In May 1961, Britain and Malaya had proposed a Malaysian federation. Malaya had then been independent from Britain since 1957, but remained under British military responsibility. The new Malaysian federation would besides Malaya include Singapore, the Crown Colonies of Sabah and Sarawak in British Borneo, and finally the small British protectorate Brunei, a semi-independent autocratic sultanate which was wedged in between Sabah and Sarawak. Such a federation would keep the fragile majority of ethnic Malays in power by balancing the largely Chinese Singapore against the different ethnicities of Borneo. Given the firm anti-communism of the Malay majority, the new Malaysian state was also seen by the British and Americans as a safeguard against communist sympathy among the ethnic Chinese in the area, particularly in Singapore.
The relative calmness of Indonesian foreign policy after West Irian did not last long. On February 13, 1963 Sukarno formally declared a policy of confrontation (Konfrontasi) against the formation of Malaysian federation. The scenario in many ways seemed familiar to West Irian: It was a dispute around de-colonization of territories bordering Indonesia, now even on the same land mass and with a partly Malay population. Once again, Djakarta streets were filled with nationalistic rallies arranged by the PKI, and once more Sukarno excelled in anti-colonial rhetoric, with full army backing. As with the West Irian issue, the Americans first saw the Soviet hand behind Indonesian aggression.
There were also easily seen differences from the West Irian dispute: This time, the European colonial power involved was Great Britain, and thus the conception of Indonesia as the natural heir of the Dutch East Indies did not apply. The conflict also involved other independent nations in the area, namely Malaya and the Philippines. Furthermore, the disputed areas were not remote wasteland, but densely populated or oil-rich areas like Malaya and Brunei. The disputed areas were strategically more central than West Irian: They formed the southern crescent of the South China Sea as well as the northeast side of the densely trafficked straits of Malacca. Singapore was at the heart of the conflict, both geographically and by being a both a trade center and the home of a central British military base.
It took Kennedy only a day to denounce Sukarno’s confrontation and publicly announce his support to Malaysia and Great Britain. There was one prime reason behind the American support of Malaysia: That the US shared the British strategic plans for the federation of Malaysia. From the British and American view, a Malaysian federation had three important advantages: It would save an ailing Singaporean economy, which suffered from poor access to the Malayan hinterland. It would further integrate the politically unstable Singapore into a non-Chinese, non-communist state. Most importantly, the new federated state would serve as a buffer against the northern threat from China and the communists, as well as strengthen the safeguard against any possible future Indonesian expansionism. It would also help secure the Malacca straits and South China Sea for trade and naval movements between the Indian and Pacific oceans. In the administration, there was no significant dissent to the support for Malaysia, and little debate on this issue. The US position had remained unchanged since the plans were first discussed in 1961.
Another aiding factor for US going against Konfrontasi so strongly, was that the formation of Malaysia were guided by the British. In Southeast Asia, the "special relationship" between USA and Britain remained in many aspects, particularly regarding national security issues.27 The British base in Singapore was widely used by the Americans, and had been actively used by CIA in the 1958 to support the regional rebellion in Indonesia. The two countries cooperated closely on military and security issues. In US eyes, the Anzus treaty indirectly bound the United States to support the British against hostilities in the area, due to Anzus partner Australia’s Commonwealth treaties with the UK and Malaysia. 28 The British had furthermore sided with the US against the Dutch on the West Irian issue, and had done so with little hesitation. A practical sharing of the work load also took place: While Indonesian security issues, like a minor military aggression, was mainly considered American responsibility, Malaya and Singapore were British responsibilities. 29 The special relationship did however not take place without differences, and diverging agendas occurred. Still, there was a high barrier for going openly against the British, and especially in issues concerning regional security. 30
For the US, Sukarno’s signs of hostility against a future Malaysia had until now been only a minor irritation, and did not significantly influence the relations between Indonesia and the US. The Malaysian question was a British concern, where the US chose to remain in passive support. As the actions of Indonesia and the Philippines increased the tension, the Malaysia issue turned into one of direct American concern.
At first, Indonesia had expressed no objections to the proposed Malaysian federation.31 Neither had Sukarno objected to the formation of an independent Malaya in 1957, despite that the Malay areas of the British colonies had been included in the broader Indonesian/Malayan nationalism. Sukarno was known to have supported this broad nationalism during the Indonesian war of independence. 32 The PKI, however, had opposed the Malaysia plans from the very beginning, branding them as neo-colonialism. The Djakarta press had followed the PKI cue and soon turned hostile to the federation plans.
The Philippine government under president Diosdado Macapagal also protested the Malaysia plans, and raised an old claim on Sabah. Yet the Philippines stated that they had no objections to a Malaysian federation per se, only to the inclusion of Sabah.33 On July 27, 1962 President Macapagal had proposed an alternative plan for a greater Malayan confederation, consisting of all the involved Colonies in Borneo as well as Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Malaya. The still vague concept of a loose Pan-Malay confederation was later named Maphilindo.
Malaya under Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman (the Tunku), Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew and Britain had continued to prepare for the federation throughout 1961, with US approval. In the first half of 1962, popular hearings and elections were held in the different territories, all establishing popular majority in favor of a Malaysian federation. Only among the 78.000 inhabitants of Brunei, doubts emerged over participation in the federation.
In Indonesia, the mood toward the Malaysian federation chilled during 1962. In September, Foreign Minister Subandrio announced that Indonesia had a security concern with Malaysia, and hence would not allow military bases in non-Indonesian Borneo, hinting that "an American base, for instance," would be countered with "a Soviet base on [their] part of Borneo".34 Tunku Abdul Rahman reacted strongly, calling the statement a virtual "declaration of cold war," which Sukarno topped by saying that "physical conflict" with between Indonesia and Malay might well become "unavoidable". 35
During fall, a small Bruneian guerilla force under the leadership of Sheik Azahari had been allowed to train in Indonesian Borneo. The training was well known to Western intelligence, although it was uncertain whether it was the regional army commander, known for his independence, or Djakarta who had authorized the training. Chairman Sheik Azahari and his anticommunist Brunei People’s Party had won 14 out of 15 constituencies in the recent elections held in Brunei. However, the elected representatives had no actual power, and the Sultan and his British protectors seemed reluctant to grant any. Azahari’s party was strongly opposed to a Malaysian federation, but preferred an independent, single North-Bornean state consisting of Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak, much like the British had first proposed in 1958.
In December 1962 a revolt broke out in Brunei, and Sheik Azahari declared the formation of the Unitary State of Kalimantan Utara (Northern Borneo) with himself as President. Azahari was still in Manila after talks with the Philippine Vice President when he declared the state, making Manila the de facto capital of the new state. Two days later, Sukarno proclaimed his support to an independent Bornean state under Azahari. The main thrust of the revolt was put down in a week by three British Ghurka battalions. However, the rebellion provided an opening for Sukarno to increase his criticism of the Malaysian federation.
On January 13, 1963 Sukarno declared confrontation, Konfrontasi, against Malaysia on a mass meeting in Djakarta. "We are being encircled," Sukarno spoke in English, "[...] We do not want to have neo-colonialism in our vicinity".36 Sukarno used the PKI arguments and portrayed Malaysia as a neo-colonial plot designed only to contain Indonesia and keep British colonial power intact. That Malaysia’s defense and economy still was to be controlled from London, Sukarno presented as evidence of the colonialist nature of the proposed federation.
The launch of Konfrontasi made the Malaysia issue cross the line for how long the US could overlook its existence. It became an international issue which could escalate into an armed conflict. Hence, there was also a danger of US direct military involvement: A conflict would lead to Australian military support to the British Australia could then demand the US to fulfill its Anzus obligations, and the US could be forced to participate in a military conflict against Indonesia at the very time the US tried to build up and befriend the Indonesian army. The US initiatives to turn Indonesia westwards would have small chances of survival, should the US be involved in direct hostilities against Indonesia, likewise would the US friendly contact with the army be endangered.
The day after Sukarno’s speech, President Kennedy gave his open support to the Malaysian federation on a press conference, "because [Malaysia] is the best hope of security for that very vital part of the world."37 The statement was directly targeted against Sukarno. Kennedy’s intention was to calm Sukarno down by making him realize the dangers involved in a confrontation, particularly the consequences it could have for Indonesian relations with the US. This was the first time Kennedy openly spoke against Sukarno in the Malaysia question, and it was not received well in Djakarta. Rather than calming down, Sukarno increased the temperature, and expressed offense and surprise at Kennedy’s statement.
To the Americans, Indonesian reasons for entering Konfrontasi were a puzzle. Hostility had first been expressed by PKI, and both Ambassador Jones, the White House and State Department presumed that Moscow and Beijing had been active behind the scenes.38 The Bloc strategy was hence first assumed to be the same as under the West Irian crisis: To exploit Indonesian nationalism and to provoke conflict between Indonesia and Great Britain. The Malaysian conflict had the advantage for the Soviets of involving the United States, Australia and New Zealand by treaty. Hence the West Irian loophole was ruled out: The US could not side with Indonesia against the other Western interests in this conflict, as they had did in the West Irian conflict. The disadvantage to Moscow was interpreted to be that, unlike in West Irian, the Indonesians were not likely to be the victor of a full-scale war. Accordingly, the US assumed that Soviet and Chinese interest rather lay in a small-scale, protracted and lukewarm semi-war, designed to annoy and tire out British commitments in Southeast Asia. The first year of Konfrontasi, the fervent PKI support and reports of Soviet diplomatic efforts to encourage escalation were taken as evidence of Beijing’s and Moscow’s intentions.
The communists’ intentions were however not a crucial issue, as long as the power to control the confrontation was perceived to lie with Sukarno. In order to find a way to halt the conflict, the US tried to analyze the reasons Indonesia and the Philippines may have had to instigate it. For the Philippines, the reasons seemed simple enough: Economic gain combined with a colonial demand and a wish not to alienate Djakarta. For Sukarno, however, no single rational reason seemed sufficient.
Until spring 1963, the prime reason for Sukarno’s oral attacks against Malaysia were deemed to be his personal peculiarities. Ambassador Jones attributed the hostility mostly to the Indonesian president’s personality and emotions: He was a colonial hero and nation-builder, and pre-occupied with anti-colonialism wherever it took place – it was his very heartbeat.39 Sukarno personally was willing to fight anywhere, anytime for people’s freedom, Jones argued. Jones was convinced that Sukarno actually believed that the British had duped the elections, that the Borneans wanted independence and that the British had mischievous intentions. Furthermore, Malaya had insulted and irritated Sukarno: They had performed much better economically after independence and had a more stable political system, but had gone through the de-colonization process in the opposite manner of Indonesia: The British had left peacefully, rather than been thrown out. Where Sukarno had ousted Dutch economic dominance, the British retained their in Malaya. Moreover, independent Malaya’s prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, seemed in manners and education more British than Asian. To the nationalists in Djakarta, the Malayan state represented treason and its leaders were fifth-columnists to the anti-colonial cause. When Malaya expanded into Borneo—practically natural Indonesian territory—Sukarno had every emotional reason to attack Malaysia, Jones concluded. Konfrontasi was hence a result of irrational emotions, and could not be stopped with rational arguments. State Department concurred more dryly that "Historical, social, economic, linguistic, cultural and psychological factors" all contributed to a continuing "high volatility in the relations of leaders of Indonesia and Malaya". 40
A variation of the personality explanation attributed Sukarno’s behavior to the Javanese mystical conception of power. Sukarno supposedly felt a personal divine right and duty to exert his mystically given autocratic power over his area, and his area included the Northern Bornean territories. The Malaysian federation had upset this right, and it had upset the power system. Sukarno could see it as his mystical obligation as well as right to maintain the power structure which culminated in himself. Konfrontasi was necessary to keep the powers of chaos away. The basic assumption was that Javanese mystical power was a binary concept: Power was either total, or it was nothing. If Sukarno lost power by caving in to a Malaysian federation, he and the Javanese elite with him, might believe that he would lose Indonesia entirely. The alternative would be chaos. Furthermore, Sukarno’s actions could be interpreted in the light of the actions of his favorite character in the shadow plays: The righteous, idealistic warrior-king, who led his brothers in a devastating battle for justice against their own cousins. To explore the mystical aspects, Jones sough out Sukarno’s spiritual adviser (dukun) with his deputies and others, but without success.41 The mystical explanation was not sufficient neither to Jones or to the Americans, nor was it a prominent model. However, in different variations, the mystical explanation provided the element of Javanese mysticism which the administration tended to include as ad notams in their analyses of Indonesian affairs.
When Konfrontasi escalated beyond rhetoric during spring 1963, Washington, no longer were satisfied with emotional, personal or mystical explanations alone. Sukarno’s actions were now interpreted along the lines of the theory of Sukarno as a power politician. The West Irian confrontation had shown Sukarno the advantages of an external enemy. The lack of external threats made it more likely that the delicate balance act between the army and PKI would fall to Sukarno’s disadvantage: He would lose the power to set the army and PKI up against each other in a competition where Sukarno controlled the battlefield: Emotional nationalism. Sukarno’s popularity was his main strength, and that popularity rested on his ability to stir up popular, mostly nationalist, emotions.
Furthermore, an enemy could be part of a conscious nation-building effort. Sukarno, a nation-builder, would know this, and he would see Malaysia as a low-risk target. Also, Sukarno knew the army would support the concept, since an external enemy helped contain the internal army differences. Besides, it was difficult for the army to oppose a nationalist issue without endangering its popular credentials.42 The PKI, would naturally support any budding conflict with a Western power. Hence, it seemed to be internal political reasons and Sukarno’s balance act that lay behind Konfrontasi rather than actual foreign policy concerns.
Events altered the foundations of the US analysis. Preliminary negotiations had started in Manila on April 9, 1963. Representatives from Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines attended. The US privately voiced their support to both the Maphilindo concept and an "Asian solution". The US did not want to take part in the negotiations themselves. To underline their seriousness in opposing Malaysia, the Indonesians a few days into the negotiations launched their first military action in Borneo. Although of little military significance, it was an alarming move. So-called "refugees" and volunteers were trained by the Indonesian army, and then infiltrated as guerillas into the Bornean jungle, supposedly under the cover of being part of Azahari’s rebel forces. None of the involved parties doubted that Indonesia controlled the forces, although Indonesia denied any such control. On the borders, the guerillas faced British, Malayan and later Australian troops, and with considerable losses.43 Also, with the increased military activity and indications of military action taken without Sukarno’s pre-approval, it now seemed more and more like the army actively drove the conflict further, rather than just following Sukarno’s lead. 44
Some of the US-friendly leaders in the Indonesian army presented the embassy officials for an alternative reasoning behind the army support to Konfrontasi: They held that Malaysia actually represented a communist threat, contrary to what the British and Americans thought. To some army leaders, to form Malaysia was actually to allow a potentially communist nation to establish itself on the very borders of Indonesia. Although the Tunku and the Chinese-Malay leadership were strongly anticommunist, the rank and file of Chinese Malayans would in the long term tip the balance – the ethnic Chinese controlled 85% of the resources, and they were largely pro-China. Accordingly, the anticommunist segments of the Indonesian army strongly opposed the formation of Malaysia. However, the Americans did not accept this argumentation either, having full faith in Malaysian anti-communism. Washington conceded that there were a few people in the Indonesian army who held this view, but would not accept it as the primary motivator.45 In may 1964, Guy Pauker’s report about a thousand ethnic Chinese guerillas being trained in Borneo by the army further weakened the credibility of this argument.
Ambassador Jones concluded that both the army and Sukarno actually believed that the Bornean people wanted an independent state. Jones credited this belief to false intelligence, probably with leftist origin. Furthermore, Sukarno and the army were probably influenced by spending too much time with the Azahari-milieu. The US-friendly General Nasution expressed surprise to Jones’ insistence that the US believed that the Borneans actually wanted a federation, and Nasution’s reaction surprised Jones in return. Hence, the theory of actual idealistic motives behind Konfrontasi was strengthened in Washington, but mainly as a complementing theory to Jones’ original argument of Sukarno’s emotional reasons. The Americans still could not accept that the army really believed that the British "neo-colonialism" was real, the army leadership "knew as well as the American Embassy that it was Sukarno’s confrontation policy that kept the British in Southeast Asia".46
After the first Manila talks, Sukarno balked from entering further negotiations. During April and May, heavy diplomatic pressure was exerted on Sukarno from several parties, particularly Thailand and Australia. Foreign Minister Garfield Barwick of Australia visited Djakarta three times in May only, trying to persuade Sukarno into entering talks. Jones also added his voice to the chorus, although the US were more concerned with the petroleum negotiations and the implementation of the IMF stabilization plan at the time. Who and what actually drove Konfrontasi further now seemed increasingly unclear, as Sukarno continued to show cooperation and good will toward the US’ and their wishes in all other issues.
It was the US-led oil negotiations that provided a way back into negotiations. In the end of May, Sukarno agreed to meet Tunku Abdul Rahman privately in Tokyo. Sukarno had the opportunity by already being in Tokyo for vacation. Because of the well known secret oil negotiations, the presence of other diplomats and foreign policy advisors provided a cover, should any party desire a low profile. The talks were hosted privately by Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira, and ended in an agreement to start negations between the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines in Manila the next week.
On June 7 the three parties started negotiations in Manila, with Thai assistance. Jones was asked to be available in Manila for consultations, although neither Jones nor other Americans took part in the actual negotiations. As previously, an "Asian solution" was what all the parties desired, save for the British. The US administration, eager not to get involved in the Malaysia issue while pursuing their Action Plan in Indonesia, fullheartedly supported a negotiated "solution for Asians by Asians."
On June 11, agreement was reached. Plan for the loose confederation of Maphilindo was a set up, and Malaya, possibly without British pre-approval, had agreed to let a team of UN observers verify last years elections, to see if the pro-federation majority was plausible. A final summit for signing was planned for the end of July, and was to be held in Manila but arranged by Malaya.
The US viewed the Maphilindo plans as a positive development. Given the solid anticommunist stand of Manila and Kuala Lumpur, Indonesian plans to join Maphilindo constituted "a new expression of [Indonesian] foreign policies and one which is more compatible with the interest of the Western world than conspicuous flirtation with the Peking and Moscow". 47 However, the honest intentions of the Malaysian and Indonesian participation in Maphilindo were uncertain. Rather, the US treated Maphilindo as a .face-saving device with positive potentials, than an actual prospect of a working Pan-Malay confederation.
After the Manila meeting, the US started to look on the British Malaysia-policy as more of an obstacle for solution, and hence hindering US efforts for stabilization in the more important Indonesia. After talks in London, the British and Malay government announced the formation of Malaysia on August 31. The Indonesians interpreted this to mean that the formation would take place regardless of the UN team’s findings, in breach with the Manila agreement. The Indonesian reaction to the London statement was increased military activity and a massive anti-Malaysia public campaign. Furthermore, Sukarno halted the preparation work with the UN survey officials, and threatened to abstain from the upcoming summit. In return, Malaya delayed the invitation to the summit, something which Sukarno interpreted as a personal insult. All these events were proof of British tactlessness leading to a worsened situation for the US efforts in Indonesia, although Sukarno was the actual perpetrator behind escalation.
By the end of July 1963, Ambassador Jones had modified his earlier conclusions on the nature of Konfrontasi.48 Now, he found it likely that the army had been the main instigator behind Konfrontasi, after several talks with Nasution and others. Through Konfrontasi, the army maintained their West Irian-sized budgets and political importance. Several incidents pointed the direction of army responsibility, Jones argued. Particularly important was the recent announcement of the new supreme command, where the military regained their special legal powers from the Martial Law period, which had been withdrawn after the end of the West Irian conflict. What the army and Nasution actually sought, was to keep up military pressure, but without wanting to escalating it into a costly full-blown conflict. Jones added that all intelligence indicated that the Indonesian army did nothing militarily to prepare for real war, but rather continued to build themselves up against PKI and followed the US-coordinated training schemes minutely. He concluded that while the confrontation would "continue to produce clamor," 49 there were no indications that the Indonesian were about to start any serious fighting in the near future. 50
Jones’ arguments were supported by news analyses and reports from the fighting. The local Reuters corresponded told Jones in late February that he had information saying that the driving forces behind Konfrontasi were the armed forces and PKI, and that Sukarno sought a way out.51 Furthermore, the ineptitude of the Indonesian guerillas were striking, if not peculiar given Nasution’s renown as a guerrilla strategist. 52 Probably, the US assessed, the army did not want to send any real troops into the fighting, since this was not a war the army sought to win militarily. It was rather a war held for propaganda and to gain public sympathy. Hence the British slaughter of the "independence movement’s" guerillas was more of an asset to the army than a loss, as it discredited the British and made their professional Ghurka forces look brutal in comparison to the small, amateurish and volunteer-dominated guerilla-troops. 53 The NSC concluded in May 1964 that the army indeed were central in Konfrontasi, and might even continue a low-level subversion campaign of their own, should Sukarno enter a peace agreement. 54
The discrepancy between the British analyses and actions, and the US’ became wider. The British assessment of Indonesian confrontation was "not as a passing outburst of bad temper" but as "an integral part of their national policy."55 The Indonesian objective was a Greater Indonesia including Malaysia and the Philippines, the British thought. Sukarno, PKI and the army all shared this objective for various reasons. The most important reason was the Indonesian desire to hold internal differences in bay. A common national project in foreign policy was the ideal tool for curbing internal conflicts. The ones who gained most from Konfrontasi was PKI, since Konfrontasi postponed the inevitable showdown between the army and PKI. This bought time for PKI infiltration of the army. Hence, PKI could bee seen as the driving force behind the confrontation, yet Konfrontasi was a nationalistic project shared by all three parties in the power balance, the British concluded in their arguments to Washinton. 56
In Washington, London’s arguments were met with concern. The "current unfavorable British attitude toward Indonesians can well become a complicating factor in the forthcoming DAC consideration [of] Indonesia," State wrote to its London embassy, meaning that the British attitude endangered the multinational funding necessary to finance the stabilization plan for Indonesia.57 The embassy were instructed to explain how the US analyzed the situation to the British, in order to make the British understand the overall importance attached to saving the stabilization plan.
State conceded to London that Indonesia still was hostile to Indonesia, but regarded it as an issue that could be solvedState conceded to London that Indonesia still was hostile to Indonesia, but regarded it as an issue that could be solved.58 The time for courting Sukarno into the Western camp was perfect now, given the uncertainty the Sino-Soviet split had created. Opposing British views, the US found it difficult to "go along with any viewpoint which portrays current Indonesian policies as monolithic or irrevocable." Rather the Indonesian policies were "products of constantly shifting internal forces, maneuvers among Sukarno’s [overstrikes removed] competing advisers, emotionalism, prestige-hunger, opportunism and, in some cases, sheer whim." 59The US saw "no evidence of [a] single Indonesian ‘grand design’ either toward Malaysia or toward anything else." However, there may well have been "various ‘grand designs’ in [the] minds [of] different Indonesian leaders, but they [were] at best fuzzy, contradictory and subject to constant mutation.." 60 Hence, the US rejected the notion of Indonesian basic expansionism as well as Indonesian foreign policy as a unitary force.
Furthermore, Indonesian motives should not dominate Western policy towards Indonesia, the US now ascertained, confronting that Indonesian motives had become the main focus of policy debate.61 The reason was that Indonesian motives were constantly changing, and that the Indonesians seldom achieved what they plotted for; there was a "wide discrepancy between Indonesian talents for [...] plotting and [their] ineptitude in implementing plots." In fact, the very shifting nature and complexity of Indonesian politics made the opportunities to "exert outside influence [...] considerably greater than would be the case in [a] more orderly nation." 62The US policy was therefore to actively influence Indonesian policy "by inducements and pressures," to "encourage them when they make progress and minimize inevitable backsliding." State was "convinced [that the] game will be forfeit if we merely stand aside and confine our efforts to stern lectures and periodic spanks." Concluding their case, the Americans stated that in the Malaysian issue, the carrot had to be used, and the IMF-led stabilization program had to be implemented and secured funding. Only then there was a chance of solving the Malaysia problem and improve the situation in Indonesia. Hence, the US viewed the Malaysia issue as problem which could be solved only by stabilization, while at the same time seeing the Malaysia issue as the prime obstacle against obtaining stabilization. 63
The Malayans presented an alternative "grand design"- variation to the Americans: The theory of abandonment.64 In this theory, Sukarno and Zhou En-lai had reached an agreement on hemispheres after the Bandung conference. While Indonesia should control the islands, China was given the mainland, including Malaya. The formation of Malaysia hence upset the basic understanding between Beijing and Djakarta, causing Indonesian opposition. The Malayans backed their theory with Chinese intelligence maps drawing the line, and with the Indonesian coolness towards Malaya after Bandung.
The abandonment theory seemed even more unrealistic to the Americans than the other Grand Designs: To Sukarno, and particularly the army, China was still a larger threat to Indonesian security than Malaysia would ever become, the US concluded.65 That Sukarno actually would agree to Chinese control over Malaya while alternatives still existed, seemed unlikely—especially since the alleged agreement had been made several years ago, when PKI was much less influential and Indonesian foreign policy was more stable. The only situation in which Sukarno would sign such an agreement, was if he felt he had no choice: That China inevitable would control the area. While the Malays claimed that Sukarno actually felt this way, the Americans did not agree. Sukarno was not prone to surrender to a future Chinese hegemony. Furthermore, the Malays had been notoriously untrustworthy in their presentation of intelligence regarding Indonesia, and the plan seemed too neat to be true. This seemed to be Malayan paranoia, or just another Kuala Lumpur plot to discredit Sukarno.
In the beginning, the US saw the advent of Konfrontasi mainly as an obstacle to achieving stabilization in Indonesia. Hence they set out to find the Indonesian reasoning behind Konfrontasi, in order to halt it. Much of the US activity regarding Konfrontasi hence concentrated on finding an explanation. This was despite the Administration’s insistence on that explanations were not important, but that the continuing US efforts to influence Indonesian policy through stabilization, army contacts and cultural dissemination was to be continued regardless what reasons existed for Konfrontasi. The insignificance of Indonesian intentions was due to the Indonesian lack of ability to realize their plans, and that no single reason behind Konfrontasi probably existed—rather there was a complex range of causes and individual reasons. Konfrontasi furthermore made the US relationship with the Indonesian army more difficult, since the army supported Konfrontasi. The US had originally shared objectives with the British and supported London on Malaysia. However, the British attempts to halt Konfrontasi by firmness had started to create some dissonance between London and Washington, since Washington viewed London’s strategy and assessments regarding Konfrontasi as a hindrance to the US’ own efforts in Indonesia.
Konfrontasi in its early days had little direct impact on US actual policy at the time. The main direct consequence was that the administration spent more of its time defending and developing interpretations of Konfrontasi, rather than on adapting and adjusting its actual policies in Indonesia. Hence, the administration may have missed or underestimated the importance of other developments in Indonesia, which it otherwise might have paid more attention to—for instance the modest start of PKI’s cultural campaign against the West in summer 1963. However, the most serious result of Konfrontasi was a developing distrust between the British and the US, which later led to contrary British and US policies. This discordance would ultimately be central in the disruption of the American offensive program, where aid and economic stabilization remained the main thrust.
Aid, Stabilization and the Breakdown The unsolved Malaysia issue eventually led to the abandonment of the stabilization program and impaired aid as a possible American leverage. The death of Indonesian Vice President Djuanda and President Kennedy dealt further blows to the American strategy. Combined with the pressure from the press, the Congress and the British, this led to the abandonment of American initiative. However, the President still sought to keep a "foot in the door" in Indonesia, despite public opposition.
The US effort to implement the stabilization plan seemed to go smoothly after the oil negotiations had succeeded. State Department was optimistic: They saw a "a pattern of events" that lend support to the "conclusion that a multilateral investment of Free world resources in Indonesia at this time might not only serve defensive purposes but also go some distance towards bringing up significant reorientation of Indonesia towards the west."66.
The events which made State look optimistic were several. On May 26 Sukarno had unilaterally signed a stabilization plan, in defiance of PKI opposition. The Governor of the Indonesian Central Bank had also been able to negotiate rescheduling of Indonesia’s debt payments to the USSR. The negotiation was a "significant indication of Djakarta’s desire to diminish its economic and military dependence on Moscow," State Department concluded.67 The renegotiations also meant the US could support the stabilization plan financially, something which had been politically impossible in Washington with the debt repayments at original schedule. Furthermore, the Nasakomization of the government had been postponed: Sukarno seemed to have no intention of giving any seats in the inner cabinets to the PKI. In Tokyo, the oil negotiations and the Malaysia issue both seemed to have been solved. Even if Sukarno was "certainly not fully reconciled to Malaysia," and could "be expected to continue his obstruction tactics," the Malaysia issue did not seem to threaten the stabilization efforts after the Tokyo meeting. 68
In May, Sukarno had signed the IMF-plan and started to implement economic reforms. Inside Indonesia, First Minister Djuanda had been the main driving force behind the reforms, the US assessed.69 The reasons why Sukarno decided to go along were several, but one reason was deemed to be the determining factor: Sukarno probably saw the reforms as favorable to himself in the Indonesian power balance. The PKI had been gaining strength for some time now, and when the Martial Laws were lifted in early May, the army would be considerably weakened. The economic reforms re-balanced the situation and made sure the PKI was kept out of important cabinet positions. Hence the administration admitted that the US efforts themselves did not create opportunities for stabilization, but rather they were efforts to use all opportunities available to their fullest extent.
From June and through the summer, the administration concentrated their efforts on securing funding to the stabilization plan. The funding was to be concerted through the IMF. The Development Assistance Committee of OECD (DAC) were to have a meeting in Paris on July 26, and on that meeting, the US intended to secure $50 million in interim loans to Indonesia for 1964, in line with a recently dispatched IMF-teams recommendations. The US would forward a stabilization loan in the $25–35 million range. The proposed total US AID contribution under the DAC-umbrella for the next year hence amounted to over $125–135 million, including $78 million in PL480 "Food-for Peace"-commitments.70
One obstacle that still could hinder the stabilization plan was the Indonesian foreign debts, particularly to the Soviet Union. Originally, the US intelligence suggested that the recent debt deal between the Soviets and Indonesia consisted of a three year moratorium on all debts, and a doubling of the succeeding repayment period from 8 to 16 years. In hard figures, that would mean an extra $25 million in foreign exchange available on the Indonesian state budgets. However, it turned out that the moratorium only covered half that sum, and that the debts to various European countries had not been renegotiated.
The US posed a condition for forwarding aid that total Indonesian yearly net repayments of debt did not exceed $20 million. Furthermore, the US loan would only be forwarded if Indonesia refrained from further military action against Malaysia. The conditions were indirectly and privately presented to Sukarno by Jones in Djakarta. In Paris, the US delegates used a more firm presentation of the same conditions to defend the soundness of the plan to the other DAC-members. Before the DAC-meeting, the US concluded that Sukarno had "complied sufficiently with our pressure for stabilization and Bloc debt rollover".71 Despite the British "unfavorable attitude," the DAC-meeting hence accepted the American arguments and "chipped in": On July 24, the IMF approved a standby loan of $50 million to Indonesia, of which $20 million were made available soon after. On July 26, the DAC-meeting approved another $50million in fresh credit to be drawn during the same fall. The US total AID commitment was coined to $110 million. A second DAC-meeting in September should sort out more details. However, the administration needed to Congress approval on the aid funds.
In Congress, the mood against foreign aid in general was negative, and to Indonesia especially so. Sukarno had received particularly bad press during the escalation of Konfrontasi in July. Although Sukarno’s rage was understandable to the administration, given what they saw as British and Malayan provocations, the Congress did not share this interpretation of events. Outside the administration, Sukarno was generally seen as the expansionist aggressor with sole responsibility for Konfrontasi.
In mid-July, the Broomfield Amendment was proposed in the House. The amendment would bar any military aid to Indonesia, and allow economic aid only when the President personally decided the aid to be of vital interest to the United States.72 Behind the House’s wish to bar military aid was the basic view of Indonesia Sukarno as an aggressor, and that military aid would support that aggression; besides a moral indignation over Sukarno personally and Indonesian flirtation with leftist ideology generally.
The White House sought to defeat the amendment in the House. with one main argument, "that denying MAP cuts us off from [the] very group (Indo military) which [the Soviets] have been wooing with fancy equipment but seems to prefer us."73 The administration worked variations on this argument on who they thought were persuadable Republican representatives, as well as Senators for a later Senate round. During the Congressional hearings, the administration used their full argumentational strength. The testimonies defending Indonesia’s vital importance to US national security was topped by State with General Felt’s testimony, outlining what "catastrophe" to the free world it would be, should Indonesia become communist. 74
The House Foreign Affairs committee voted in favor of the Broomfield Amendment, and formal approval in the House of Representatives followed soon, cutting off MAP funds for 1964. The implications could be grave for the administrations long term efforts to rescue Indonesia for the West. The military insignificant MAP-program still formed the basis of the defensive half of the Action Plan, and it was through MAP that the friendship to the Indonesian army was symbolically affirmed.
The administration were confident that Senate would reverse the House cuts if Konfrontasi could be moderated. Hence, they tried to soften the negative impact the amendment had in Djakarta. The day after the amendment was publicized, Jones talked in length with an insulted Sukarno, trying to convince him of the Kennedy’s administrations efforts to reverse the Broomfield amendment. Sukarno was furthermore told that aid to Indonesia would be impossible if no agreement were reached in Manila, implying that Sukarno himself held the key to turn the Broomfield amendment and secure continued US aid. To persuade Sukarno finally of going to Manila, Jones convinced Sukarno that clerical errors was behind a delayed Malayan invitation to the Manila summit, not the deliberate offense both the US and Sukarno originally saw in the delay. From the UN, U Thant went to Djakarta to lay further pressure on Sukarno.
As the US had expected, Sukarno decided to attend the summit in the last minute, in US eyes caving in to tacit US pressure on aid while demonstrating both pride and statesmanship in public. The summit started on July 30, and by August 5 a final agreement had been made. The agreement detailed the UN surveys and the Maphilindo plans. Also, they stressed the "temporariness" of foreign bases in the area, with specific hints to the US bases in the Philippines and the British in Singapore and Malaya. To US displeasure, the CIA-support to the 1958-rebellion in Indonesia was implicitly referred to as the example of why such bases must be abolished. Still, the US supported the deal, seeing the base problem as minor technical hindrance subordinate to the greater concern of solving the conflict. Sukarno continued to show goodwill throughout August, and his annual August 17 Independence day speech was, in US eyes, a rare and promising exercise in restraint. The British, however, remained skeptics; as did Beijing, Hanoi, and the PKI.
For the US, the main problem in August and September was no longer Sukarno, nor Congress. "Our main problems [...] now seems to be with the British" Forrestal wrote to Kennedy.75 The US had asked the British to play ball with Sukarno until the stabilization plan was safer and the formation of Malaysia in order. However, when the UN team headed for Sabah and Sarawak, the British obstructed the team’s entrance and work. Furthermore, the British hindered entrance for the Indonesian observers which had been agreed upon in the deal, on the grounds that some of the Indonesians worked for Indonesian intelligence. Only after US pressure, did the British allow a severely reduced UN survey team to start their work on August 26.
On August 29, a Malaysian act threatened to halt the process again. In a front page headline, the NY Times quoted the Tunku saying that the Malaysian federation would be formed regardless of the UN findings. The date was now fixed to September 15. Once more, the Indonesians were insulted and infuriated. In an effort to calm things down, the Malayan Foreign Minister Ghazali flew to Djakarta to talk with Subandrio. Once more, the talks succeeded after the first heat had calmed down, and Indonesia continued their support to the survey process. To have a leverage on ready hand in case of further emergencies, Kennedy approved of an immediate $10 million stabilization loan. The loan should given at Jones’ discretion, after how well the Sukarno behaved towards Malaysia in the first weeks of September.76
On September 12, the UN team finished their work, concluding that the population indeed was in favor of the Malaysian federation. The news reached Washington before they reached Djakarta. White House and State Department agreed that Kennedy should send Sukarno and Macapagal personal letters to pre-empt a potentially tense situation.77
The Kennedy letter to Sukarno became an ultimatum. This time, it was the "Jones-fraction" who wanted to lean hard on Sukarno. Robert Komer, despite having changed post in the administration, rewrote the "utterly anodyne" State drafts and "strengthened [it] to [the] point of saying [that] if they went down [the] wrong Malaysia road we simply would not give them aid," commenting on his own text, "(how much blunter can you get?)"78 To make the ultimatum acceptable, Komer wrote in a paragraph on how strong JFK desired to visit Sukarno in Djakarta next spring, but were not able to do so this fall due to political obligations. The letter was transmitted on September 13. 79 The next day the UN published their findings, and on September 15, 1963, the Malaysian federation was declared. Like the letter to Sukarno had forewarned, Kennedy publicly stated his support to the new state. 80
Djakarta exploded with fury. Sukarno refused to accept that the results of the UN team were correct. In the streets, PKI arranged mass demonstrations. In a few hours, the Malayan embassy had been sacked, there were riots outside the British embassy and several British and Malayan business and properties were burnt down, including Shell estates. Also outside the US embassies there were demonstrations, but little damage was done.
To the US, it seemed like the riots had, if not been instigated, so at least not properly hindered by the Indonesian Government. Still, the riots and Sukarno’s fuming reaction were neither unexpected or seen as really threatening. Subandrio assured Jones that matters would be smoothed out in a matter of weeks, this was just the necessary public outcry. The Malayan ambassador was asked by the Indonesians to stay in Djakarta unofficially meanwhile, a decision Jones supported.
The following day, Malaysia severed diplomatic ties with Indonesia. Sukarno countered within 24 hours by breaking all economic connections with Malaysia and imposing an embargo. Then a mob sacked and burned down the British embassy in Djakarta, unhindered by the government. The next few days, Indonesia made a series of minor forays into mainland Malaysia, for the first time during Konfrontasi putting Indonesian troops on the Malayan peninsula. Sukarno had chosen a between Konfrontasi and stabilization, and all evidence suggested he had chosen the glorious confrontation.
To Washington it was evident that the confrontation now had escalated to a new level. While taking time to re-evaluate strategy, Washington relied on interim assessments and actions. Firstly, a continued economic break between Malaysia and Indonesia would clearly mean the end of the stabilization effort: The Indonesian economy relied on exporting to and through Singapore and Malaya. Without access to Singapore and Malaya, the Indonesian economy had no chance of stabilizing or recovering. State estimated the Indonesian losses from the embargo to be $200–250 million p.a, or 3–4% of total Indonesian GNP. About $110 million p.a. would be lost in foreign exchange earnings, roughly 15% of estimated exports.81 Furthermore, there was little chance of continued European funding of the IMF-plan, nor future support in Congress if the situation did not improve dramatically.
The next week, an interagency group of all involved agencies and State Department agreed on an interim position on the US aid programs in Indonesia. Firstly, the $10 million immediate credit to Indonesia was deferred. The IMF were informed that the US thought the Fund should delay implementation of the actions agreed on in July. Furthermore, the IMF should be encouraged to tell the Indonesians how seriously the Malaysian embargo actually would be for their economy. The American "Food for peace"-deliveries were separated between previous commitments and new commitments. The old commitments were continued while all new commitments were halted. MAP deliveries were continued, except for arms. In line with the Broomfield amendment, all arms were deliveries halted, including those in the pipelines and in docks. This included weapons, ammunition and parts to both the military and the Mobrig. Commercial deliveries to the Indonesian military from now was furthermore be carefully screened. However, Washington purposely did not tell Djakarta that military aid had been halted, but left it to their own discovery when time demanded it. The remaining aid, mostly educational grants besides the civil part of civic action, was continued.
The administration still fostered hopes of steering Sukarno back into course. There had been crises before, and the administration had been able to solve them. The oil agreements were finally worked out in detail and signed in late September. A particular event proved that Sukarno still was responsive: When intelligence reports of Djakarta’s intent to severe diplomatic ties with Great Britain reached Washington around 25th September, Washington tried to forestall Sukarno’s decision. Also, they tried to get the British in on a coordinated effort to coach the Tunku and Sukarno into negotiations.
Once again, Kennedy’s preferred mean was to send a personal message to Sukarno with Jones as the envoy. The brief and right-to-the point message expressed Kennedy’s disbelief that Sukarno really desired "to permit the momentum of events to carry us all to a point which would among other things imperil the entire relationship which you and I and our countries have been working toward [...]".82 Kennedy appealed to Sukarno’s statesmanship, finishing with a half-promise of making the Tunku and British "join in a standstill" if Sukarno were "agreeable". Kennedy’s message was combined with intensive persuasion efforts from Jones. The Americans lined up the prospect of an initial cooling-off period, so an atmosphere could be reached "in which problems can be threshed out under the Maphilindo forum." 83 And once again, Sukarno said he would do as Kennedy proposed and attend a summit meeting without preconditions. 84
To persuade the Tunku, White House decided to "get the British to agree" and to put pressure Tunku.85 While Kennedy wrote to the Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and Rusk wrote to opposition leader Alec Douglas-Home (Lord Home). 86 The US diplomatic offensive led to no immediate results in Kuala Lumpur. Yet, the episode raised hopes for a future summit, and with some luck, the Sukarno letter had kept the British in Indonesia a little while longer. However, an immediate solution seemed no closer.
With the stabilization plan temporarily stranded, the US were forced to revise their strategy towards Indonesia. Sukarno’s rhetoric continued to weaken the White House’s case in Congress, and the Committee hearings abode further restrictions on US aid in the future. Presidential determination could no longer be relied on as a lasting loophole in Congress’ anti-aid amendments. Hence, the "carrot" was removed from the administration’s carrot-and-stick policy.
Kennedy’s ultimatum in September had removed the "stick": The US had threatened to remove aid, and Sukarno had defied the ultimatum by imposing the Malaysian embargo. The US then considered briefly moving on to an actual embargo of Indonesia. However, the agrarian economy of Indonesia would be too resilient, Washington concluded, the economic damage could not be made grave enough to influence the policy makers in Djakarta. Hence, there were by fall 1963 no remaining sanctions which the West could effectively impose on Sukarno, save open military intervention.
A direct military involvement in Indonesia was exactly the form of last-resort-remedy which US policy was formulated to avoid. While the Indonesian army remained in the power balance, the issue of military intervention was not even mentioned. Likewise, violent subversive activities were not seriously considered as an option in the White House and State.87 Although Sukarno himself believed that the CIA regularly made attempts on his life, Washington saw more risks than advantages in "getting rid of" Sukarno. 88
The final remaining American leverage turned out to be JFK himself. Ambassador Jones had since January argued for using a visit by Kennedy to influence Sukarno. In July, the new Assistant Secretary of State For Far Eastern Affairs, Roger Hilsman, added his support. During August and September, the administration actually hinted of a possible Kennedy visit to Sukarno. However, no commitments were made, and the administration remained undecided on whether to actually use such a visit at this time or not—once used, the prospect of a personal visit by Kennedy and the actual visits of personal emissaries would probably be less influential on Sukarno.89
In November, Washington called Jones back home for one months vacation. To scare Sukarno, Jones was officially in Washington for "consultations". The real reasons for Washington to ask Jones was primarily to let him relax after the "tremendous burden [he had] carried," and be prepared to what seemed to be another stormy period coming up.90 "Seldom has an Ambassador been more needed for the long pull," McGeorge Bundy wrote, "but our feeling is that it is well to get a rest now to be ready for the later efforts." 91 In addition, Kennedy and various member of the administrations wanted to discuss the situation first hand with Jones. 92
Jones proposed to Kennedy that the US could set up a new "package deal".93 In the deal, the new American give was a visit by Kennedy in spring 1964. In addition, the Americans would use their influence to set up a tripartite meeting with Macapagal and the Tunku. To restore normal connections between the three nations, the US would then resume aid and provide 150.000 tons of emergency rice supplies. In return, Sukarno would withdraw his troops from the Malaysian borders, cease support to guerillas, take part in new negotiations, and re-establish the stabilization plan. The crucial new element in the package was the promise of a Kennedy-visit. The presidents’ persuasive abilities when talking directly to Sukarno, as well as the promise of the prestigious visit itself, was the administration’s final hope for tipping the scale, Hilsman and Jones agreed.
Kennedy concurred, saying that "he was thinking about April or May," and could be gone up to 16 days in Asia.94 Hence, the new US offensive tactic was specifically to exchange aid and Kennedy’s personal show-up in Djakarta in return for peace and economic Westernization of Indonesia. As such, the US now once more relied on the use of top-level personal relations to save the systemic part of their offensive strategy. However, this time, it was the core relationship between Sukarno and Kennedy that would be utilized.
The administration defended its aid budget in the Senate throughout October and November, and was able to recover a significant share of the cuts made in House. However, the differing sum between the House and Senate appropriations was checked: Aid under this budget could only be forwarded on special presidential determination, and the determination had to be substantiated by national security needs. By this term, Congress introduced a control mechanism and limited the possible uses of the appropriations. Hence, the defensive US strategy, aimed at keeping a foothold of contact with friendly Indonesians, on one side remained largely unchanged thus far. On the other side, the program’s economic foundation was from December 1963 under continuous Congressional supervision.
Even if the program of building relations with the Indonesian army was continuing in the US, the first signs of threats to the program from emerged from the Indonesian side in the end of November, when Nasution was scheduled to visit Washington. On one side, the visit provided an opportunity to display extra friendliness. However, the administration realized that demonstrating too much friendliness could actually hurt Nasution’s position in Djakarta, given the rising anti-American sentiments and Nasution’s weakening position inside the cabinet. Nasution’s rival in the military hierarchy was General Yani, whom the US deemed to be an opportunist and without any strong political leanings. Sukarno had from 1962 gradually elevated general Yani’s position on Nasution’s behalf, most visibly by letting Yani take over the position as Chief of Staff of the army and then removing Nasution as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, moving Nasution further away from his military power base. A too overt display of friendliness could provide an excuse for removing Nasution from his position as Minister of Defense.95 Eventual Eventually, State decided to let Nasution talk for some time with Kennedy, but without giving the full public show which belonged to an official visit of state.
1 Speech by Sukarno, December 28 1964, (quoted in Airgram 491, Djakarta to State, unknown date, Enclosure 1, POL 15–1, "Head of State 11/1/64", box 2314, NARA). Note that "rooster" also implicates strength, bravery, and could mean "champion". 2 When I use the terms "worldview", "theory", "concept" and "idea" I refer to variably sized, loose and dynamic meme-constructs, ranging from the single-meme (idea, concept) through the intermediate networks/complexes (theory, ideology) and to the individually all-encompassing meme-network (worldview, cultural background, religion). The terms are used loosely, presupposing arbitrary divisions between the different intermediate networks. I have chosen to use the more loose terms for legibility, and in order to maintain this work’s focus on narrative rather than formal models. 3 The concept, like much political language in Indonesia, was originally conceived in Dutch. From Dutch, the word that became "guided" might better have been translated into the English word "planned". Sukarno chose "guided" instead, since that word had more active and dynamic associations, disregarding the vast difference in political association in the West between "planning" and "guiding" in politics. 4 Phrases, words or concepts which spread rapidly among a population. 5 Manipol is an acronym for "Political Manifesto". USDEK is a shorthand for the five mentioned elements in the national unity. The 1945 Constitution was a temporary wartime arrangement giving the President power over all the other branches of Government. 6 Nasakom was an acronym for three major elements in the Indonesian society, the nationalist, religious and communist ones. 7 FRUS 1961–63 XXIII: 169, Memo, R. Johnson to Rostow, April 21, 1961, Attachment 8 Ambassador Green, in Embtel 460 (Djakarta), August 29 1965, "DEF/Defense Affairs", "INDON", 1/1/64, Box 1642, NARA 9 Ambassador Green, in Embtel 460 (Djakarta), August 29 1965, "DEF/Defense Affairs", "INDON", 1/1/64, Box 1642, NARA 10 FRUS 1961–63 XXIII: 317, Deptel 317 (Djakarta), October 24, 1963; Jones actually told Sukarno that "Pantjasila was in harmony with American Philosophy" (FRUS 319) 11The degree in which these areas may be called ethnic "Malay" is variable, however, from the core areas of Malaya to the disputed Melanesian areas of the Philippines and Australian New Guinea. 12 See next subchapter, "Konfrontasi" 13 FRUS 1961–63 XXIII: 293, Memo of conversation, Kennedy, Jones, Forrestal, October 11, 1962; FRUS 1961–63 XXIII: 184, Telcon, Ball-McConaughy, August 25, 1961 14 Report, "Indonesia’s Grand Design in Southeast Asia", Guy Pauker, May 1964, RM 4080-ISA/ARPA Order 189–61, RAND Corporation, (printed in LBJ, CF, NSF, Indonesia/SEA/SWP, Reel 7, UPA Microfilms), p. 19 15 For broader treatment, see Chapter 4, "Feil! Fant ikke referansekilden." 16 USIA (the agency) is the general term for the Information Agency in Washington, while USIS (the service) was the term used when talking about field operations or specific missions. Also, the term IA (information agency) is used when referring to USIA. 17 See chapter .... 18 Administrative History, United States Information Agency, (1961–68), undated, Vol. 1 (Narrative), Chapter 1, Box 1, LBJ Library; Administrative History, United States Information Agency, (1961–68), undated, Vol. 1 (Narrative), Box 1, LBJ Library, tables 5–1, 5–2, 5–4B, 5–7, chart 5–1, 19 The actual total USIS salary and expenses appropriation figure for 1963 was $123 million, while the total actual appropriation of USIA for 1963 was $157 million and the overseas mission actual appropriation for salaries and expenses was $55 million (figures rounded). 20 The figures exclude area wide efforts, which constituted nearly half the total budget. For natural reasons, the figures changed dramatically in 1964 and 1965. 21 April 22, 1963, "House Hearings on USIA Appropriations for 1964", p8 (Quoted in Administrative History, United States Information Agency, (1961–68), undated, Vol. 1 (Narrative), Box 1, LBJ Library, p5/30) 22 Ibid. 23 See for instance the discussion before Sukarno’s visit to Washington, chapter 1. 24 Administrative History, United States Information Agency, (1961–68), undated, Vol. 1 (Narrative), Box 1, LBJ Library, pp5/24–5/27 25 Vietnam and Dominican republic issues concentrated on the concept "freedom", while the space issues concentrated on pictures of the moon and Mars, besides Edward H. Whites 20-minute space walk. The reasoning behind was summarized as, "Whether or not we and/or the Soviets consider ourselves to be in a race to the moon and beyond, the developing (and some developed) nations find space achievements a handy yardstick for measuring technological capabilities and potential." (Administrative History, United States Information Agency, (1961–68), undated, Vol. 1 (Narrative), Box 1, LBJ Library, pp. 5/26–5/27) 26 Embtel 853 (Djakarta), November 9 1964, LBJ, CF, NSF, Indonesia/SEA/SWP, Reel 7, UPA Microfilms, frame -241 27 Howard P, Jones (interviewee), recorded interview by Dennis O’Brien (interviewer), June 23, 1969(March 20, 1970, April 9, 1970, Oral History program, JFK Library, pp.45–47 28 Summary record of NSC meeting, January 7 1964, #2, NSC Meetings, NSF, LBJ Library 29 Ibid. 30 See next chapter "Feil! Fant ikke referansekilden.", p * for more on the US-British agreements. 31 Jones 1971: pp. 266–7 32 For instance did the nationalist Mohammad Yamin want to unite Malaya into Indonesia and draft borders after the old Madjahapit Empire rather than the colonial borders. Mohammed Hatta claimed to be the one who hindered Sukarno from pursuing such integration until the 1960s. (Jones 1971: p273) 33 Until 1878, Sabah had been under the Sultan of Sulu in the Southern Philippines. In 1878, the British had taken over—the dispute was whether the take-over had been based on a lease agreement or a sale. (Ibid.) 34 Jones 1971: p268 35 Jones 1971: p269 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Embtel 680 (Djakarta), October 12, 1962, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14, JFK Library 39 This argument is also forwarded by Jones in as the most important in hindsight, and is formulated in his memoirs. (Jones 1971: p272 40 Letter, British Foreign Office to Washington (read by Bundy), Ref "Guidance of October 11", October 11, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library 41 Along with Jones were Edward Ingraham in 1960, who later became the Indonesian Desk officer, and Frank Galbraith, Jones’ deputy. (Gardner 1997: pp. 185–186) 42 Jones 1971: p270–271 43 Typically the federation forces would get intelligence on all the guerilla moves, and then wait in a hideout for the guerillas to arrive. Then, the forces would snipe the guerillas, normally with few or none losses on part of the federation forces. 44 CIA Current Intelligence Memo, OCI#1560/63, June 3, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library
45 The names of the Army officers who presented this view are not reproduced, indicating that they either were lesser known figures, connected to intelligence, or persons who received high positions in the New Order regime. (Jones 1971: p270–271) 46 Jones 1971: p. 270 47Deptel 99 (Circular), July 17, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14, JFK Library, p5 48 Embtel 1356 (Djakarta), 3 July 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, JFK Library 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Embtel 1806, (Djakarta), March 1 1964, "POL INDON", 3–1-64, NARA 52 Nasution was assumed to be the brain behind Indonesia’s successful guerilla strategy during the liberation war, and is now referred to as one of the founders of modern guerilla strategy. 53 There were indications that the Army actually fed the British with intelligence on their landings. 54 NSC Paper for NSC meeting, May 12, May 9 1964, #64c, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 246, LBJ 55 Letter, British Foreign Office to Washington (read by Bundy), Ref "Guidance of October 11", October 11, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library 56 Ibid. 57 deptel13137jul63, pp. 1–2 58 deptel13137jul63, pp. 1–2 59 deptel13137jul63, pp. 1–2 60 deptel13137jul63, pp. 3–4 61 Ibid. 62 Jones 1971: p271 63 Ibid. 64 Deptel 99 (Circular), July 17, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14, JFK Library, p. 25 65 Deptel 99 (Circular), July 17, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14, JFK Library, p. 3 66 Deptel 99 (Circular), July 17, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14, JFK Library, p. 5 67 (Memo, Forrestal to Kennedy, August 30, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library)? – check other than CF-NSF to be sure, attached memo memo29aug63 68 Memo, Forrestal to Komer, July 19,1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library; 69 Memo, Komer to Kennedy, July 23, 1965, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library 70 Memo, Komer to M. Bundy, July 16, 1965, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library; 71 Memo, Komer to M. Bundy, July 16, 1965, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library 72 See chapter and 73 (Memo, Forrestal to Kennedy, August 30, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library)? – check other than CF-NSF to be sure 74 Memo, Forrestal to Kennedy, August 30, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library 75 Memo, Komer to M. Bundy , September 17, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library;Deptel 301 (Djakarta), September 13, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library 76 Memo, Komer to M. Bundy , September 17, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library; 77 Deptel 301 (Djakarta), September 13, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library 78 Deptel 453 (Djakarta), October 10, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library 79 80 Deptel 384 (Djakarta), September 26, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library 81 Oral Message, Kennedy to Macapagal, September 27, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library 82 Memo, M. Bundy to Kennedy, September 27, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library;jfkmacmillan27sep63 83 Lord Home took over as British Prime Minister three weeks later, on October 19. 84 See chapter 4, subchapter ..... for arguments on the role of CIA and military and the overthrow of Sukarno 85 Memo, R.W. Komer to M. Bundy, January 15 1964, R.W. Komer Name File, box 6, NSF, LBJ Library 86 Deptel 50928 (Djakarta), October 28, 9163, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library; FRUS 1961–63 XXIII: 318, Deptel 509 (Djakarta), October 28, 1963 [and more] 87 Deptel 503 (Djakarta), October 24, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library 88 Memo, M. Bundy to Read, October 25, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library 89 Deptel 503 (Djakarta), October 24, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library; FRUS 1961–63 XXIII: 317, Deptel 317 (Djakarta), October 24, 1963 90 Memo of conversation, President Kennedy, Jones, Hilsman, Forrestal, November 19, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library 91 Memo of conversation, President Kennedy, Jones, Hilsman, Forrestal, November 19, 1963, Indonesia, CF, NSF, Box 14a, JFK Library 92 Jones 1971: pp. 385–386 93 Jones 1971: p298 94 Memo, L. B. Johnson to the President, May 23 1961, McGeorge Bundy Name file, Box 19,NSF, LBJ Library 95 Marquis Childs, "NSC Looks at Southeast Asia", Washington Post, January 8[?], 1964 96 Summary record of NSC meeting, January 7 1964, #2, NSC Meetings, NSF, LBJ Library 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 Jones 1971: p299; Henry Brandon, "Brother Robert looks beyond election", The Sunday Times, January 26, 1964 103Henry Brandon, "Brother Robert looks beyond election", The Sunday Times, January 26, 1964 104 Jones 1971: p. 301; Memo, Forrestal to W. Bundy, May 8 1964, LBJ, CF, NSF, Indonesia/SEA/SWP, Reel 7, UPA Microfilms, frame -0056) 105 Deptel 290 (Tunis), Rusk to Ambassador, February 2 1964, "2/1/64", POL 32–1, "INDON-MAL", NARA 106 See for instance Deptel 4307 (London), January 16 1964, "DEF6/ Armed Forces", "INDON", 1/1/64, Box 1641, NARA 107 Memo, W. R. Tyler to Rusk, April 1 1964, [DEF12–1641] 108 Memo of Conversation, February 12, 1964, state/rfk, Indonesia, CF, NSF, LBJ Library 109 Deptel 1484 (Circular), Rusk to various, February 12 1964, "2/1/64", POL 32–1, "INDON-MAL", NARA; 110 Memo, R.W. Komer to M. Bundy, December 3 1963, Indonesian Country File, box246, NSF, LBJ Library 111 Memo, R.W. Komer to M. Bundy, February 25 1964, Indonesian Country File, box246, NSF, LBJ Library 112 Ibid. 113 Ibid. 114 Ibid. 115 NSAM 278, February 3, 1964, NSAMs, NSF, LBJ Library; Memo, Rusk to L.B Johnson, June 29 1964, #4, NSAMs, NSF, Box 5, LBJ Library 116 Charles Baldwin (interviewee), recorded interview by Dennis J. O Brien (interviewer), March, 1969, Oral History Program, JFK Library, pp. 65–69 117 William E. Stevenson (interviewee), recorded interview by Dennis J. O Brien (interviewer), May 5, 1969, Oral History Program, JFK Library , p94 118 Charles Baldwin (interviewee), recorded interview by Dennis J. O Brien (interviewer), March, 1969, Oral History Program, JFK Library, pp. 65 119 Schlesinger 1978: p. 685 120 Jones 1971: p. 320 121 Transcript, James C. Thomson, Jr. interviewed by Paige E. Mulhollan, July 22, 1971, pp. 24–29 Tape 1 of 2, LBJ Library 122 For a more extensive discussion, see Chapter 4, subchapters 2 and 3. 123 CIA estimated that number of Indonesian guerillas committed to Konfrontasi in March 1964 to be 1600, whereof 800–870 were in Borneo. (Memo, A. McCafferty to Bundy, March 11 1964, LBJ, CF, NSF, Indonesia/SEA/SWP, Reel 7, UPA Microfilms, frame -891 124 Jones 1971: pp. 304–305 125 Quoted in Jones 1971: p. 321 126 Unknown, "While Sukarno dreams of Empire", Philadelphy Inquirer, March 30 1967, quoted in Jones 1971: p322 127 Senator Morse quoted in Jones 1971: p. 324 128 For argument, see chapter 4, ["preparing for war"], p. ... 129 Jones 1971: p. 303 130 For argument, see chapter 4, ["preparing for war"], p. ... 131 Draft memo, W. Bundy to President, August 27 1964 #74, "Indonesia Memos", Vol. 2, 5/64–8/64, 2/2, Indonesia, CF, NSF, LBJ 132 NSAM 309 (McG. Bundy’s version), July 6 1964, #1a, NSF, NSAMs, Box 5, LBJ 133 Memo, Enclosure 1, Rusk to President, June 29 1964, #4, NSF, NSAMs, Box 5, LBJ 134 Ibid. 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid. 137 Memo, Enclosure 2, Rusk to President, June 29 1964, #4, NSF, NSAMs, Box 5, LBJ Library 138 Ibid. 139 Memo, Rusk to President, June 29 1964, #4, NSF, NSAMs, Box 5, LBJ Library The source....