in protest of the administrative reforms erupted but the Siamese government forces managed to suppress them. The rebellious activity and pressure form the British in Burma had forced the Siamese government to take control of Patani until the end of the 19th century. The British renounced the extraterritorial rights it had claimed previously and recognized Siam’s governance of the province and this also allowed control of four other Malay states to the European power. The Siamese government were able to have a firm control over Patani and this allowed the to take several measures to weaken the Islamic identity of the people of Patani to reduce them to a, “mono-ethnic character of the state,” a David Brown’s version.

The government first step was to replace the Islamic Shariah and adat laws with Siamese law. Second, an act was passed in 1921, requiring all children to attend Siamese primary schools, institutions designed to offer a secular education, and the medium of instruction was the Thai language. This included the closure of local pondoks (Islamic schools) to undermine the ulams power.[14] Reorganizing the seven provinces into four, Patani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun further centralized the administration. Thai governors replaced the rulers. The changes had led to loss of political powers of the traditional aristocrats.

During the Second World War, Phibun regime issued the Thai Customs Decree prohibiting the “wearing of sarongs, the use of Malay (Muslims) names and the Malay language,” this has angered the people. However, at the end of the war, Patani’s districts and local governments were brought under the direct control of Bangkok. All these measures were attempts to integrate Patani Muslims into larger framework of Thailand, and they created serious resentment among them. The traditional elite and pondok religious teachers were very unhappy and objected to the introduction of secular education and the Thai language in schools. Haji Sulong, president of the Islamic Religious Council, submitted a seven- point demand to the Thai government. It called for (i) the “appointment of a single individual with full powers to govern the four (Patani) provinces. The individual to be local-born in one of the four provinces and to be elected by the people”; (ii) 80% of government servants in the those provinces to profess the Muslim religion; (iii) Malay and Siamese to be the official languages; (v) Islamic law to be recognized and enforced in a separate Muslim court other than the civil court; (vi) any revenue and income derived from the four provinces to be utilized within them; and (vii) the formation of a Muslim Board.[15] As a consequence of making this demand, Haji Sulong and his associates were arrested and charged with treason. At the end of the Second World War, the Patani separatist movement was brought under control by the Thai State through military intervention.[16] In the initial post-war period, the government adopted a policy of accommodation towards the Muslims. However, the state penetration in pre-war years into the civil society of Patani Muslims, together with the absence of political participation of Patani elites and especially the arrest of Haji Sulong in the late 1940s, contributed to the Dusun Nyiur incident. A violent clash between the Thai police and the Patani Muslims. The Thai government was able to suppress the revolt but the political situation in Patani remained very tense in the 1950s. In 1948, the government declared a state of emergency, and act that reinforced the Patani Muslim perception of the Thai nation as an ‘alien state.” Once the emergency ended, Tengku Abdul Jalal, a follower of Haji Sulong, in 1959 formed an underground organization, Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP, or Patani National Liberation Front), that drew support from traditional aristocrats as well as the religious elite.

3.2 DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTIC
Demographic factors also have an impact on a insurgency. Where the population is small and concentrated, it is easier for the government to control the people and sever their links with the guerrillas. The location of the majority of the people in cities does not appear as favourable to insurgent movements as the situation in which they are concentrated in rural areas, although, as noted later, some contemporary insurgent strategists believe otherwise. If a society is highly urbanised, the government can control and monitor the people and prevent the establishment of guerrilla bases. But, if the government is weak and the insurgents have a significant degree of international support, it is possible some of the tactical aims of the insurgents may achieved. An example is Palestine, where Jewish terrorism combined with pro- Zionist currents in the international arena to force a British retreat[17]

Table 1.1 indicates the distribution of the region’s population.[18] Scholars have identified a variety of cultural streams in Thailand that correspond to sub-national social groupings. Even the older literature note highly important cultural distinctions among interest groups, such as cultures of the military or the bureaucracy.[19] Recent analysis of attitudes and opinions of Thai respondents indicates that what are regarded as fundamental cultural sources - national, religious, and ethnic identifications - may be less profound than previously conceived.[20] More important, perhaps, for modern Thailand are more fundamental cultural cleavages associated with modernization and the movement toward status as a “newly industrialising country (NIC)”. One source of this cleavage is a fundamental difference in perspectives between rural and urban areas, a source of political conflict in virtually all societies.[21] Although conventional wisdom suggest that religious differences in Thailand result in highly differentiated orientations to political activity, Albritton, et al, show that, in southern Thailand, there are no significant differences between Buddhists and Muslims in their evaluations of government actions, their political efficacy, or in measures of political culture. Except for cleavages in support for political parties, a result of interest-group mobilisation, there is little relevance for positing religious dimensions of culture as translating into political cleavages. Far more significant than religious differences for political orientations is “ethnic” diversity. Thai-speaking Muslims are more similar to Buddhist (who are also Thai-speaking) than to their Malay-speaking Muslims counterparts. In fact, ethnic cleavages, based upon language, are a source of political stresses are largely interest-group and socioeconomic status related, rather than cultural in their origins.[22]

3.3 IDEOLOGY OF THE MOVEMENT, STRUGGLE AND OBJECTIVE
There are four major Muslims underground groups currently active in the four southern border provinces of Thailand. They include the Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP) or National Liberation Front of Patani (presently is Known as Barisan Islam Pembebasan Patani, BIPP or Islamic Liberation Front of Patani); Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) or National Revolutionary Front; Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) or Pertubuhan Perpaduan Pembebasan Patani; and Barisan Bersatu Mujahideen Patani (BBMP) or United Fronts of Patani Fighters. The Malay resistance transformed from a movement largely organised around members of the Malay ruling elites to one with a broad base of popular support. This transformation resulted in the formation of GAMPAR in Malaya and PPM in the Patani region. The two organisations coordinated their operations closely. Their struggle, however, was confined to political activities, with only sporadic outbursts of violence, such as the uprisings in Kampung Belukar Samokin 1947 and in Dusun Nyor in the following year.

When the GAMPAR and PPM leaders died in 1953 and 1954 respectively, the organisations disintegrated. Drawing former members of the defunct GAMPAR and PPM, Tengku Abdul Jala (Adul Na Saiburi), former deputy leader of GAMPAR, formed the BNPP in 1959. The BNPP leadership comprised both traditional aristocrats and religious leaders. Its pattern of resistance became more ideologically inclined; its objective was no longer autonomy or irredentism but restoration of independence. The preferred strategy also was widened to include not only political activities but also armed guerrilla warfare. Idris bin Mat Diah, alias Pak Yeh, renowned gang leader in the Muslim provinces. [23] From the early 1960s, armed clashes with the government forces occurred intermittently. The early 1960s also saw Muslim religious students, particularly those who studied in Malaya, join BNPP. Some of these students, such as Badri Hamdan, Abdul Fatah Omar, Hannan Ubaidah (present leaders of the BNPP), continued their studies in Al-Azhar University in Cairo. While in Cairo, they formed an organisation known as Rumah Patani (House of Patani) which became the BNPP’s overseas base. At the same time, rifts among the Muslim activist emerged. The ideological commitment at this early stage was not clear as it became in the 1970s. Although the objective was to gain independence, the idea of restoring a sultanship was still floated by some of its leaders and supporters, especially the former aristocrats. This left the impression that should the struggle of the BNPP succeed, the Patani sultanate might be restored.

The more progressive Muslims, such as Ustaz Abdul Karim Hassan and his colleagues, admirers of Sukarno of Indonesia, hesitated to join BNPP. In March 1963 Ustaz Abdul Karim Hassan and his group formed BRN with the aim of establishing a Republic of Patani. The main factor contributing to the emergence of the BRN was ideological differences. The BRN leaders placed greater emphasis on political organisation than on guerrilla activities. Their strategy was to penetrate the pondok. This is because the Chairman himself was the headmaster of an Islamic school, the task of penetration was not very difficult for the BRN. Within five years (1963-1968), the BRN was able to influence several of the Islamic schools, especially in Narathiwat and Yala provinces. In 1968 Ustaz Abdul Karim Hassan and other BRN leaders went underground. There had been little military activity throughout the 1960s except for sporadic encounters with the BNPP’s guerrilla units, which at this stage were treated by the Thai authorities as bandit gangs rather than as disciplined, armed insurgent units. [24]

In 1968 the third front, PULO, emerged. The PULO was first organised in India by Tengku Bira Kotanila(Kabir Abdul Rahman), who had at the time just completed his first degree in Political Science at the Aligarh Muslim University, and a group of Patani students at the same university. Soon after the formation of PULO, Tengku Bira Kotanila moved to Mecca and focused his recruitment efforts primarily on young, non-committed Patani Muslims by stressing secular nationalism, and differentiating PULO from BNPP’s orthodox Islam and BRN’s ‘Islamic socialism’. The PULO also cultivated its support in the homeland, in Malaysia, and among Patani students in various Arab countries.

The Islamists founded an organisation, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN, or National Revolutionary Front), whose aim was to establish the Islamic Republic of Patani. The BRN’s base of support lay mainly in the pondoks. The secularists formed the Patani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), which claimed that it had an “invinsible government” whose tactic was to work by ambush. Many recent Patani university graduates as well as their fellows studying abroad supported this organisation. Both organisations considered the Thai government to be an “internal colonial” power with which compromise was impossible; the only option was to achieve Patani independence through armed struggle. However, the two groups did not coordinate their activities, choosing to pursue their guerrilla action independently. The organisation’s objective was complete independence and the establishment of an Islamic state. In response to the Patani separatist movement, Thai government launched a series of military operations against the guerrillas while adopting a policy of accommodating certain demands. The opposition movement has remained factionalised. However, in late 1997, activists across the political spectrum joined to form an underground organisation called the Council of the Muslim People of Patani (MPRMP). Taking inspiration from the Moros’ success, they sought to pressure the Thai government to come to an understanding with the Patani Muslims. The strategy remain the same, i.e., guerrilla attacks on police stations and government offices. Since the council is quite new, it is difficult to predict the success of the organisation.[25]

[1] . Richard Hoggart,(ed) Peoples and Cultures, Volume 7, New York, Oxford University Press, 1992, p.279.
[2] .Ibid, p.277.
[3] .Ibid, p.211-212
[4] .Ibid, p.239.
[5] . Wilkinson Paul, Terrorism and The Liberal State,London, The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1977, p.85.
[6] Evans Graham and Newnham Jeffrey, The Dictionary of World Politics, Great Britain, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992, p.142.
[7] .Ibid, p.278.
[8] .Wilkinson Paul, Terrorism and The Liberal State, London, The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1977,p.88.
[9] News Straits Times, 5,April,1999,p.1
[10] .Newsweek, 22 March, 1999,p.28
[11] .Asia, Sri Lanka, Civil War without end, The Economist, 5 December,1998,p.32-33
[12] .Syed Serajul Islam, The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines, Asian Survey, Vol, XXXVIII, No.5, May 1998.
[13] .Che Man W. K, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1990,p.35.
[14] Syed Serajul Islam, The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines, Asian Survey, Vol.XXXVIII, No.5, may 1998, p. 443.
[15] . Lukman Thaib, Political Dimension of Islam in Southeast Asia, Kual Lumpur, National University of Malaysia, 1996, p.96.
[16] . Syed Serajul Islam, The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of the Phiippines, Asian Survey, Vol, XXXVIII, No.5, May 1998, p.444.
[17] .Bard E. O’Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts(ed), Insurgency in the Modern World, USA, Westview Press,1980,p.19
[18] .Che Man, W.K, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand, Singapore, Oxford University Press,1990,p.36.
[19] .Fred W. Riggs, Thailand: The Modernisation of a Bureaucratic Polity, Honolulu, East-West Center Press, 1966,p.326-29
[20] .Robert B. Albritton and Sidthinat Prabudhanistisa, “ Culture, Region, and Thai Political Diversity”, Asian Studies Review, Vol 21(1997), p.61-62.
[21] . Jim Logerfo, “Attitudes Toward Democracy among Bangkok and Rural Northern Thais’, Asean Survey, 36 (1996), p.904-23.
[22] . Robert B. Albritton, Phan-Ngam Gothamasan, Noree Jasai, Manop Jitpoosa, Sunandpattira Nilchang and Arin Sa-Idi, “Electoral Participation by Southern Thai Buddhist and Muslims”, South East Asia Research , 4 (1996), p.127-56.
[23] .Che Man, W. K, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand, Singapore, Oxford University Press,1990,p.98.
[24] .Ibid,p.99
[25] .Ibid,p.448.

Continue Part 3....
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