Betty Teh : To ordinary Sabahans, MA63 is not a dusty document; it is a promise of fairness that Kuala Lumpur has broken for six decades. It guaranteed Sabah control over its immigration, land, oil, gas, courts, education, healthcare, and a bigger share of taxes and royalties. Instead, Sabah got 5% oil royalty, federal appointees running its courts, and thousands of undocumented migrants straining schools and hospitals.
PBSās 1985 victory was a roar: āGive us what was promised, or we walk.ā Kuala Lumpur heard secession and responded with UMNO.
The federal response was swift and multipronged. UMNO absorbed the leadership of the defunct United Sabah National Organisation (USNO), including Sakaran Dandai and Harris Salleh. Between 1986 and 1995, 72,209 immigrants mostly Muslim Filipinos and Indonesians were granted Malaysian citizenship under the clandestine Operasi Durian Buruk, pushing the Muslim share of the electorate from 21 per cent to 29 per cent. This was engineered demography.
Federal allocations to Sabah doubled from RM 1.2 billion in the second half of the 1980s to RM 2.8 billion in the first half of the 1990s, channelled through UMNO linked contractors.
By the 1994 state election, UMNO contested 25 seats, won 18, and formed government after 11 PBS assemblymen defected within 48 hours of polling.
The BN/UMNO model rested on three pillars:
ā¢Centralised patronage where UMNO became the sole gatekeeper for Muslim Bumiputera seats, relegating PBS and later UPKO to junior roles.
ā¢Resource leverage followed: 70 per cent of Sabahās timber revenue between 1995-2005 was tied to BN loyalists, while 1.2 million hectares of native customary land were alienated between 1994 and 2018, with 60 per cent awarded to Peninsular firms.
ā¢Coalition dominance was enforced through fluid post poll alliances; Sabah has had eight chief ministers since 1994, with an average tenure of 3.2 years.
Money politics was not an aberration but a design feature. The MACC documented RM 114 million in unexplained cash flows from the Chief Ministerās Department between 1994-2003, including RM 40 million directly linked to the 1999 state election.
In the 1999 Kimanis parliamentary by election, BN candidate Anifah Aman won by 1,893 votes after RM 2.1 million in ādevelopment aidā was disbursed to 14,000 voters; about RM 150 per head. A 2015 study using electoral returns and household surveys across 1,200 respondents found that voters in UMNO contested constituencies were 2.8 times more likely to report receiving cash or goods than in PBS areas.
Sabahās ethnic mosaic made the model especially jarring. Pre UMNO politics required cross ethnic coalitions. Post 1991, UMNOās Muslim seat monopoly 38 of 73 constituencies are now more than 60 per cent Muslim, up from 22 in 1985 forced non Muslim parties into reactive nativism. Interethnic trust indices fell from 0.68 (1988) to 0.41(2018.)
Every election since 1985 has been a referendum on MA63. PBS in 1985, Warisan in 2018, and now every party in 2025 campaigns on āMA63 or nothing.ā Yet zero major clauses have been restored. The federal excuse? āNational unity.ā The Sabahan reply? āUnity without justice is occupation.ā
The collapse of BN in 2018 did not dismantle the model; it diffused it. GRS, formed in July 2020, absorbed six UMNO assemblymen and three PBS defectors within 72 hours of polling.
The MACC later traced RM 12.8 million in āconsultancy fees" from the Chief Ministerās Department to GRS aligned village heads. The Sabah Maju Jaya Development Plan allocated RM 4.1 billion in federal funds to GRS controlled districts between 2021 and 2025, with 68 per cent awarded to Peninsular linked contractors. A 2023 study using budgetary data and constituency level contracts found that GRS held seats received 3.2 times more federal project approvals than opposition ones: a ratio identical to UMNOās 2008ā2018 average.
The demographic legacy is a ticking bomb. The āProject ICā citizens have now produced second generation voters. Electoral rolls in Lahad Datu, Semporna, and Kunak grew 41 per cent since 2000, compared to 12 per cent statewide. This engineered bloc, loyal to whoever controls federal citizenship pipelines underpins the Muslim seat lock and permanently sidelines KDM and Chinese parties.
Economically, the model has been a disaster. Sabahās GDP per capita stands at RM 29,000 in 2023, 42 per cent below Peninsular Malaysia despite contributing 11 per cent of national oil revenue. Petronas extracted RM 112 billion from Sabah (1976-2023) returned a fixed 5 per cent royalty. Timber royalties totalled RM 18.7 billion (1994-2018); under 15 per cent was reinvested in reforestation or rural infrastructure.
The data is clear, a district panel study (1990-2020) over 30 years looking at 25 districts ruled by BN/UMNO vs districts rules by other parties, UMNO areas grew slower became poorer. Every term they are in power, the economy in these districts dropped by about 0.3%. Why? Because money that should have to roads, school, clinics, water, internet and jobs was instead channelled into political networks; contracts for cronies, election handouts and rent seeking.
Defections have become political DNA. Since 1994, 42 assemblymen have switched parties, with estimated payoffs rising from RM 2.1 million in the 1990s to RM 5.2 million in the 2020s. The 2020 GRS coup involved RM 1.5 million per defector, funded via āstate development funds.ā Sixty two per cent of assemblymen elected after 2010 have switched parties at least once.
A 2024 survey in Ranau found that 71 per cent of voters expect āproject guaranteesā before casting ballots. So voting is no longer about policies, principles or leadership. It is you give us something now, we will give you the votes later. Democracy is now a transaction.
The November 29, 2025 state election will be the modelās final stress test. Five coalitions, no prepoll pacts, 41 multi cornered fights. Itās likely independents and local parties in KDM interiors will decide the outcome, and they will be the kingmakers. Whoever buys them wins.
Even before the state election, the federal government has suddenly announced a huge number of "development projects" for Sabah worth RM 6.8 billion.
Dismantling the model requires more than electoral reform. It requires:
* an anti hopping law with immediate by elections
* MA63 fiscal reset (20% oil royalty and 50% tax retention)
* district level budgeting for 30% of federal funds
* biometric re-registration of electoral rolls are the minimum preconditions.
Without them, the BN/UMNO model now rebranded as GRS 2.0 will outlive every party that adopts it.
The export of the BN/UMNO model to Sabah was not integration; it was control without consent. A state with no ethnic majority was governed as if it had a Malay core.
The 2025 election is not a contest of parties. The election will decide whether Sabah remains a colony or maybe finally becomes a partner as MA63 promised!
Authorās Note:
The data referenced in this analysis draws from 30 years of academic studies, federal audit reports, MACC investigations, and constituency level research published between 1994 and 2025. This article is a simplified interpretation intended for public understanding.
